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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis revisits Stanley Milgram’s “cyranoid method” of interactive social psychological 
experimentation (Milgram, 2010a) and explores the technique’s empirical potential in several 
domains. The central component of the method is speech shadowing, a procedure that 
involves a person (the shadower) repeating in real-time words they receive through an inner-
ear monitor by-way-of radio-relay from a remote source. Speech shadowing effectively 
creates a hybrid agent (a “cyranoid”) composed of the body of one individual (the shadower) 
and the “mind” (or more precisely, the words) of another (the source). Interactants naïve to 
this manipulation perceive speech shadowers as autonomous communicators, and this 
perceptual bias (the “cyranic illusion”) affords researchers the ability to inspect the effects of 
separately altering the physical (outer) and dispositional (inner) elements of an interlocutor’s 
identity in contexts involving spontaneous and unscripted face-to-face dialog. 
 
Four articles and two additional chapters have been developed for this thesis. Chapter 1, 
“Introducing and situating the cyranoid method” presents an overview of the cyranoid 
method alongside an analysis of documents pertaining to the method contained in the Stanley 
Milgram Papers archive at Yale University and situates the method in the context of the 
demise of the classical paradigm, or “golden age,” of social psychology. Chapter 2 (Article 
1), “Replicating Milgram” (published in the Journal of Social Psychology under the title 
“Revisiting Milgram’s cyranoid method: Experimenting with hybrid human agents”), 
examines the cyranic illusion through replications of two of Milgram’s original pilot studies 
and discusses the method’s potential as a means of conducting person perception. Chapter 3 
(Article 2), “Echoborgs: Cyranoids with computer program sources” (published in Frontiers 
in Psychology under the title “A truly human interface: Interacting face-to-face with someone 
whose words are determined by a computer program”), expands upon the traditional cyranoid 
method by exploring situations wherein a conversational agent (a computer program designed 
to mimic a human interlocutor) sources for a human shadower, thereby producing a special 
type of cyranoid known as an “echoborg”; the article places the echoborg within the context 
of android science, a field that uses humanlike machines as stimuli in social psychological 
research in order to explore various aspects of human interaction (Ishiguro & Nishio, 2007). 
Chapter 4 (Article 3), “Using echoborgs to assess intersubjective effort in human-agent 
dialog” (accepted for publication pending minor revisions in Computers in Human Behavior), 
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combines conversation analysis techniques (e.g., Schegloff, 1992, 1993) with the echoborg 
method to investigate factors that influence how people repair misunderstandings that arise 
during dialog with conversational agents. Chapter 5 (Article 4), “Cyranoids in first-person, 
self-experimental research” (published in Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science 
under the title “The researcher as experimental subject: Using self-experimentation to access 
experiences, understand social phenomena, and stimulate reflexivity”), explores the history of 
researcher-as-subject self-experimentation in social psychology and illustrates how the 
cyranoid method can be used as a first-person means of directly experiencing the 
consequences of a transformed social identity through systematic self-experimentation. 
Finally, Chapter 6, “Cyranoid ethics,” discusses the various ethical concerns involved in 
cyranoid research, outlines how they were mitigated in the current thesis, and offers 
suggestions for ensuring positive research participant experience.  
 
As Milgram died before publishing any work on the cyranoid method, and as speech 
shadowing has seen relatively little application in social psychological experimentation, this 
thesis attempts to provide the initial basis for future iterations and variants of the method.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Background and motivation 
In the fall of 2011, a little over a month into my M.Sc. program at the London School of 
Economics, I attended a Department of Social Psychology student-faculty retreat at 
Cumberland Lodge on the outskirts of London near Windsor Castle. On the first night of the 
retreat, Dr. Alex Gillespie, a senior lecturer in his first term with the department, gave a 
presentation on an experiential installation art project he and Robb Mitchell had produced 
several years prior in Glasgow (Mitchell, 2009; Mitchell, Gillespie, & O’Neill, 2010). The 
premise of the installation was that of experiencing social life through another body, and of 
encountering friends, family, and strangers who had themselves been given different bodies 
through which to interact. The title of the presentation was “Cyranoids.” 
 
A cyranoid, I would learn, is a hybrid social agent composed of the “mind” (or more 
precisely, the words) of one individual and the body of another, a real-world fusion of 
separate personae capable of socially engaging with people in all manner of situations. The 
concept works like this: one person (the “shadower”) wears a discreet inner-ear monitor and 
uses an audio-vocal technique known as speech shadowing to articulate words transmitted to 
them by another other person (the “source”). A well-rehearsed speech shadower can perform 
this technique more or less effortlessly, giving rise to the illusion that they are speaking self-
authored words. The shadower thus becomes an interface through which the source interacts 
with interlocutors (“interactants”) and through which these interlocutors interact with the 
source. Cyranoids had been the brainchild of Stanley Milgram, the social psychologist made 
famous by his obedience to authority “shock” experiments of the 1960s (Milgram, 1963). 
Milgram coined the term “cyranoid” in reference to the character Cyrano from the Edmund 
Rostand play Cyrano de Bergerac, which tells the story of a poet (Cyrano) who vicariously 
fulfils his unrequited love for Roxane by providing to Christian (an inarticulate but handsome 
nobleman) words with which to woo her.  
 
I instantly became fascinated with the concept of cyranoids. I had come to the LSE seeking to 
research how one’s external identity impacted their ability to exert social influence, and 
Milgram’s method immediately struck me as an extremely powerful means of mixing and 
matching the outer (physical) and inner (dispositional) identities of separate people in order 
to explore how these different elements affect social perception, first-person experience, and 
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other social psychological phenomena. What I was drawn to in particular was the fact that the 
cyranoid seemed to present a means of studying these phenomena in an interactive, highly 
experiential way. Contemporary experimental methods used to study, for example, how 
aspects of outer identity affects person perception, are generally quite static and often involve 
research participants engaging with the implied presence of other people via written vignettes 
rather than involve the actual presence of people (Blascovich et al., 2002; Zebrowitz, 2002; 
Zimbardo, 1999). Where contemporary methods are more interactive, they tend to involve 
distancing people through computer interfaces or having participants interact in scripted 
environments so as to achieve a desired level of experimental control. In my estimation, the 
cyranoid method presented an opportunity to create mundanely realistic yet controllable 
social experiments given that it allowed research participants to interact in person with a 
stimulus person (a cyranoid) who had all the attributes of a real person (a non-cryanoid), but 
whose component parts (the source and the shadower) could be manipulated independently of 
one another in order to answer a research question about the separate effects of these 
components. 
 
It came as a surprise to learn following Dr. Gillespie’s presentation that Milgram had never 
formally published any of his work with cyranoids, and the method has remained relatively 
dormant within psychology since his death in 1984. In fact, Milgram’s only concerted effort 
to publicize his cyranoid studies came in the form of a speech he recorded for an American 
Psychological Association conference in Toronto a few months before his death, a 
transcription of which appears in the edited volume of collected Milgram essays The 
Individual in a Social World (Milgram, 2010a). I thus approached Dr. Gillespie with the idea 
of conducting a Ph.D. that would attempt revive the cyranoid method in order to see what it 
might offer to psychological research, and this thesis is the culmination of four years of 
attempting to do precisely that.  
 
Thesis format 
The current work has been prepared as a thesis-by-publication in accordance with guidelines 
established by the London School of Economics’ Department of Social Psychology. In 
addition to this introduction, this thesis includes four academic journal articles (Chapters 2 – 
5), two additional chapters (Chapter 1 and Chapter 6), a conclusion, and appendices. Though 
the use of the cyranoid method connects the journal articles to one another, each article 
contributes to a distinct literature within social psychology. To enhance continuity and to 
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make the linkages between the articles more clear, each journal article chapter includes a 
preface that explains the relationship of the subsequent journal article to the aims of the 
thesis. I served as the principal investigator, data analyst, and primary author for each journal 
article, with Dr. Alex Gillespie serving as a secondary author and research supervisor. Two 
additional secondary authors (Geetha Reddy and Ellen Choi) contributed to Chapter 5’s 
journal article. Each preface includes details as to the proportional contribution of each 
author. All other sections of this thesis were authored solely by me.  
 
Overview of aims and chapters 
Instead of there being overarching theoretical aims to this thesis, the cyranoid method itself 
will serve as the tissue that connects each chapter as different empirical, historical, 
ontological, and ethical issues relevant to social psychology are explored. This thesis seeks to 
lay the groundwork for future research involving the method by demonstrating the unique 
affordances it can bring to bear on different topics within social psychology, affordances 
which include allowing for mundanely realistic yet controllable and manipulable person 
stimuli. This primary aim will be approached via attempting to resolve six sub-aims particular 
to the thesis’s six chapters as well as tertiary aims particular to the various studies contained 
within each chapter. 
 
The first sub-aim is to present a comprehensive introduction to the cyranoid method and 
situate it historically. This aim is primarily covered in Chapter 1, “Introducing and situating 
the cyranoid method,” though the method’s history is touched upon throughout the thesis. 
Chapter 1 begins with a description of what a cyranoid is and how one operates within a 
social interaction via speech shadowing. Due to both the lack of secondary sources detailing 
the history of the cyranoid method and Milgram’s failure to publish details on his cyranoid 
studies during his lifetime, a thorough accounting of the method’s early history required 
revisiting primary source documents and multimedia contained in Milgram’s personal archive 
at Yale University. Many of these documents have never before been analyzed, let alone 
woven into the story of Milgram’s famous research career. Part and parcel to the history of 
the cyranoid method has been its dormancy within experimental social psychology since 
Milgram’s death. Chapter 1 considers various reasons for this dormancy, including the 
paradigmatic changes within North American experimental social psychology that coincided 
with the end of Milgram’s research career and life (i.e., the demise of the so-called classical 
paradigm, or “golden age,” of experimentation). Chapter 1 concludes by exploring reasons 
13
why the cyranoid method is worth revisiting and discusses analogous modern methodologies 
within contemporary social psychology that might serve as a framework for future cyranoid 
research.  
 
The second sub-aim comprises validating the cyranic illusion (the phenomenon described by 
Milgram as failing to perceive when one is interacting with a covert cyranoid; Milgram, 
2010a). This is primarily covered in Chapter 2, as well as to a certain extent in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 2, “Replicating Milgram” (published in the Journal of Social Psychology under the 
title “Revisiting Milgram’s cyranoid method: Experimenting with hybrid human agents”; 
Corti & Gillespie, 2015b), is an empirical article that includes experimental replications of 
two of Milgram’s original cyranoid pilot studies. It is demonstrated that even when a 
cyranoid is composed of highly incongruent component parts (i.e., a child shadower paired to 
an adult source, and vice versa), naïve interactants reliably fail to notice when their 
interlocutor is simply speech shadowing. The cyranic illusion provides the cyranoid method 
with perhaps its greatest affordance: the ability to present multiple and in some cases vastly 
incongruent individuals together as a singular social actor (a cyranoid) while preserving the 
interactant’s impression that they are interacting with an autonomously communicating 
person. Insofar as it is a researcher’s goal to keep a source hidden from an interactant, the 
cyranoid method can only ever be useful under conditions where participants reliably 
succumb to the cyranic illusion, and this fact necessitates exploring the robustness of the 
illusion under various source-shadower pairings. Chapter 2 also examines how interactant 
addressivity is affected by the composition of the cyranoid they encounter: people adjust 
what they say to a cyranoid on the basis of the outer identity of the cyranoid. Furthermore, 
the article demonstrates how interactants anchor onto aspects of outer identity when 
describing the character of a cyranoid post-interaction and prior to their becoming aware of 
the true nature of the cyranoid. 
 
The third sub-aim of this thesis is to extend the concept of cyranoids to include scenarios 
wherein the source of a cyranoid is not a real person, but an artificial conversational agent 
computer program (a software program designed to mimic a human interlocutor). This 
special type of cyranoid is referred to as an “echoborg.” The project to develop echoborgs 
derived from a consideration of whether the cyranic illusion would prove robust in scenarios 
involving extreme source-shadower incongruity and intrigue as to whether echoborgs might 
enable humans to interact with machine intelligence through actual human bodies. The main 
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proofs-of-concept for this derivative of the cyranoid method are described in Chapter 3, 
“Echoborgs: Cyranoids with computer program sources” (published in Frontiers in 
Psychology under the title “A truly human interface: Interacting face-to-face with someone 
whose words are determined by a computer program”; Corti & Gillespie, 2015a). Chapter 3 
seeks to demonstrate how echoborgs can serve as useful experimental tools within the field of 
android science, a discipline that seeks to use machine imitations of humans to better 
understand human social psychology and cognition (MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006b; 
Ishiguro & Nishio, 2007). The chapter’s three studies investigate the extent to which 
echoborgs “pass” as fully human (in the social psychological and sociological sense of 
identity “passing”; see Goffman, 1963; Renfrow, 2004; Khanna & Johnson, 2010). The first 
experiment demonstrates how echoborgs can be used in a classic Turing Test (Turing, 1950) 
scenario. The second experiment explores whether people see echoborgs as autonomous 
persons speaking self-authored thoughts even when primed to suspect the possibility of 
encountering an echoborg. A final experiment investigates whether participants take covert 
echoborgs to be autonomous persons and explores how people make sense of the behaviors of 
covert echoborgs. 
 
The fourth sub-aim is to show how echoborgs can be used to explore human-agent 
intersubjectivity, and in particular, how beliefs about an interlocutor’s communicative agency 
and the interface through which they communicate combine to affect the behavioral patterns 
exhibited by people during their interactions with various agents. This sub-aim is tackled in 
Chapter 4, “Using echoborgs to assess intersubjective effort in human-agent dialog” 
(accepted for publication pending minor revisions in Computers in Human Behavior under 
the title “Co-constructing intersubjectivity with artificial conversational agents: People are 
more likely to initiate repairs of misunderstandings with interlocutors represented as 
human”). The chapter presents an analysis of an experiment that uses echoborgs to determine 
whether the intersubjective effort a person exerts while conversing with a conversational 
agent (i.e., the scale at which they attempt to repair misunderstandings so as to cultivate 
common ground) is affected by how the agent is embodied (computer screen vs. human 
body) and the framing of the agent’s identity (i.e., whether the person explicitly knows they 
are encountering words determined by an agent). Certain repair activity speech acts (a 
concept central to Conversation Analysis; Schegloff, 2007), namely other-initiations of 
repair and self-repairs, are operationalized as quantitative dependent measures in accordance 
with a framework recommended by Schegloff (1993), making this experiment one of the few 
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within the Conversation Analysis tradition to use formal statistical methodology to analyze 
how conversational phenomena are affected by different experimental manipulations. 
Furthermore, the article makes a contribution to the literature that combines intersubjectivity 
theory and human-agent interaction (e.g., Cassell & Tartaro, 2007) by showing how the 
echoborg method can be used as a means of benchmarking intersubjectivity in human-agent 
interaction.  
 
The fifth sub-aim is to argue that the cyranoid method can serve not only as a means of 
conducting traditional, third-person observational experiments, but also as a means of 
conducting first-person, self-experimental research in which the researcher participates in a 
cyranoid experiment as either the source or the shadower. This argument is put forward in 
Chapter 5, “Cyranoids in first-person, self-experimental research” (published in Integrative 
Psychological and Behavioral Science under the title “The researcher as experimental 
subject: Using self-experimentation to access experiences, understand social phenomena, and 
stimulate reflexivity”; Corti, Reddy, Choi, & Gillespie, 2015). Whereas the preceding 
chapters largely focus on understanding interactants’ behavioral reactions to and perceptions 
of cyranoids, this chapter turns attention to the fact the experiences of the source and 
shadower can also serve as objects of inquiry. Chapter 5 begins with a discussion of self-
observation/self-experimentation in the early schools of psychology (e.g., Wilhelm Wundt’s 
Leipzig model of experimentation) and how analogues to these models were preserved 
through the mid-20th century among a cohort of social psychologists that included Milgram 
and other ethnomethodologists interested in first-person “breaching” experiments (e.g., 
Garfinkel, 1967). It is argued that first-person self-experimentation can complement 
contemporary mainstream third-person experimentation and that acting as a source or 
shadower within a cyranoid in the context of a researcher-as-subject self-experiment affords 
researchers three potential benefits: (1) access to “social qualia” (i.e., direct experience of a 
transformed inner or outer identity), (2) improved mental models of social phenomena on 
account of systematic experiential knowledge, and (3) an enhanced ability to be reflexive 
about a given experiment via a more complete understanding of the various perspectives 
involved. Three first-person reflections from researchers who have self-experimented with 
cyranoids are provided in support of these claims. 
 
The sixth and final sub-aim is to outline an ethics protocol for the cyranoid method given that 
deception goes hand-in-hand with the use of covert cyranoids. Chapter 6, “Cyranoid ethics,” 
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details how various ethical concerns were dealt with in each of the studies contained in this 
thesis and how participants responded during debriefing when the true nature of the studies 
were described and the identities of the sources revealed. The chapter gives an overview of 
the important ethical considerations that should be made when designing and conducting 
cyranoid research and is meant to serve as a guide for researchers planning on adopting the 
cyranoid method in their own work.  
 
The thesis concludes with a general discussion of the main findings of this thesis and 
limitations of the method, and provides an outlook for future research applications of the 
cyranoid method.	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CHAPTER 1 | Introducing and Situating the Cyranoid Method 
 
 A cyranoid is…  
A cyranoid, in its most basic form, is a hybrid social agent composed of two individuals, one 
of whom behaves as the shadower, and the other as the source. The source is the 
metaphorical mind of the cyranoid and supplies the shadower (the body) with verbal 
communication to instantaneously replicate, and this is accomplished using an amalgam of 
devices that enable audio produced by the source to be transmitted to an earpiece worn by the 
shadower. In the studies detailed in this thesis, the shadower remains verbally non-
autonomous while ventriloquizing for their source (i.e., they communicate solely the sounds 
produced by the source and vocalize no self-authored thoughts). Cyranoids engage 
interactants – third parties who encounter the shadower in person but from whom the source 
may or may not remain hidden. Thus, an elementary cyranic interaction is a tripartite face-to-
face social encounter (see Figure 1.1).  
 
To accomplish a fluid cyranic interaction, the shadower must be well rehearsed at speech 
shadowing – a vocal technique that involves replicating the words one hears in as close to 
real-time as feasible. The specifics of speech shadowing are discussed in detail throughout 
this thesis, but the point that will be emphasized here is that shadowing comes quite naturally 
to native-language speakers. Shadowers can achieve latencies (i.e., the time between the start 
of a source-utterance and the commencement of replication by the shadower) as low as a few 
hundred milliseconds (Bailly, 2003; Marslen-Wilson, 1973). This produces an effect whereby 
from the first-person perspective of interactants, shadowers appear as though they are 
delivering self-authored prose (a phenomenon known as the “cyranic illusion”). As shall be 
demonstrated in this thesis, this illusion is extremely robust and can be maintained even in 
conditions involving high degrees of source-shadower incongruity (e.g., a child sourcing for 
an adult shadower and vice versa). The means by which a shadower’s earpiece receives 
verbal stimuli from their source can vary depending on the type of cyranic scenario the 
researcher wishes to construct; the studies detailed in this thesis involve sources transmitting 
audio to shadowers by-way-of FM radio transmitters connected to microphones that they 
speak into.  
 
Functioning as a speech shadower in a cyranic interaction is a dual-task performance 
requiring both an ability to accurately replicate spontaneous speech received from a source as 
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Figure 1.1: Illustration of a basic cyranic interaction. 
 
 
 
well as an ability to simulate contextually appropriate body language. Though a shadower’s 
body language, if misaligned with the speech they are conveying, may not compromise the 
cyranic illusion per se, misalignment can create a veneer of abnormality that confounds how 
an interactant perceives the interaction and behaves in relation to the shadower. This notion is 
underscored by research on the implicit alignment of interlocutors’ body movements and 
speech patterns that occurs during face-to-face interaction, also known as “interactional 
synchrony” (Bailenson, Yee, Patel, & Beall, 2008; Condon & Ogston, 1966; Kendon, 1970). 
Any change or disruption to this synchrony may affect the embodied perception of the 
intersubjective experience on the part of the interactant. Consequently, if a shadower’s 
movements and repertoire of nonverbal cues is to a large degree discrepant from that which is 
implied by the source’s communication, this will in some ways be mirrored by the interactant 
and may arouse suspicions of non-authenticity. A shadower, thus, must implicitly persuade 
the interactant as to the genuineness of their communication through nonverbal cues (facial 
expressions, hand movements, posture, etc.) and avoid gestures that discretely convey 
subterfuge (for examples see Frank & Ekman, 1997). Taking into consideration one’s own 
perspective of the replicated words is only half of the equation, for the shadower must also 
instinctively sense which nonverbal behaviors “fit” the intersubjective situation through 
gaining a sense of what may “feel right” from the perspective of the interactant (see Cesario 
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& Higgins, 2008).  
 
The task of accomplishing presentation authenticity while shadowing is not as difficult to 
accomplish as it may sound, however. For a decently practiced shadower, the act of 
spontaneous speech replication requires very little cognitive load. This is thanks in part to the 
fact that there is strong evidence for a two-route system of speech production whereby the 
semantic representation of words is cognitively processed separately from the phonetic and 
motor requirements of verbal language (McCarthy & Warrington, 1984, 2001). Shadowed 
speech is facilitated by an input/output loop that bypasses other neural language structures 
(Bailly, 2003; McLeod & Posner, 1984). As a consequence, shadowers don’t necessarily have 
to spend cognitive resources thinking about what to say, and instead may divert attention to 
convincingly performing nonverbal cues and other motor tasks (see Spence & Read, 2003). 
 
The origins of the cyranoid method: Stanley Milgram 
The cyranoid concept originates with Stanley Milgram (2010a), the social psychologist 
whose obedience to authority “shock” experiments (Milgram, 1963) are among the most 
widely cited and remain among the most controversial psychological studies ever to have 
been performed (Reicher, Haslam, & Miller, 2014). During the time he conducted his 
research with cyranoids (a period which spanned from 1977 until his death in late 1984), 
Milgram served as Distinguished Professor of Psychology at the City University of New 
York (CUNY) Graduate Center in Manhattan. He never published material from his work 
with cyranoids and died a little over a year after he had secured a small research grant from 
CUNY to explore the ideas he had for a formal set of cyranoid studies. Secondary sources 
that detail this research are scant and typically offer little more than a basic description of the 
method. The limited number of more detailed accounts of Milgram’s cyranoid studies have 
primarily come from Thomas Blass, Professor of Psychology at the University of Maryland. 
Blass has produced a biography of Milgram’s life (Blass, 2004) as well as edited a well-
known collection of Milgram’s which contains a brief chapter on cyranoids derived from a 
transcription of a speech Milgram recorded for the 1984 American Psychological Association 
(APA) annual convention (Milgram, 2010a).   
 
Luckily, many of Milgram’s notes, datasets, illustrations, and correspondences concerning his 
cyranoid studies have been preserved in the Stanley Milgram Papers Archive at Yale 
University. The portions of this archive that pertain to cyranoids, though highly unorganized, 
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contain numerous documents that offer a general picture of the arc the method took with 
Milgram. Though a small component of this content has been briefly described by Blass 
(2004), this chapter shall offer the first formal survey of the archive’s most relevant material.  
 
Beginnings. One of the more substantial documents contained in the archive, and one that 
provides a glimpse into the origins of the cyranoid method and Milgram’s vision for it, is a 
lab report dated 17 November, 1977 titled “The person as a medium: studies in the cyranic 
mode” (Milgram, 1977b). In it, Milgram describes having conducted his first cyranic 
interactions three days prior during his graduate course in mass media. The report begins with 
a reference to Cyrano de Bergerac – the story made famous by playwright Edmund Rostand 
(1981) in the late 19th century that tells the tale of a poet (Cyrano) who prompts an 
inarticulate nobleman (Christian) with what to say so that they may jointly woo Roxane. 
Milgram discusses how he and his students went about constructing a “cyranic contraption” 
(a term introduced by Mitchell, Gillespie, & O’Neill, 2011) by-way-of an FM radio 
transmitter that relayed to an inner earphone worn by the “medium” (a term Milgram used 
early on to refer to the speech shadower). A microphone relayed audio from the interactant to 
another room where the source was located. According to this document, Milgram’s initial 
explorations with the method involved him and his students taking turns functioning as the 
shadower, source, and interactant. It is in this document that Milgram first describes the 
cyranoid method as analogous to mind-body interchange, stating that his and his students’ 
experiences witnessing shadowers was akin to observing a social situation in which “one 
person is given the mind of another” (Milgram, 1977b, p. 4), and that “it is a somewhat 
uncanny experience to have a onversation [sic] with someone whose brain is not formulating 
the words with which he responds to you” (p. 3).  
 
At the time of his initial forays with the method, as this early lab report makes clear, Milgram 
was still in search of a concrete theoretical domain at which to direct the technique. The 
curiosity the method roused amongst he and his students lead him to produce a list of 
potential research directions. An interest in pursuing person perception research topped the 
list, as Milgram saw the technique as a potentially powerful means of gauging the degrees to 
which the inner (dispositional) and outer (physical) identities of another person separately 
influence impression formation. He also suggested that it was worth investigating the 
experience of the shadower; for instance, to what extent is the shadower aware of what they 
are repeating? How would functioning as a shadower for a long period of time (days, weeks, 
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or months) impact the shadower? Furthermore, Milgram was interested in whether or not 
interactants could detect source-consistency (i.e., if numerous people rotated functioning as 
the source for a single shadower while in conversation with a single interactant, would the 
interactant notice the inconsistency? Would it seem as though the shadower had amnesia 
when sources were rotated?). Milgram was also determined to investigate the experiences of 
the source, wondering whether or not people who functioned as sources were more or less 
likely to communicate certain things through the shadower with whom they were paired than 
through their own bodies.  
 
The list of potential research directions Milgram outlines in this early document is important 
because it suggests that Milgram was keenly aware from an early stage of one of the great 
affordances of the cyranoid method: all three components of a cyranic interaction (source, 
shadower, and interactant) can serve as objects of inquiry for a researcher. Interactants 
encounter cyranoids, and thus lend themselves to questions concerning social attribution, 
person perception, stereotyping, and so on. Shadowers experience having an alternative 
source of thoughts and have to participate in social encounters without verbal agency, thus 
the cyranoid method presents a novel way of studying phenomena such as cognitive 
dissonance (e.g., if one is forced to say something their source articulates that is not aligned 
with their own inner disposition, does their inner disposition subsequently change to match 
the words spoken?). Finally, from the perspective of the source, one could ask classic 
questions surrounding phenomena associated with social disinhibition, self-perception, and 
behavioral confirmation (e.g., does one’s behavior as a source align with stereotypes about 
the shadower?).  
 
Another early document contained amongst the archival material is an extensive transcription 
of self-narrated audio Milgram prepared sometime between November 1977 and February 
1979 (Milgram, n.d.). The document reads very much like a meditation on the cyranoid as a 
metaphor for the elusive nature of human agency and free will. For instance, Milgram 
describes a number of real-world social relationships that are cyranoid-like in composition: 
government (source) ↔ diplomat (shadower), composer (source) ↔ musician (medium), 
ghostwriter (source) ↔ television host (shadower), and so on. The fundamental phenomena 
that intrigued Milgram, it seemed, was that of never really knowing the true source of an 
interlocutor’s thoughts, and the reflexive tendency to ascribe authorship of certain thoughts to 
the person observed speaking said thoughts. He invokes the work of  Alan Turing, whose 
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famous “imitation game” (Turing, 1950) raises the philosophical issue of how one can ever 
know that they are dealing with a legitimate autonomous person as opposed to a computer 
should the behavior of computers someday come to perfectly match that of an autonomous 
person. Milgram draws an analogy to this by wondering whether one could ever truly know 
that they were dealing with an autonomous person as opposed to a cyranoid should the 
cyranoid’s behavior be indistinguishable from that of an autonomous person. His growing 
enthusiasm for the cyranoid method stemmed from the fact that, to him, the method appeared 
to provide a means of approaching these philosophical questions “with a degree of technical 
precision” (Milgram, n.d., p. 21).   
 
Despite these metaphysical musings, what becomes clear when reading this transcription is 
that Milgram was still searching for a suitable scientific domain within which to focus the 
cyranoid method. Ever the dramatist, some of the hypothetical scenarios involving the 
technique that he proposes implementing contain more theatrics than psychological 
substance. For instance, he suggests using the cyranoid method to simulate a hostage 
negotiation situation wherein a remote expert negotiator would feed lines to a person who, for 
whatever reason, was a more ideal candidate to physically encounter the hostage taker. He 
also suggests conducting suicide intervention simulations wherein a speech shadower was 
used to talk-down a potential victim by channelling the words of someone sufficiently trained 
to deal with a suicidal person. Milgram believed that these scenarios would test people’s 
performance in and out of “cyranic mode.” He saw the ability to access and subsequently 
vocalize the thoughts of a remote expert source as akin to a form of mind augmentation: a 
person connected to a source, if given the freedom to articulate both their own thoughts in 
addition to those of their source, would not be constrained by the limited information 
available within their own central nervous system (i.e., they would have real-time access to a 
secondary brain, one that was potentially more capable of handling a certain social situation 
than their own). 
 
Attempts to scale out the method. One of the archive’s key documents is a grant proposal 
titled “The Technique of Mediated Speech as a Tool in Social Psychology” (Milgram, 1979), 
which, according to Blass (2004), Milgram submitted in February 1979 to the National 
Science Foundation’s (NSF) program in Social and Developmental Psychology (the division 
of the NSF responsible for sponsoring basic mainstream social psychological research). 
Milgram sought to secure $200,000 over a two-year period for cyranoid research.  The 
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document opens with what Milgram perhaps intended as a subtle allusion to his Lewinian 
roots1, stating that “Certain research methods are useful for the very reason that they alter the 
ordinary manner in which things work; by doing so they force us into a more rigorous 
examination of the processes of normal functioning” (Milgram, 1979, p. 1). He follows by 
directly referencing Garfinkel’s (1964) method of conducting breaching experiments – 
experiments wherein researchers and confederates directly manipulate a social context by 
acting in a highly abnormal manner in order to observe how people’s reactions to such 
breaches expose the web of implicit social norms that are ordinarily taken-for-granted.  
 
In the proposal, Milgram (1979) outlines four research projects he plans to pursue with the 
grant money. The first project, “Cyranic persuasion,” proposes using the cyranoid method to 
test whether audiences are more persuaded by a speaker in cyranic mode whose words are 
determined by a remote expert source than the same speaker functioning autonomously. 
Study 2, “Application to emergency counselling situations,” suggests using the method 
within the context of staged hostage negotiations, wherein a non-expert shadower would 
speak either their own thoughts or those of a remote expert negotiator while being filmed; 
research participants would then rate whether the shadower is more effective in cyranic 
mode. Study 3, “Studies in person perception,” proposes using the method to see how the 
physical identity of the shadower affects how audiences perceive personality attributes of a 
cyranoid whose source is controlled. Also suggested for Study 3 is an experiment wherein it 
will be determined whether any discrepancy in personality will be perceived by those who 
observe a cyranoid whose source changes intermittently (Milgram states that “this question 
touches deeply on all of human experience. We assume that when we leave a person, then see 
him again, he is the same person,” p. 9). Finally, Study 4, “The cyranic continuum,” proposes 
exploring situations of variable shadower-autonomy (i.e., situations wherein the shadower 
may elect when to interject with their own thoughts rather than strictly repeat solely those of 
the source they are paired to). In the general discussion of the grant proposal, Milgram 
conveys that the cyranoid method’s strength is the researcher’s ability to independently vary 
the source and the shadower in relation to the research question, and at the end of the 
document he suggests that he wishes to leave open the question of whether or not cyranoids 
be presented to research participants live or via a pre-recorded video stimulus.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Lewin	  is	  credited	  with	  suggesting	  that	  you	  cannot	  understand	  a	  system	  until	  you	  try	  to	  change	  it	  (Schein,	  
1996).	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 At best, the grant proposal’s four studies each suffer from conceptual shortcomings, and at 
worst, the experiments Milgram suggests undertaking contain serious design flaws. For 
example, in describing Study 1 (“Cyranic person”), Milgram fails to convincingly 
demonstrate why the cyranoid method is needed at all to explore the question of whether or 
not an expert source’s words are more persuasive to an audience when projected through a 
speech shadower than the shadower’s own words. The shadower could, for example, simply 
articulate two versions of a script (one expert, one non-expert). Furthermore, Milgram failed 
to notice a glaring confound in this proposed dual-condition experiment: two factors are 
actually being manipulated in the treatment condition (expert vs. non-expert, cyranic mode 
vs. non-cyranic mode), not one. The scientific justification Milgram provides for conducting 
Study 2 (“Application to emergency counselling”), meanwhile, is very weak. He briefly 
mentions developments in telemetered medical assistance (e.g., when a lay person is able to 
access experts within a call center in order to attend to a medical crisis) and suggests that 
shadowers could potentially relay this expert information when dealing with a crisis rather 
than resort to their own limited knowledge, but Milgram does not offer any reasons why the 
simulations he proposes would contribute anything of value to the discipline of social 
psychology. The proposal for Study 4 (“The cyranic continuum”), is very brief and limited to 
Milgram simply wondering aloud how “effective” a shadower would be in a given situation 
in relation to the level of input they received from a source (effective in terms of what, 
however, Milgram does not make clear). The strongest of the grant application’s four 
proposed studies is Study 3 (“Studies in person perception”), as Milgram offers various 
factorial experimental designs that aim to investigate how differences between inner and 
outer identity (e.g., a male source paired with female, and vice versa) impact perceived 
personality – a question with clear social psychological foundations. A significant flaw of 
Study 3, however, is that Milgram proposes using pre-recorded videos of cyranoids rather 
than have research participants interact live with a cyranoid. This design aspect undersells the 
power of the cyranoid method because, again, it could be argued that simply showing 
participants video-recordings of confederates speaking from scripts is a more controlled 
means of tackling the same research question.  
 
The archive contains a video Milgram prepared for the NSF grant proposal that features him 
narrating over various pilot demonstrations of the cyranoid method in his CUNY laboratory 
(Milgram, 1977a). From one room (the source room) Milgram is shown feeding words to a 
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male speech shadower in dialog with a female interactant located in an adjacent room (the 
interaction room). Several minutes into the interaction, Milgram begins swapping different 
lab assistants in as the source while the camera shifts back and forth between the source room 
and the interaction room. We witness the interactant continue to engage the shadower while 
naïve to the fact that the source of the shadower’s words has been rotating every few minutes, 
though it is clear that the interactant has the impression that they are interacting with a 
coherent, singular individual. In a second video clip, a female speech shadower is used, and 
this time Milgram reveals to the interactant that their interlocutor (the female shadower) is 
merely replicating the words of a remote source (an example of an “overt” cyranoid scenario 
wherein the interactant knows the true nature of their interlocutor). When this is disclosed, 
the interactant refuses to believe they are interacting with a cyranoid – they have the strong 
impression that they have engaged an autonomously speaking person. The shadower then 
reveals to the interactant the radio device that forms part of the cyranic contraption, to which 
the interactant responds with amusement.    
 
On July 30, 1979, Milgram received a letter from the NSF informing him that his grant 
application had been rejected. Blass (2004) documents the reasons the various subcommittee 
members decided to issue a rejection, the common denominator being a lack of theoretical 
focus. As one reviewer put it: 
  
It seems obvious that the PI [principal investigator] has become 
fascinated with a method he has invented and is seeking uses to 
which it can be put. Unfortunately, it seems to me that none of 
the studies he proposes will illuminate our understanding of 
social behavior in any substantial way (quoted in Blass, 2004, p 
241). 
 
According to Blass (2004), the subcommittee that evaluated the proposal had not watched the 
videos Milgram prepared, a fact which incensed Milgram. Milgram made minor adjustments 
to the original proposal and resubmitted it to the NSF in November 1979, this time urging the 
chair of the NSF subcommittee (Robert A. Baron) to consider the videos prior to making a 
final determination. Once again, however, the grant proposal was rejected on the grounds that 
the experiments Milgram suggested would fail to touch upon anything of social psychological 
significance. In the words of one reviewer, “Milgram is here the clever kid who has been 
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given a clever hammer and now needs something that needs pounding” (quoted in Blass, 
2004, p. 242).  
 
Later years with cyranoids. Despite failing to secure a grant from the NSF in 1979, 
Milgram continued exploring the cyranoid method through pilot studies with his graduate 
students. In April 1981, he produced more short videos demonstrating the method, this time 
using more formal experimental procedures compared to what appeared in his earlier videos 
(Milgram, 1981). In these newer videos, research participants are shown entering an 
interaction room where they are told by a research assistant that the study they are involved in 
concerns how people talk to each other. Participants are asked to engage in a 10-minute 
discussion with a stranger (a confederate shadower seated across from them) on a topic of 
their choosing related to current events. In some sessions Milgram acts as the source while in 
others he acts as the shadower. In several of the iterations showed in the video, once a 
participant has finished participating in a trial as a naïve interactant, they are instructed by 
Milgram on how to speech shadow and subsequently perform as the shadower during the next 
experimental trial. Milgram uses this device to emphasize to the observer just how non-
technical a skill shadowing is – people with only a few minutes of rehearsal with the 
technique are shown to sufficiently perform as a covert shadower while interacting with 
complete strangers. In one particular trial, the shadower is a local high school student paired 
with a college student source. Following the interaction, the interactant, an adult naïve to the 
nature of their interlocutor, remarks that the person with whom they spoke seemed brighter 
and considerably more articulate than a typical high school student. This particular trial is 
notable because it reveals the movement Milgram was making toward studying cyranic 
interactions wherein the source and shadower were significantly incongruent; convinced of 
the robustness of the cyranic illusion, he seemed to be pushing the method in the direction of 
creating cyranoids whose inner and outer identities were vastly divergent from one another 
(in this same spirit, Chapters 2-5 of this thesis involve exploring radically incongruent 
source-shadower pairs).  
 
The archive contains a number of personal correspondences, notes, and essays on the topic of 
cyranoids authored by Milgram, his students and his colleagues from around this time. These 
informal documents help shed light on Milgram’s development of the method as well as some 
of his motivations behind its continued use in his CUNY lab. For instance, in a letter penned 
to Stuart Albert (a former Assistant Professor of Psychology at CUNY) on October 9, 1983, 
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Milgram (1983) laments being unclear as to what dependent measure he should focus the 
cyranoid method upon and wonders aloud whether cyranoids can yield any scientific value, 
stating: “Sometimes I suspect [cyranoids] more a theatrical than a scientific phenomenon, 
evoking artistic wonder, rather than serving as a source of scientific propositions” (p. 1). In 
the same letter, Milgram reveals the connection between cyranoids and his prior work on 
obedience to authority, stating that in the obedience to authority paradigm, “one person tells 
another what to do [while in] the cyranoid situation, one person tells another person what to 
say” (p. 1). Milgram then takes on the critique that the cyranoid method cannot contribute to 
real world social psychological inquiry given that cyranoids are not real world phenomena; 
he does so by drawing an analogy to non-Euclidian geometry, “wherein an entire system of 
logic is worked out based on premises which don’t hold up in the real world” (p. 1-2). 
Milgram states that such a system can be useful even if its premises don’t hold up in the real 
world because it forces thinkers to clarify their taken-for-granted assumptions. In his reply 
(dated November 9, 1983), Albert (1983) outlines a number of suggestions to Milgram and 
draws a connection between Milgram’s cyranoids and the concepts of self-monitoring and 
self-perception, remarking: “by monitoring what we say, we may conclude that we are other 
than we thought, if only because we are formed from the reflections of others, and what is 
reflected depends in part on what is initially sent” (p. 1).   
 
Another revealing document is a short essay written by Stuart Green (1983) – one of 
Milgram’s students and lab assistants. Titled “Notes on Cyranoidia,” the essay connects the 
cyranoid method with Karl Popper’s views on the ontogeny of the self. Popper was known 
for his distinguishing three domains of real objects (Popper, 1979): World 1 (physical 
objects), World 2 (subjective psychological states), and World 3 (products of psychological 
states). Popper’s contention was that in being a product of the human mind, the self is an 
object that belongs to World 3, yet is embodied in World 1 and is directly experienced in 
World 2. Green uses this framework to explain the relationship between cyranic experience 
and self-discovery, and he does so by invoking another of Popper’s precepts, that the self can 
only be understood so long as it is experienced as in some sense different than the mere body 
(see Popper & Eccles, 1977). Green (1983) suggests that the cyranoid method provides a 
proxy for dissociating from one’s material body, and that participating as a cyranoid allows 
for the experience of “‘self’ and its potencies most fully” (p. 2). Central to Popper’s 
philosophy is the tenet that human beings have a unique ability to theorize about objects in 
the world, gather data, and subsequently falsify (or fail to falsify) these theories, and it is 
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through this process that people develop improved understanding. The self, as an object, 
undergoes this same scrutiny as it is explored in different contexts and in different embodied 
formats (e.g., we may discover something about ourselves by observing how we behave when 
augmenting our bodies or by wearing masks or anonymizing costumes). Green argues that 
cyranic experiences allow one to directly manipulate the World 1 manifestation of the self, 
and that such a transformation can allow one to test theories held about the self and thereby 
become more enlightened as to the self’s true nature.  
 
On October 7th, 1982, Milgram applied for a small internal grant from CUNY to formally 
conduct cyranoid research (a coversheet for the proposal can be found in the archive; 
Milgram, 1982). Milgram seems to have simply taken the original NSF proposal from three 
years prior and attached it to his CUNY grant application (albeit requesting only $11,840) 
because he suggests conducting the same four studies outlined in the previously-rejected NSF 
proposal (i.e., emergency negotiation, persuasion, person perception, and cyranic continuum). 
CUNY awarded him $5,000 to conduct this research from mid-1983 through mid-1984 
(Blass, 2004; Milgram, 1983).  
 
It is unclear whether Milgram ever conducted the studies proposed in the CUNY grant 
application as the archival materials from this period mostly detail a few small-scale pilot 
projects involving cyranoids, none of which bear a resemblance to the studies outlined in the 
proposal. One cyranoid project that appeared to culminate in a formal experiment, however, 
was a master’s thesis exploring the fundamental attribution error conducted by one of 
Milgram’s graduate students, Andrea Martin (n.d.). The thesis, titled “Cyranic attribution: An 
analysis of attribution error,” details an experiment wherein participants were presented with 
a video stimulus of a person answering a series of questions in either a stereotypically liberal 
or conservative fashion, with participants either being informed or not informed that the 
stimulus person was a speech shadower who was simply articulating the thoughts of a source. 
Participants were asked to rate the stimulus person using a likert-style questionnaire that 
gauged a liberal vs. conservative political identity. The main hypothesis was that participants 
would succumb to the fundamental attribution error (i.e., it was predicted that despite the 
knowledge of a person merely being a mouthpiece for someone else’s thoughts, observers 
would still make attributions toward the person as if the thoughts were their own). The results 
of the experiment, however, did not show evidence in support of this hypothesis. What is 
telling about this particular study is that it reveals that even at this point in time, several years 
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into his forays with the method, Milgram still saw pre-recorded video presentations of 
cyranoids as a worthwhile experimental stimulus. It is unclear whether Milgram ever 
encountered the critique that pre-recording negated the necessity of the cyranic technique 
(again, scripted interactions would more straightforwardly achieve the same effect). The true 
power of the cyranoid method is that it enables participants to directly interact with a 
cyranoid in person or have the experience of being a cyranoid (indeed, all explorations of 
cyranic interactions in this thesis involve in person interaction). Videos of cyranoids, by 
comparison, are a much weaker stimulus and cause the mind-body discontinuity of the 
cyranoid to be presented in a significantly more distal way.  
 
Two more substantial pilots exploring person perception that Milgram conducted at around 
this time, however, did involve research participants interacting in person with a cyranoid. In 
the first pilot study (Milgram, 2010a), which was designed mainly to gauge whether 
interactants would succumb to the cyranic illusion, Milgram sourced for four separate 
shadowers in communication with 20 adult interactants naïve to the deception (with each 
participant speaking with one shadower). The shadowers Milgram used were a 16-year-old 
African-American male high school student, a 16-year-old male high school student of 
Korean descent, a 22-year-old female graduate student (no ethnicity reported), and a 32-year-
old Caucasian male graduate student. Interactants were instructed to engage in conversation 
with their partner on personal and political issues and were provided with a set of questions to 
guide the interaction. Therefore, although far from scripted, the conversations (which lasted 
upwards of 20 minutes) did stay within a certain defined range of topics. Following these 
dialogues, and before disclosing the true nature of the interaction to interactants, Milgram 
elicited interactants’ general impressions of the encounters via a questionnaire composed of a 
mixture of written-response and multiple-choice items. Milgram only reported select excerpts 
from these responses, conveying the general sense that interactants were totally unaware of 
the illusion. The written responses Milgram highlights do indeed suggest that interactants 
genuinely believed they were speaking to an autonomously functioning individual.  
 
In the second pilot (Milgram, 2010a), Milgram sourced for 11- and 12-year-old child 
shadowers (recruited from an acting school) whilst being interviewed by panels consisting of 
as many as six high school teachers naïve to any deception. The teachers were asked to assess 
their interviewee’s intelligence, so in effect were unknowingly evaluating a child with the 
mind of a professor, so to speak. The teachers were given freedom to generate their own 
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questions, but were told that they should touch upon areas related to science, literature, and 
current events. Each panel interviewed both children one at a time, with one of the children in 
each set speaking autonomously while the other shadowed for Milgram. The children 
alternated shadowing and speaking autonomously such that each child was interviewed an 
equal number of times autonomously and as a cyranoid in order to allow baseline condition 
evaluations to be compared against cyranoid condition evaluations. Following the encounters, 
Milgram measured the cyranic illusion by prompting teachers with a questionnaire item that 
read, “I can now tell you that there was a very unusual feature in the interview situations you 
participated in today. Could you indicate what it was?” (Milgram, 2010a, p. 407). None of the 
teachers, according to Milgram, came close to identifying the true deception. One teacher, 
having noticed the earpiece worn by one of the child shadowers, suspected that their 
interviewee might have had a hearing disability, but did not attribute anything further to the 
fact that interviewee wore such a device. Milgram concluded that the impression of an 
authentic personality could be achieved via the cyranic method even in instances when a 
cyranoid is a “mash-up” of highly disparate individuals.    
 
Aside from the accomplishment of showing that the cyranic illusion holds in such 
incongruent cases, Milgram’s second pilot highlighted the cyranoid method’s ability to reveal 
two major social phenomena: (1) how people engage with others on account of the implicit 
attributions they make (e.g., through acts of addressivity), and (2) how this in turn affects 
post-interaction judgement. To illustrate, Milgram felt that while sourcing for the young 
children he was unable to fully demonstrate his intellect due to the fact that the teachers 
simply didn’t think to ask the types of questions to the children they might otherwise ask to 
an adult, remarking: “As the source, I was hoping [the teachers] could ask the cyranoid about 
Freud, Jung, Adler, or at least Darwin and Wittgenstein, but some teachers stuck to fractions 
and parts of speech” (Milgram, 2010a, p. 407). Due to the low-level questions he received on 
account of teachers’ beliefs that they were really speaking to a child, Milgram was only able 
to achieve in certain cases modest increases to the children’s perceived baseline intellect: 
 
When teachers were asked to assign each boy to an appropriate 
grade level in the fields of English, science, math, art, and 
social studies, Jason as a cyranoid was elevated at least 2 years 
in each subject over his autonomous performance and 4 years 
over his actual grade level, i.e., the sixth grade. In the field of 
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art, Jason received a mean score of twelfth grade, compared to 
an eighth-grade level when he was on his own. In social 
studies, he was elevated from ninth to tenth grade, a gratifying 
improvement to the source, who, as I have indicated, was a 
professor of psychology (Milgram, 2010a, p. 406). 
 
Milgram made note of how the social and interactive capacities of the cyranic method 
allowed for participants to experience embodied, emotional, and deeply personal responses. 
In their post-interaction evaluations of the cyranoid they believed to be an autonomously 
communicating child, teachers described feeling embarrassed for not being as intellectually 
gifted as the child cyranoid, while others spoke of the warmth and sincerity of the cyranoid’s 
personality. One teacher remarked of a child cyranoid they interviewed, “He is sincere in his 
beliefs but I feel he cannot be opposed graciously” (Milgram, 2010a, p. 407), while another 
wrote “He was poised and expressive (hands, face). He was fascinating and again for me a 
little frightening. I feel his self-confidence is almost overwhelming” (p. 406). These types of 
responses are integral to social experience, yet as Milgram pointed out, too often social 
psychological methods remove all manner of actual social interaction from the field of study: 
 
We thus see very clearly how the impressions people form are 
to some extent generated by their own interaction with the 
stimulus person, the things they bring out and suppress. It is not 
enough, as some studies in our field do, to present a subject 
with a prepackaged description of a stimulus person, for in the 
real world the subject significantly shapes those aspects of the 
person to which he is exposed (Milgram, 2010a, p. 407). 
 
Milgram’s death. Milgram was invited to present his cyranoid research at a symposium 
titled “New Paradigms in Psychology” in August, 1984 at the APA’s annual convention in 
Toronto (Blass, 2004). This was to be Milgram’s first public presentation featuring the 
method as he had not at that point formally published anything on cyranoids. In July, 
however, he suffered a heart attack, leaving him too ill to attend the convention. Rather than 
cancel his presentation, he recorded an audiotape detailing the two person perception pilots 
reported above and requested that the audio be played to the symposium attendees in lieu of a 
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live talk. The original audio recording can be found in the Stanley Milgram Papers Archive 
(Milgram, 1984), a full transcription of which is presented in The individual in a social world 
(Milgram, 2010a). Milgram tried to continue recruiting participants for additional cyranoid 
studies in the fall semester at CUNY following the APA convention, but from the material 
available in the archive it does not appear as though anything substantial manifested from 
these efforts.  
 
On December 20th, 1984, Milgram suffered his fifth heart attack and died at the age of fifty-
one. With his death came the end of cyranoid research at CUNY. None of Milgram’s doctoral 
students had used the method in their dissertations (see Blass, 2004, p. 293), and thus none 
would go on to involve cyranoids in their own research careers.  
 
Evaluating Milgram’s cyranoid research 
Part of the genius of Milgram, according to Blass (2004), was his ability to invent novel and 
elaborate forms of experimentation in his pursuit of social psychological questions. This was 
no doubt the case for his obedience to authority experiment (Milgram, 1963), which entailed 
both performance theatrics on the part of the confederates employed in the study and the 
development of an intricate technical apparatus (for a discussion of how Milgram designed 
his “shock generator”, see Oppenheimer, 2013). His “small world” experiments, which 
sought to explore the number of connections between any two persons in the United States, 
used a methodology that was highly inventive for the time, involving sending information 
packets to random recipients in cities in the middle of the country and tracing their pathway 
back to Harvard University in Boston (Milgram, 1967; Travers & Milgram, 1969). It was in 
this same creative vein that Milgram developed his cyranoid studies, which combined science 
with theatrics, artistry, technology, and subterfuge. 
 
From a methodological standpoint, the great accomplishment of the cyranoid pilots was the 
use of speech shadowing as a social psychological research device in live experimentation. 
Whereas at the time the technique had been used primarily in psycholinguistics (Marslen-
Wislon, 1973) and to a much lesser extent in non-interactive social psychological research 
(Schwitzgebel & Taylor, 1980), Milgram was the first to report bringing covert speech 
shadowers face-to-face with subjects to create truly in person cyranic encounters. It is this 
marriage – speech shadowing with live, in person social interaction – that led to his discovery 
of the cyranic illusion, the intriguing phenomenon that underpins the utility of cyranoids as a 
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methodology. Moreover, Milgram’s discovery that a child as young as 11-years-old could 
spontaneously and convincingly speech shadow for an adult demonstrated the power the 
cyranoid method has for creating hybrid personae from incongruent individuals. Milgram’s 
work with the method also showed that cyranoids can be used for first-person experiential 
research. As demonstrated by his expressing frustration at not being asked the types of 
questions that would allow him to display the range of his intellect when interviewed by 
teachers through the body of children, Milgram (2010a) experienced something of the 
subjective qualia of having the outward identity of a young child. The cyranoid method is 
perhaps the first reported means of enabling individuals to experience a face-to-face 
intersubjective context vicariously through another person’s body in real-time.  
 
The major empirical contributions of Milgram’s cyranoid pilots are what they add to our 
understanding of person perception. The fact that the participants in Milgram’s studies 
succumbed to the cyranic illusion so consistently, even when encountering highly 
incongruent cyranoids, underscores a certain tolerance for ambiguity at work during social 
encounters with strangers. People simply don’t question the communicative authenticity of 
those they meet unless they enter into the encounter with pre-existing doubts. This reinforces 
the general social psychological phenomenon that people tend to perceive unity between 
outer appearance and inner character (Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972; Eagly, Ashmore, 
Makhijani, & Longo, 1991), suggesting that dichotomies between the mind and body 
implicitly reconcile in the minds of interactants and observers, particularly during brief casual 
encounters. In assigning an intellectual score their interviewee, the teachers in Milgram’s 
adult-child cyranoid pilot, while no doubt recognizing the child as extremely intelligent, in 
most cases scored the child only several years above their baseline (autonomous) scores. 
Milgram’s investigations of the cyranic illusion lend support to the notion of perceptual 
salience – the principle that describes humans as having a predisposition toward attributing 
causality to what is most salient to them (Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Taylor & Fiske, 1975).  
 
There are several important shortcomings to Milgram’s cyranic work. In particular, it seems 
as though Milgram never systematically analyzed the majority of data that was collected from 
the various cyranoid projects he was involved in. He may have gone on to do so had he lived 
beyond 1984, but unfortunately for both him and the cyranoid paradigm, this was not the 
case. Aside from the analysis presented in the master’s thesis authored by Martin (n. d.), 
Milgram’s use of statistical procedures to compare experimental conditions in his various 
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pilots seems to have proceeded in a very disorganized and ad-hoc fashion. Milgram collected 
a lot of quantitative data during his time exploring the cyranoid method (as the reams of raw 
data spreadsheets in the Stanley Milgram Papers Archive will attest), with observations 
consisting mostly of personality scale responses made by interactants, but unfortunately he 
seems not to have formally tied this data together in a manner that led to discernible 
conclusions. Furthermore, despite the dialogical richness produced by the interactive 
cyranoid pilots, Milgram did not seem to perform even so much as a basic qualitative analysis 
of these interactions (this thesis, on the other hand, uses a mixture of qualitative and 
quantitative approaches to arrive thick descriptions of the emergent dynamics of cyranic 
interactions). In his writings and dictations on cyranoids, Milgram presents very little in 
terms of concrete evidence in support of the inferences he makes and instead appears to reach 
deductions via a reliance on instinct; Milgram thus reported his cyranoid research more like a 
science journalist than a professional psychological researcher. Even in his failed grant 
proposal to the NSF (Milgram, 1979), Milgram attempted to sell the panel members on the 
method by-way-of a presenting a clever and theatrical narrative rather than elucidate potential 
contributions to the field of social psychology via a presentation of preliminary data 
(quantitative or otherwise) drawn from the pilots he had conducted up until that point.  
 
Another important limitation of Milgram’s cyranoid portfolio is that, in his seven years with 
the method, he largely failed to position cyranoids within the broader context of social 
psychological research methods and thereby distinguish its unique affordances from those of 
the other mainstream methods being applied to phenomena similar to those he was 
investigating. The concept of presenting one person’s identity through the body of another 
individual existed as a method in social psychology prior to Milgram’s forays with cyranoids 
(e.g., the use of “physically attractive” vs. “physically unattractive” images of target-people 
to test for stereotyping and self-stereotyping in social interaction; Snyder, Tanke, & 
Berscheid, 1977; also see Chaiken, 1979). As his lamenting of the popular technique of 
presenting participants with a “prepackaged description of a stimulus person” suggests 
(Milgram, 2010a, p. 407), Milgram clearly knew that a significant affordance of the cyranoid 
method absent from other standard techniques was that it enabled interactive face-to-face 
encounters between participants and stimuli. Curiously, however, Milgram consistently 
proposed designs for cyranoid studies that consisted of mere videos of cyranoids being shown 
to participants. What makes his decision to advocate for video-based cyranoid stimuli even 
more strange is the fact that quite a number of Milgram’s more famous and successful 
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research projects involved real interactions between subjects and confederates (e.g., his 
obedience studies and his breaching experiments; Milgram, 2010c; Milgram, 2010d). This, 
with the benefit of hindsight, was a critical error of Milgram’s, and it is hardly a surprise that 
the NSF panel members were so underwhelmed by Milgram’s presentation of cyranoids.  
 
Examining the dormancy of the cyranoid method: The passing of the “classical 
paradigm” of social psychology 
Upon Milgram’s death, the cyranoid method entered a long period of dormancy, with the 
studies contained in the subsequent chapters of this thesis being the first formal reapplications 
of the method within a scientific context. This begs the question as to why Milgram’s work 
with cyranoids went ignored and un-replicated within social psychology for so long. 
Milgram’s other works,	   particularly his obedience to authority experiments, are widely 
referenced throughout the social sciences (Miller, Collins, & Brief, 1995) and he is among a 
small and select group of figures from throughout history whose names and works are near-
universal in introductory social psychology syllabi (Miller, 2013). Although he never 
published material on cyranoids, the second edition of The Individual in a Social World, 
released in 1992, contained the aforementioned transcription of Milgram’s pre-recorded APA 
speech (Milgram, 2010a), so it is not as if evidence of his cyranoid work remained buried 
deep in his Yale archive and in the memories of those students and colleagues who had 
witnessed the method first-hand. The method’s dormancy is even more puzzling considering 
the fact that Milgram’s work with cyranoids came during the emergence of the dual process 
theories of social influence, namely the “elaboration likelihood model” (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986) and the “heuristic-systematic model” (Chaiken, 1980). These models attempt, in part, 
to account for the effects of source-cues (e.g. factors such as age, gender, attractiveness, etc.) 
on attribution formation, person perception and persuasion. The cyranoid method, with its 
capacity to nimbly construct and control physical and dispositional traits of a stimulus person 
for the purposes of live, face-to-face experimentation, could have seen wide application as a 
research tool that contributed to the dual systems paradigm. 
 
A broad explanation for the dormancy of the cyranoid method can perhaps be arrived at if we 
step back and consider the historical trajectory of experimental social psychology and 
Milgram’s place within it. Milgram’s brand of social psychology derived from those of his 
mid-20th century “classical paradigm” intellectual forbearers, most notably Kurt Lewin, 
Harold Garfinkel, Gordon Allport, Muzafer Sherif, and Soloman Asch (who Milgram served 
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as an assistant to while at Harvard). Asch in particular was known for his predilection for 
experiments that involved research participants being placed in group contexts populated 
with confederates and observing how variations on the different facets of the group or the 
group’s environment induced changes in overt behavior (Martin, 2015; see Asch’s famous 
social conformity line experiments: Asch, 1951), a design format Milgram readily adopted. 
This situationist approach to social psychology was known for being primarily concerned 
with “empirical demonstrations of the power of immediate situations to affect individuals” 
(Martin, 2015, p. 25), a research perspective that appealed to Milgram’s flair for the dramatic 
and his preference for method over theory. This penchant was on full display in Milgram’s 
obedience to authority experiments (Milgram, 1963), as he set out to uncover through 
elaborate laboratory staging how “situational factors might induce obedience in individuals in 
order to reveal the psychological dimensions of the experience of obedience to a malevolent 
authority” (Lunt, 2009, p. 25), and was echoed by his situationist contemporaries, most 
notably Phillip Zimbardo, whose infamous “prison experiment” at Stanford University 
(Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973) is perhaps the only other classical era social 
psychological study to rival Milgram’s obedience studies in terms of notoriety and 
controversy. In both Milgram’s obedience research and Zimbardo’s prison study, method 
largely preceded theory, as theorizing as to why participants engaged in certain behaviors 
followed from the practice of first constructing an immersive experimental situation that 
functioned as an abstraction of some real-world scenario.  
 
Fundamental to Milgram’s situationist approach was his proclivity for using the classroom to 
generate and test research questions. According to social psychologist Harold Takooshian 
(2000), one of Milgram’s former PhD students, “teaching fed [Milgram’s] research… so 
many of Milgram’s most intriguing publications were based on ideas born in his classes – the 
small world problem, the lost letter technique, the familiar stranger … [and] cyranoids” (p. 
16). Milgram encouraged his students to draw from personal experience when developing 
research questions (Takooshian, 2000), and believed that social psychologists in general 
should rely on direct experience “as a source of insight” (Milgram, 2010b, p. xviii). On the 
basis of such insights, Milgram and his students (à la Sherif and Asch) would then devise 
ways of constructing models of the real-world phenomena they experienced and develop 
methods for re-creating these phenomena under controlled laboratory conditions or in field 
experiments wherein they themselves often acted as confederates (Harré, 2006; Milgram, 
2010b). This approach allowed Milgram to investigate a broad array of social psychological 
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topics throughout his career, with each new research question bringing with it the need to 
invent a novel and often theatrical methodology.  
 
Despite Milgram’s successful and wide-ranging research resume, the end of both his life and 
his research career coincided with a substantial paradigm shift in social psychology, one that 
saw the field largely move away from the experimental approach Milgram was known for. 
By the mid-1970s, experimental social psychology was in the midst a self-described “crisis” 
(Kim, 1999). Serious doubts lingered from both outside and inside the discipline as to the 
relevance of major research areas (Silverman, 1971). Prominent scholars began to suggest 
that the targeting of overt human behaviors as dependent experimental measures in an effort 
to construct predictive behavioral models was problematic given that the types of behaviors 
that interested social psychologists were fundamentally distinct from the behaviors of objects 
in the “natural” (non-human) world; human social behavior was prone to change over time as 
a result of “enlightenment effects,” and thus, as some argued, social psychology encompassed 
more of a historical science than a natural science (Gergen, 1973). The crisis made it 
increasingly clear that social psychologists lacked sound theoretical guidance, needed to 
address critiques concerning the ethical components of experimental research, and needed to 
give new thought to research design and data analysis (Adair, 1991; Elms, 1975). The method 
most criticized was the traditional laboratory experiment, which, it was argued, produced 
behavioral artifacts by-way-of researcher effects, demand characteristics, and difficult-to-
replicate staging (see Orne & Holland, 1968; Rosenthal, 1966).  
 
Social psychology survived this crisis thanks largely to two parallel developments. First, the 
emergence of the social constructionist movement served to bring social psychology out of 
the laboratory and into the field, particularly into communities and cultures where traditional 
psychological research had not been conducted (Gergen, 1985; Moghaddam, 1987). This both 
quelled anxiety for the need to account for non-laboratory social psychological phenomena 
and restored institutional and public faith in the discipline’s ability to produce socially 
relevant impact. Second, lab-based experimental social psychology largely converted to the 
cognitivist paradigm and moved away from a fixation on overt human behavior as both a 
dependent measure and as a stimulus (Adair, 1991). These changes helped preserve 
experimental psychology’s status among the traditional, natural sciences. Experimenters 
became more focused on evaluating various aspects of cognition via indirect social 
simulation, written vignettes, cognitive tasks, questionnaires, and self-report techniques, with 
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experimental stimuli generally delivered in a non-social way (often via priming or interaction 
with a computer interface). These new methods minimized the need for potentially 
confounding laboratory effects (e.g. direct experimenter/confederate interaction with 
subjects), reduced the cost of conducting large-scale studies, made experiments more 
replicable and standardized, and enabled a convergence among researchers on the use of 
certain psychometric techniques and statistical tools.  
 
Milgram’s cyranoid studies thus came about at a time when his own field was largely moving 
away from the very interactive experimental methods cyranoids are so emblematic of, and as 
a result, today’s social psychology bears very little resemblance to that of Milgram’s era, both 
in terms of the research questions pursued and the methodological tools employed. Milgram 
and his contemporaries were concerned with, in the words of Zimbardo (1999), “real on-line 
behavior: what people do, how they act, what they report feeling or thinking in response to 
the particular situation they have encountered… not research that begins and ends with what 
people say they would do in a given situation” (p. 136). Cyranoids were conceived of as a 
social stimulus that would confront the research participant face-to-face under varying 
conditions in order to generate a visceral reaction that manifested in observable behaviors. 
Social psychology’s move toward cognitivism made this style of empiricism old-hat, a shift 
in emphasis that did not sit well with many classic experimentalists: 
 
For the new breed of cognitive social psychologists, the action 
is not in gross behavior but in subtle predictions, estimations, 
judgments, and decisions. A one-paragraph typed description of 
a scene or setting takes the place of the laboriously constructed 
stage sets of old-time experimentalists. A check mark on a five-
point scale fills in for the buttons on a shock generator or the 
amount of food or water consumed by a subject. It is so clean, 
concise, and effortless to construct, to analyse, and to publish 
that I imagine newcomers to our field wonder why anyone 
would waste so much time and effort with the old-line 
experimental approach (Zimbardo, 1999, 138). 
 
Epistemological quarrels between the old and new paradigms aside, the use of deception that 
was commonplace in experimental social psychology under the classical paradigm met with 
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greater and greater resistance leading up to the crisis and was one of the principal reasons for 
the field’s movement toward a new style of laboratory research (Adair, 1991; Blass, 2004; 
Elms, 1975). In 1973, in the wake of the controversy sparked by Milgram and Zimbardo, the 
APA published its “Ethical Principles in the Conduct of Research with Human Participants” 
(American Psychological Association, 1973), which in addition to mandating informed 
consent in research, established the standard that the use of deception should only be used if 
the reasons for its use are thoroughly described to the research participant following the 
experiment in order to “restore the quality of the relationship with the investigator” (p. 79). 
The next year, and in reaction to more serious abuses of research subjects in biomedical 
research (e.g., the Tuskegee Experiment), the United States Congress passed the National 
Research Act (1974), which created the National Commission for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The commission produced the Belmont 
Report, which established bedrock ethical principles for human subjects research: (1) respect 
for persons (including the right to informed consent), (2) beneficence (“do no harm”), and (3) 
justice (the fair administration of procedures). In 1975, the United States Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare mandated that all human subjects research be reviewed by an 
institutional review board (IRB) so as to ensure participant wellbeing (Blass, 2004). The 
vesting of IRBs with the power to regulate research protocols within institutions, as well as 
the internalization of ethical norms established by the APA, created a selection pressure for 
experimental methods that shied away from a dependence on deception, and as such, the use 
of deception in social psychological research declined after the 1970s (Nicks, Korn, & 
Mainieri, 1997). Cognitivist social psychology was well-positioned to benefit from this 
selection pressure as its methods are generally less dependent on what one might consider the 
most troublesome forms of social deception (e.g., those of the Asch, Milgram, and Zimbardo 
variety).    
 
Milgram’s experiments with cyranoids, thus, came on the heels of substantial efforts made by 
regulating authorities to curb the use of deception and other research practices that carried 
with them the potential to inflict psychological harm on participants. Many of Milgram’s 
laboratory and field studies involved deception at some level and a lack of informed consent 
of today’s standard, and his obedience studies in particular fomented a tremendous ethics 
backlash that has continued through today (see Baumrind, 1964; Nicholson, 2011; Perry, 
2012). Cyranic interactions – at least of the kind that are the most psychologically interesting, 
where the interactant assumes they are engaging with an autonomously communicating and 
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otherwise normal person – require deception (i.e., they necessitate withholding from the 
interactant the hybrid nature of their interlocutor). If a researcher sought to use cyranoids in 
social interactions to gauge the extent to which the inner vs. outer identity of a cyranoid 
influenced some aspect of interactant person perception, disclosing to interactants prior to the 
interactions that their interlocutor would be a cyranoid would largely invalidate the 
conclusions of the study. This is not to say that there are no interesting research questions that 
can be investigated validly using overt cyranoid scenarios (in fact, several experiments 
described in the later portions of this thesis make use of such scenarios), but the ability to 
leverage the cyranic illusion so as instil the belief that one is having an unscripted in person 
encounter with an autonomous person is a (if not the) primary affordance of the cyranoid 
method. Milgram himself never reported any ethical issues arising from his participants’ 
experiences with covert cyranoids and the deception involved. In fact, video evidence from 
Milgram’s pilots suggests that people, when informed that their interlocutor was a cyranoid, 
were generally quite amused and enthusiastic about the method (see Milgram 1977a, 1981a). 
Nonetheless, it is easy to imagine covert cyranoid scenarios where the inherent deception 
does lead to negative participant experiences.  
 
The post-Milgram dormancy of the cyranoid method, therefore, may have as much to do with 
the confluence of changes that culminated in social psychology’s parting with the classical 
paradigm, particularly those changes that led to the ascent of taboos concerning the use of 
deception, as with Milgram’s personal failure to formally publish with the method and sell 
his colleagues on the method’s empirical potential.  
 
The argument for revisiting and reapplying the cyranoid method 
Contemporary methodological issues in social psychology. It has now been over three 
decades since the end of the classical paradigm within social psychology, and for that matter, 
Milgram’s last cyranoid study. Some contemporary researchers have lamented the 
methodological status quo of the new paradigm, particularly the manner in which dependent 
measures are operationalized and the manner in which supposedly “social” person stimuli 
have evolved. With regard to the nature of dependent measures, much of the concern 
surrounds the relative absence of interest in human social behavior of the sort that 
preoccupied classical era situationists such as Milgram, Asch, Sherif, et al. (see Baumeister, 
Vohs, & Funder, 2007; Lewandowski & Strohmetz, 2009; Patterson, 2008; Zimbardo, 1999). 
Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder (2007) summarize the current state of affairs in the following 
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manner: 
 
The fields of social and personality psychology, however, offer 
a special and discouraging case. Both of these related fields 
have a mandate to study the important social behaviors that 
compose the very texture of human life, with personality 
psychology focusing on individual differences in those 
behaviors and social psychology exploring situational 
influences. But personality psychology has long relied heavily 
on questionnaires in lieu of behavioral observation, a state of 
affairs that has begun to change only recently and ever so 
slowly, at that. Even worse, social psychology has actually 
moved in the opposite direction. At one time focused on direct 
observations of behaviors that were both fascinating and 
important - a focus that attracted many researchers to the field 
in the first place - social psychology has turned in recent years 
to the study of reaction times and questionnaire responses. 
These techniques, which promised to help to explain behavior, 
appear instead to have largely supplanted it. The result is that 
current research in social and personality psychology pays 
remarkably little attention to the important things that people 
do (p. 396). 
 
Questionnaires and self-report techniques are not problems in and of themselves (indeed, 
Milgram himself used questionnaires in his cyranoid studies and many of the experiments in 
the current thesis utilize questionnaires and self-report measures); the problem is the 
disproportionate use of these modes of data-extraction when making generalizations about 
the on-line, real-world social behaviors they purport to capture. What the cyranoid method 
can return to social psychology is a way of conducting truly social experiments wherein the 
observable behavior of interactants and shadowers over the course of a cyranic interaction is 
assessed in relation to the composition of the cyranoid, the identity of the interactant, and the 
interactive context within which they meet.  
 
Central to the lament regarding the nature of contemporary experimental person stimuli, on 
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the other hand, has been a concern with the extent to which today’s research tends to sacrifice 
mundane realism in favor of experimental control (Chapter 5 of this thesis provides a 
historical overview of this phenomena). In an effort to achieve high degrees of control, many 
of today’s standard research protocols forego concerns about creating contexts that mirror life 
outside the laboratory (DiFonzo, Hantula, & Bordia, 1998), and as a result, person stimuli in 
experimental person perception research tend to take the form of “paper-and-pencil” 
descriptions of people, recordings, or still images of people/people-like stimuli (Zebrowitz, 
2002). Allport (1985) famously defined social psychology as the “attempt to understand and 
explain how the thought, feeling, and behavior of individuals are influenced by the actual, 
imagined, or implied presence of others” (p. 3). Blascovich et al. (2002) refer to this widely-
accepted definition when critiquing what they feel is the unfair neglect of mundane realism in 
modern social psychology, emblemized by the general lack of realistic social and person 
stimuli, and the problem this raises regarding the ecological validity of mainstream research: 
 
We find it interesting… that social psychologists have blurred 
Allport’s (1985) presence distinctions (i.e., actual, imagined, or 
implied), at least in terms of the methods and stimuli they use. 
Many, if not most, social psychologists apparently assume that 
empirical reference to and experimental manipulations of 
actual, imagined, or implied human stimuli are essentially 
equivalent for understanding social psychological processes… 
Most would agree that simple written vignettes are far less 
compelling (i.e., many participants will feel as though they are 
in an experiment) than the more elaborate staged scenarios (p. 
103).  
 
What Blascovich et al. (2002) put forward as a way of striking a balance between mundane 
realism and control in interactionist research is a research tool that shares many similarities to 
Milgram’s cyranoid method: immersive virtual environment technology (IVET). In 
immersive virtual environments, research participants can both embody and control 3D 
human avatars as well as encounter avatars controlled by other research participants, 
confederates, or artificial intelligence in simulated virtual social environments. One’s outer 
identity can be transformed such that the avatar one controls bears little resemblance to one’s 
own physical traits, and the effect of these transformations can be observed in the form of the 
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behavioral changes they induce in the other research participants. Proponents of IVET argue 
that the technology allows research participants to encounter stimuli in a highly dynamic and 
interactive way that, while virtual in nature, is a more realistic social experience for the 
participant than a vignette or a static stimulus. As with cyranoids, the outer and inner 
identities of the person stimuli in immersive virtual environments can be independently 
manipulated. Indeed, proponents of IVET have often cited Milgram’s cyranoid studies as a 
conceptual analogue and source of inspiration (e.g., Bailenson, Yee, Blascovich, & 
Guadagno, 2008). Over the last decade-and-a-half, the IVET paradigm has been extremely 
productive at investigating phenomena central to social psychology, including aspects of 
behavioral confirmation (e.g., Yee & Bailenson, 2007, 2009), stereotyping (e.g., Dotsch & 
Wigboldus, 2008; Hoyt & Blascovich, 2007), self-representation (e.g., Bailenson, 
Blascovich, & Guadagno, 2008; Hoyt & Bailenson, 2009), obedience to authority (e.g., 
Dambrun & Vatiné, 2010), and interpersonal attribution (e.g., Hoyt, Aguilar, Kaiser, 
Blascovich, & Lee, 2007).  
 
In relation to IVET avatars, the cyranoid method, arguably, provides for much more 
mundanely realistic person stimuli as cyranoids have real, fleshy human bodies and can 
create the impression of being an autonomous singular individual. Moreover, the IVET model 
can potentially serve as a guide to a reborn cyranoid paradigm. Whereas Milgram lacked a 
methodological analogue to help scaffold the cyranoid method, the productivity of which he 
could have used to sell his colleagues on the upside of cyranoids for social psychological 
research (and grant awarding bodies, for that matter), the success of the modern IVET 
paradigm can be pointed to as a reason for revisiting the cyranoid method.    
 
Recent uses of cyranoids in experiential installations and interactive art. Aside from its 
relation to the IVET paradigm, an additional reason to revisit the cyranoid method within a 
scientific context comes from the recent use of cyranoids in experiential installations and 
interactive art. Alex Gillespie has spearheaded the rebirth of cyranoids in these domains, and 
together with Rob Mitchell (currently Assistant Professor of Social Interaction Design at the 
University of Southern Denmark) has used cyranoids as tools for exploring fusions of 
technology with human life. Mitchell (2009), for instance, has in his own work focused on 
how simple cyranic contraptions can enable human beings to service as stand-in 
communicators for non-present persons (e.g., how a cyranoid can be used as a proxy for a 
colleague who could not be physically present for a workplace meeting). Mitchell has also 
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explored the possibility of cyranoids as teaching surrogates in classroom environments (e.g., 
Raudaskoski & Mitchell, 2013). In one such study, remote teachers sourced for student 
shadowers in classrooms while delivering a lesson, with the role of the shadower rotating 
amongst the different students (Mitchell, 2010). Each student therefore had the opportunity to 
both present to the class in the form of a cyranoid as well as learn via the variety of 
personalities within the peer group. This activity suggested several potential learning 
benefits. In particular, students seemed enthusiastically engaged with the learning process, 
and the exercise demonstrated potential in helping scaffold students’ teaching and 
presentation skills.  
 
While the above-described explorations involve overt cyranoids, Gillespie has also provided 
the impetus for designing experiential installations involving covert cyranoids. One such 
installation in an art gallery context involved a number of covert and overt cyranoids 
intermingling with visitors naïve to their presence (Mitchell, 2009; Mitchell, Gillespie, & 
O’Neill, 2011). Certain attendees were discretely invited to function as a shadower’s source 
for a period of time from a control room, granting these individuals the opportunity to 
encounter unsuspecting guests (among whom were their friends and family) through the body 
of a stranger. Not only did Milgram’s cyranic illusion very much hold true in this setting, 
even those who were approached by an overt cyranoid wearing a large hat with cameras and 
microphones clearly present succumbed to the illusion. It seemed that even when the nature 
of the interaction was made explicit to them, interactants still found it difficult to accept that 
they were actually communicating with someone other than the person right in front of them 
– a testament to the robustness of the cyranic illusion. 
 
In reflecting upon the art gallery studies, Mitchell et al. (2011) make several observations. 
First, invoking Garfinkel’s (1964) belief in the value of exploring social relations in contexts 
of grossly violated, or “breached,” social norms, they argue that the cyranoid method can 
serve as a means of constructing positive environments that breach research participants’ 
expectations of normality. Second, the authors highlight that the technique allows for 
individuals to creatively play within existing social relationships. Third, participant sources 
seemed to enthusiastically approach strangers through the body of the cyranoid, leading the 
authors to infer that since the shadower absorbs the embodied sentiments (e.g. 
embarrassment) that might otherwise restrict social interaction, sources feel less restrained in 
seeking social encounters with strangers by-way-of a proxy (this possibility had been 
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suggested by Milgram).  
 
In collaboration with Gillespie and Brian O’Neill (a neuropsychologist), conceptual artist 
Lucy Pawlak has also made use of the cyranoid concept in a number of instillations and 
films. Her St. Unicorn’s Trust (Pawlak, 2009) performance art piece in London, United 
Kingdom, featured a “multiplied mind” cyranoid scenario, as visitors to an art gallery 
unknowingly interacted with a covert team of cyranoids masquerading as a tongue-and-cheek 
cult spontaneously speaking in unison via a single remote source in response to attendees’ 
impromptu questions and statements. Meanwhile, her film Inspection House (Pawlak & del 
Paso, 2012) explored a unique cyranic theatrical device: individual characters were 
distinguished by distinct masks, and throughout the film the actors interchanged which 
character they were playing such that each scene featured a different combination of actor-
character pairs. Playing off of the tendency for people to reconcile mind-body discrepancy 
(discussed above), a sense of character stability was achieved throughout the story because 
the audience implicitly associated each character with their mask despite the fact that the 
actor (source) behind the mask constantly varied.  At the film’s premier in London, Pawlak 
(who was in a remote part of Canada at the time) engaged in a question and answer session 
with the audience by-way-of a cyranoid surrogate.  
 
These artistic demonstrations, while not scientific in the traditional sense, touch upon many 
questions of significance to social psychology. As mentioned, such scenarios are examples of 
the breached environments spoken of by Garfinkel (1964), and strike at the heart of many 
consequential notions underlying the human experience. In particular, they emphasize the 
role expectation and physical appearance play in mediating our interactions with others. We 
may think that what we connect with when we encounter an intimate partner, relative, or 
close friend is some essential, historically-consistent, and ethereal personal quality that exists 
beyond their physical nature. But in reality, waking up to find your partner had completely 
changed bodies while their memory and personality were otherwise intact would, in addition 
to being quite unsettling, serve to accentuate just how much physical continuity underscores 
our social relationships.  
 
The historical argument: Milgram’s legacy within social psychology. If for no other 
reason, the cyranoid method is worth revisiting given Milgram’s historical status within 
social psychology. One can be agnostic toward or even highly dismissive of Milgram’s 
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contributions to social psychology (some of his contemporaries saw him as a “dilettante who 
flitted from one newsworthy phenomenon to the next”; Blass, 2004, p. 259), but his impact 
on the field and other disciplines cannot be understated. Haggbloom et al.’s (2002) rank order 
of the 100 most eminent 20th century psychologists, a list that considered all fields of 
psychology and considered criteria that included journal and textbook citation frequency in 
addition to other qualitative measures, placed Milgram at no. 46 (no. 1: Skinner; no. 41: 
Asch). Beyond the massive impact of his obedience studies, his insights have inspired 
disciplines far afield. Milgram’s small-world study, for instance, has reached well-beyond his 
own vision, enjoying success as a source of inspiration in applied mathematics, computer 
science, epidemiology, and other fields long after his death (e.g., Watts & Strogatz, 1998; see 
Blass, 2004). Milgram is also one of the very few social psychologists whose ideas and 
lifework have entered into the greater public consciousness, inspiring popular literature (e.g., 
Modig, 2003), popular music (e.g., Gabriel, 1986), and popular film (e.g., Almereyda, 2015). 
No analysis of Milgram as a historical figure, therefore, would be complete without revisiting 
the cyranoid method. And as has been the case with his small-world study, a reborn cyranoid 
paradigm may give rise to empirical findings that further Milgram’s status not necessarily as 
a great researcher, but as an indispensable source of ideas. 
 
Moving forward 
The cyranoid method was Milgram’s swansong – a paradigm he never gave up on despite its 
early critics, dedicated a significant portion of his later years to, and made the topic of his 
final APA address. Milgram laid the groundwork for the method, stumbling upon the cyranic 
illusion and testing various permutations of the source-shadower-interactant relationships 
made possible by the method. But in so many ways the method is incomplete and in need of a 
rigorous re-evaluation. The real test of the method’s significance, both in historical and 
contemporary terns, ultimately lies in its potential as a research tool capable of tackling issues 
of interest to today’s social psychologists, and in particular, what it can uniquely contribute to 
the field where other methods fall short. That being the case, the remaining chapters of this 
thesis pick up where Milgram left off. Though all of the possible applications of the cyranoid 
method certainly cannot be explored within the limited scope of this thesis, the technique will 
be used to interactively investigate a wide but interconnected array of social psychological 
issues. The next chapter starts the outward journey from Milgram with a replication of the 
major elements of two of his most comprehensive pilot studies.	   
47
CHAPTER 2 | Replicating Milgram 
 
Preface 
It was decided that the most sensible starting point for reviving the cyranoid method was to 
attempt basic assessments of the cyranic illusion and the method’s potential as a person 
perception methodology. To do this, two of Milgram’s more substantial pilots – those he 
described in his APA speech (Milgram, 2010a) – were chosen to serve as the basis for formal 
replications. This chapter presents those replications in the form of two separate studies. 
 
The first study described in this chapter is predominantly an exploration of the cyranic 
illusion in a context involving a mental-age-congruent source-shadower pairing. In the two 
studies described in his speech to the APA, Milgram indicated that no interactant who 
encountered a cyranoid seemed to suspect the true nature of their interlocutor (i.e., they 
succumbed to the cyranic illusion). He came about this conclusion via four basic modes of 
assessment: (1) an analysis of the content of interactant-cyranoid dialog, including via direct 
first-person observation of the illusion through serving as the speech shadower’s source in 
both pilot studies, (2) an analysis of responses to agree/disagree post-interaction 
questionnaire items designed to elicit interactants’ beliefs as to their interlocutors’ 
communicative autonomy and normalcy, (3) a post-interaction questionnaire item prompting 
the interactant to disclose their beliefs about the encounter and any possible experimental 
manipulation, and (4) an analysis of participant statements made during debrief interviewing. 
This framework functioned as the basis for the assessment of the cyranic illusion in this 
chapter.  
   
The second study described in this chapter is based on Milgram’s (2010a) pilot wherein he 
sourced for child shadowers in interview contexts; it explores mental-age incongruent cyranic 
interactions. Though the study also investigates the robustness of the cyranic illusion, the 
study delves into how interactants perceive incongruent cyranoids as well as how they in turn 
behave (i.e., address) a cyranoid in accordance with these perceptions.   
 
Though Milgram was quite convinced as to the robustness of the cyranic illusion as well as 
the cyranoid method’s utility as a means of exploring social phenomena such as person 
perception, he only informally reported the results and methods of his pilots, leaving much to 
be desired in terms of supplying a blueprint for exact replication. Enough information is 
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described in his APA speech, however, to provide a sound basis for recreating the basic 
elements of the cyranic interactions he explored. Therefore, while this chapter is framed as a 
replication of Milgram, it should be noted that certain features of the experiments contained 
in this chapter differ from those executed by Milgram. None of these differences in any way 
relaxed the burden of proof for a positive demonstration of the cyranic illusion in relation to 
those set by Milgram, and in most cases were simply slight deviations from Milgram’s 
original designs made for practical purposes. Additionally, the experiments conducted for this 
chapter contain a variety of experimental controls and additional manipulation conditions not 
seen in Milgram’s work. 
 
Though the first pilot described by Milgram in his APA speech featured less dramatic age 
incongruences than those of his adult-child cyranoid scenarios, the main aim of the pilot was 
to assess the cyranic illusion. Milgram’s pilot involved four different speech shadowers (two 
16-year-old males, a 22-year-old female, and a 32-year-old male), whereas the experiment 
that comprises the first study of this chapter only involves one shadower (a 26-year-old 
male), allowing for a more controlled stimulus. Furthermore, the first study of this chapter 
compares interactants’ experiences in cyranic interactions to those of a control condition 
(non-cyranic; shadower speaks autonomously), whereas Milgram’s pilot does not mention 
any such use of a control group. Another point of difference is that in Milgram’s pilot, 
interactants were given topic guide of discussion-points to help stimulate conversation 
involving “personal and political issues, mainly nuclear disarmament” (Milgram, 2010a, p. 
404); no such topic guide was used in the first study described in this chapter (participants 
were free to decide on their own a topic for conversation) so as to allay the possibility of 
interactants suspecting that their interlocutor (the cyranoid) had rehearsed what to say. As a 
final point of difference, Milgram himself functioned as the cyranoid’s source in his pilot, 
whereas in this chapter’s first study a research confederate blind to the research objectives 
was recruited to function as the source in the experiment’s treatment condition. 
 
The differences between this chapter’s second study and the second pilot described in 
Milgram’s APA speech consist of the following. Milgram’s study involved two child 
shadowers (an 11-year-old boy and a 12-year-old boy), whereas this chapter’s second study 
featured one 12-year-old boy. While Milgram's study involved two conditions (a treatment 
condition in which he sourced for child shadowers and a control condition in which the child 
shadowers spoke autonomously), this chapter’s second study involved two additional 
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conditions: a second treatment condition in which the child sourced for an adult shadower 
and a second control condition in which the adult shadower spoke autonomously. As a final 
point of difference, Milgram recruited actual teachers to participate as interviewers in his 
study, whereas in this chapter’s second study interactant interviewers were adults recruited 
from the greater-London area. 
 
It should be noted that the two studies described in this chapter are highly exploratory in 
nature. As such, though statistical analyses are performed on several dependent measures, no 
formal hypothesis testing is carried out. The spirit of these studies was to investigate the 
cyranoid method as Milgram conducted it, and where appropriate, offer theoretically-
informed reflections on the phenomena that emerged; these reflections are outlined in the 
general discussion section that concludes this chapter. The general discussion section also 
outlines a number of possibilities for future cyranoid research.   
 
The journal article that follows was authored by Corti and Gillespie (2015b). Corti designed 
and carried out the studies, performed the data analysis, outlined the article, and authored the 
main drafts, contributing roughly 75% of the content. Gillespie provided the technological 
devices, helped conduct the studies, provided key supervisory assistance, provided funding, 
provided Corti with editorial suggestions for the article, and contributed roughly 25% of the 
content. An editor at the Journal of Social Psychology and two anonymous reviewers 
provided helpful feedback, suggested edits, and ultimately approved the article for 
publication. 
 
Copies of participant instructions and other materials used to conduct the studies in this 
chapter can be found in Appendix A. Example transcripts from the experimental conditions 
described in this chapter can be found in Appendix D.  
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CHAPTER 2 | Replicating Milgram 
 
Article Title 
Revisiting Milgram’s cyranoid method: Experimenting with hybrid human agents 
 
Authors 
Kevin Corti (primary) 
Alex Gillespie 
 
Abstract 
In two studies based on Stanley Milgram’s original pilots, we present the first systematic 
examination of cyranoids as social psychological research tools. A cyranoid is created by 
cooperatively joining in real-time the body of one person with speech generated by another 
via covert speech shadowing. The resulting hybrid persona can subsequently interact with 
third parties face-to-face. We show that naïve interlocutors perceive a cyranoid to be a 
unified, autonomously communicating person, evidence for a phenomenon Milgram termed 
the “cyranic illusion.” We also show that creating cyranoids composed of contrasting 
identities (a child speaking adult-generated words and vice versa) can be used to study how 
stereotyping and person perception are mediated by inner (dispositional) vs. outer (physical) 
identity. Our results establish the cyranoid method as a unique means of obtaining 
experimental control over inner and outer identities within social interactions rich in mundane 
realism.  
 
Keywords 
Cyranoid, embodiment, Milgram, mundane realism, person perception, stereotyping 
 
Introduction 
In Edmund Rostand’s play Cyrano de Bergerac, Christian, a handsome yet inarticulate young 
cadet, woos the love of Roxane by speaking to her the graceful prose of Cyrano, a man whose 
unremarkable physical features instil in him a paralyzing sense of self-doubt (Rostand, 1981). 
Through Christian’s body, Cyrano achieves a means of vicariously fulfilling his unrequited 
love for Roxane, while Christian is in turn the beneficiary of ghost-written words that garner 
affection. This well-known story is but one of the many examples of a fantasy that has 
appeared in the arts and mythology throughout history - that of the fusion of separate bodies 
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and minds. Other illustrations include The Wonderful Wizard of Oz, in part the tale of a 
fraudster who is able to attain great power by presenting himself to the world through an 
intimidating artificial visage. The film Big entertains the folly that ensues when an adolescent 
boy awakens to find himself in the body of a middle-aged man. More recently, films such as 
Avatar and Surrogates have imagined hypothetical futures in which mind can be 
operationally detached from body, allowing individuals to operate outer personae constructed 
to suit their social goals. Fiction though they may be, these stories illuminate the power 
façade has over how we are perceived by ourselves and by others, and how we and others in 
turn behave in accordance with these perceptions.  
 
Stanley Milgram, perhaps best known for his obedience to authority experiments (Milgram, 
1974), operationalized the Cyrano de Bergerac paradigm in a series of pilot studies 
conducted shortly before his death. In these pilots, he explored constructing hybrid social 
agents, whom he called “cyranoids” (in reference to Cyrano), via a vocal technique known as 
“speech shadowing,” a procedure in which a person immediately repeats auditory stimuli 
originating elsewhere. Milgram’s idea was to have one person (the “shadower”) replicate the 
spontaneous speech of another (the “source”) via a covert audio-relay apparatus while 
socially engaging with research subjects (the “ineractants”) naïve to the subterfuge, and his 
findings suggest that interactants will fail to detect that their interlocutor is a cyranoid. This 
“cyranic illusion” persisted in cases of extreme identity incongruity between source and 
shadower, such as when he sourced for child shadowers being interviewed by groups of 
teachers, none of whom believed following these interactions that they had been talking to 
anything other than an autonomous (albeit unusually bright) child. Milgram never formally 
reported the results of these studies, though descriptions of them can be found in a speech he 
prepared for an American Psychological Association (APA) convention in 1984 (Milgram, 
1992) as well as in a biography authored by Blass (2004). In his APA speech, he expressed 
optimism that the cyranoid method could evolve into a powerful means of researching the 
social self and person perception. Despite this enthusiasm, no experimental validation of the 
method has to-date been reported, rendering cyranoids a largely dormant part of Milgram’s 
legacy.  
 
Our goal in the present work is to resurrect the cyranoid method by exhibiting its utility as a 
social psychological research tool. In two studies based on Milgram’s original pilots, we 
examine the robustness of the cyranic illusion and demonstrate how with the method one can 
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explore various aspects of person perception and the role of stereotypes in social behavior. 
The aim is to stimulate further research into the wide range of social and cognitive 
phenomena that lend themselves to investigation by-way-of cyranoids.  
 
Background 
Speech shadowing. A functioning cyranoid is a synchronized performance between two or 
more people and depends upon the shadower reliably and rapidly repeating the words of their 
source without revealing the true nature of the communication to interactants. This, however, 
is not as difficult a task as one might suspect, as studies have shown speech shadowing to be 
a surprisingly simple undertaking. Marslen-Wilson’s (1973) early work exploring speech 
shadowing latencies influenced Milgram’s conceptualization of the cyranoid, and the 
technique has since been used to investigate phenomena ranging from secondary language 
acquisition (e.g., Murphey, 2001) to speech pathology (e.g., Harbison, Porter, & Tobey, 
1989; Healey & Howe, 1987) to cognitive linguistic processing (e.g., Fowler, Brown, 
Sabadini, & Weihing, 2003). Native language shadowers can track the continuous familiar 
prose of a source at latencies as low as 70 milliseconds (Bailly, 2003), and continuous 
unfamiliar prose at latencies as low as 250 milliseconds (Marslen-Wilson, 1985). Shadowers 
tend to reflexively mimic gestural elements of their source (Fowler et al., 2003; Goldinger, 
1998; Mitterer & Ernestus, 2008; Shockley, Sabadini, & Fowler, 2004), while listeners tend 
to perceive more acoustic-phonetic similarity between persons A and B when A is shadowing 
for B than when A is speaking non-shadowed speech (Namy, Nygaard, & Sauerteig, 2002; 
Pardo, Jordan, Mallari, Scanlon, & Lewandowski, 2013), evidence for a phenomenon known 
as “phonetic convergence.” Thus, in addition to replicating pure syntax at low-latency, 
shadowers instinctively mirror their sources’ idiosyncratic speech qualities.  
 
Schwitzgebel and Taylor (1980) explored speech shadowing as a social psychological 
experimental tool when investigating aspects of third party impression formation. Their 
shadowers were able to effectively convey both verbal and nonverbal cues necessary for 
positive impression formation while replicating the words of others. While experimental 
stimuli in these studies were short videos of shadowers, the authors do report piloting the 
shadowing procedure in vivo. Milgram (1992) referenced Schwitzgebel and Taylor’s study as 
an example of how speech shadowing could be used in social experimentation, but his 
ambition was to employ the method in interactive settings where research subjects freely 
dialogued with shadowers face-to-face.  
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Milgram’s pilot studies. In the first pilot described in his APA speech, Milgram (1992) 
reports having 20 naïve participants engage in one-on-one conversations with various adult 
cyranoids for whom he sourced, and following these interactions no participant agreed with a 
questionnaire item suggesting that their interlocutor had been merely repeating messages 
received via radio. Upon learning the true nature of these interactions, some participants “felt 
the loss of a person,” having had quite an engaging experience with their interlocutor, who, as 
it turned out, was merely a “synthetic creation of the experimental procedure and had no 
existence apart from the hybridization which the experiment created” (Milgram, 1992, p. 
340). Notably lacking from this study were control groups (specifically, non-cyranoid dyads) 
capturing participants’ baseline experiences with the shadowers.  
 
Milgram suspected that interactants would still be inclined to see a cyranoid as autonomous 
even in cases where a source and shadower were quite dissimilar from one another. 
Accordingly, he tested the robustness of the cyranic illusion by conducting the 
aforementioned interview-panel study wherein he separately sourced for 11- and 12-year-old 
shadowers while being interrogated by groups of teachers. The teachers were asked to assess 
their interviewee’s intelligence during the interviews, so in effect were unknowingly 
evaluating a child producing the words of a university professor. Rather than provide a 
systematic analysis of these interactions, however, Milgram reports select anecdotes from 
teachers’ post-interview written evaluations highlighting how the deception went undetected 
despite the conversations being very incongruous. 
 
Cyranoids after Milgram. Despite being largely ignored within the scientific community, 
the cyranic technique has recently been picked up by artists who have used cyranoids as parts 
of social installations within which participants experience breaches of social norms 
(Mitchell, Gillespie, & O’Neill, 2011; Pawlak, 2009) and that create conditions under which 
people unknowingly encounter familiar others (e.g., friends and spouses) through the bodies 
of strangers (Mitchell, 2009). The cyranoid has also been used as a metaphorical device 
within societal and media analysis to describe public perception of highly visible social actors 
(e.g., the movie star, the news anchor, the politician, etc.), whose relationships with the 
masses are often mere performance and whose messages are often carefully crafted by unseen 
speechwriters (McCarthy, 2006, 2011). Despite these developments, which touch upon 
phenomena fundamental to social psychology, experimental scenarios involving human 
cyranoids have not yet been formally investigated.  
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Creating a cyranoid. There are many combinations of gadgetry that might facilitate a 
functional cyranic interaction. However, a researcher attempting to construct a cyranoid must 
make considerations based on the level of mobility and covertness they hope to attain. 
Various technologies enable low-latency audio transfer between source and shadower (e.g., 
radio transmitters, Wi-Fi, mobile phone devices, etc.), each with certain benefits and 
drawbacks. Inner-ear radio receivers similar to those used in the current work provide 
perhaps the greatest degree of mobility and stealth as they are wireless and not readily 
perceivable at close distances by interactants. Audio relay from shadower to source can easily 
be accomplished using wireless microphones. Though video relay from shadower to source is 
not necessary, providing the source with a feed of their shadower’s field of vision gives a 
richer sense of the intersubjective phenomena occurring between shadower and interactant. 
Live video relay can be accomplished via overt gadgets (e.g., subcams; see Lahlou, 2011) or 
covert recorders. Further descriptions of the types of gadgetry that can constitute a “cyranic 
contraption” are discussed by Mitchell et al. (2011).  
 
Methodological and theoretical implications of the cyranoid 
The cyranoid method holds particular promise as a means of constructing and controlling the 
inner (dispositional, non-visible) and outer (physical, visible) identities of human stimuli in 
experiments that approximate real-world scenarios (e.g., unscripted, face-to-face 
interlocution). The methodological advances in social psychology that followed Milgram’s 
era established experimental norms that prioritized internal validity and replicability 
generally at the expense of mundane realism and Milgram-esque experimental flair (Adair, 
1991), and as such, most modern substantiations of the field’s major theories (e.g., the dual 
processing models of information processing; Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) have 
relied upon static experimental stimuli (e.g., vignettes and cognitive tasks) in which research 
participants are largely isolated from anything resembling an actual social context. Where 
methods do involve dynamic human-human interaction, potential confounds are often 
reduced by physically distancing participants from human stimuli (e.g., via computer-
mediation) or by restricting dialogue within strict parameters by-way-of role-playing and/or 
scripting. As social psychological methodologists point out, the de-socializing of 
experimental stimuli has arisen largely due to the need to control confounds and preserve 
independence among observations of dependent variables—prerequisites for standard 
analytical techniques such as ANOVA (see Kashy & Kenny, 2000; Willard, Madon, Guyll, 
Scherr, & Buller, 2012).  
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The cyranoid method enables specific forms of experimental control to be introduced into 
research scenarios involving participants more or less freely associating with human stimuli 
(cyranoids) face-to-face and in close-proximity. This affords researchers the opportunity to 
achieve levels of mundane realism not possible with traditional stimuli (e.g., “paper people” 
and the like; see Murphy, Herr, Lockhart, & Maguire, 1986). A well-trained shadower can 
spontaneously replicate the prose of a large variety of source-types, constituting a controlled 
outer identity (or “body”) across experimental conditions differentiated by inner identity. 
Likewise, a single source can serve as a controlled inner identity (or “mind”) across 
experimental conditions differentiated by shadower-type. In fact, this logic has recently 
inspired researchers operating in the overlap between social psychology and computer 
science to develop an experimental practice that makes use of immersive virtual environment 
technology (see Bailenson, Beall, Loomis, Blascovich, & Turk, 2004; Bailenson, Yee, 
Blascovich, & Guadagno, 2008; Blascovich et al., 2002). These researchers argue that this 
technology offers a means of achieving high levels of mundane realism and experimental 
control, and often cite Milgram’s cyranoid method as an analogue. In immersive virtual 
environments, participants control human avatars (the digital equivalents of cyranoids) in 
three-dimensional simulated social worlds as researchers observe how users’ behaviors and 
perceptions change in relation to the characteristics of the avatars they ostensibly control and 
interact with (see “the Proteus effect”: Yee, Bailenson, & Ducheneaut, 2009; “walk a mile in 
digital shoes”: Yee & Bailenson, 2006).  
 
The cyranoid method also presents a means for social psychologists to examine a number of 
core theoretical paradigms. One such paradigm, which we consider in Study 2 of the present 
work, involves the role of appearance cues (e.g., age, gender, height, ethnicity, etc.) in 
mediating person perception. For instance, it has been well documented that people tend to 
implicitly perceive unity between outer appearance and inner disposition (e.g., attractiveness 
←→ competence: Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972; Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo, 
1991; race ←→ aggression: Duncan, 1976; Sagar & Schofield, 1980; youthfulness ←→ 
naivety; Berry & McArthur, 1986). Using the cyranoid method, one may investigate how 
interactants’ perceptions of a cyranoid interlocutor change when the identity of the shadower 
is manipulated (e.g., by age or gender) and the source is kept constant. We can thus come to 
understand the components of a target source’s disposition that are perceived as more or less 
stable irrespective of outer identity (i.e., which elements “cut through” the exterior), and 
those that are susceptible to change according to outer identity.  
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Connecting these issues with related literature addressing social behavior, there has been 
well-established research on stereotypes and their often self-fulfilling nature—how a 
perceiver’s biased expectations regarding a target on the basis of their appearance may 
actually elicit stereotype-confirming patterns of behavior from targets (Snyder & Stukas Jr., 
1999; Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977) as well as jointly influence behavioral confirmation 
by perceivers (Chen & Bargh, 1997). These issues can be investigated in highly dynamic and 
interactive contexts using cyranoids, as the identities of sources, shadowers, and interactants 
can be manipulated to test, for example, how the intersubjective phenomena that arise 
between cyranoids and interactants change on account of the dispositional and physical 
makeup of a cyranoid. Though Milgram had in fact alluded to stereotype phenomena in 
describing the outcomes of his pilots, he never couched his observations within a broader 
theoretical framework (Blass, 2004).  
 
Overview of studies 
Studies 1 and 2 are modeled off of the pilots Milgram (1992) conducted, though each goes 
beyond Milgram in terms of scope, control, and breadth of analysis. Both studies investigate 
the robustness of the cyranic illusion using a number of approaches, including post-
interaction interviewing, survey-response, and video/transcript review. Study 2 examines 
aspects of person perception in relation to inner vs. outer identity and associated behavioral 
phenomena. In both studies, confederates were trained to function as sources and shadowers 
across various experimental conditions while participants served as naïve interactants. Each 
study was separately approved by an ethical review board at a major British university. 
Studies were conducted in a behavioral research laboratory and participants were recruited 
from a major metropolitan area via internet advertisement.  
 
The aspect of identity we manipulate in Study 2 is age group (child vs. adult) on the basis of 
it being the trait dimension explored by Milgram. It has been shown that age is a 
characteristic with which individuals reflexively categorize others into person-types (Brewer 
& Lui, 1989), and that people tend to define themselves and others relative to prototypes 
representative of discrete age groups (e.g., infant, young-adult, middle-aged, etc.; Giles & 
Reid, 2005). Based on a target’s overt age, people instinctively make judgments concerning a 
variety of socio-personal dimensions, such as social status and competence (see Berry & 
McArthur, 1986; Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981; Fiske, 2010; Krueger, Heckhausen, & 
Hundertmark, 1995). In particular, people are more likely to ascribe intelligence to a target if 
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the target shows certain signs of aging (see Montepare & Zebrowitz, 1998; Muscarella & 
Cunningham, 1996). We use interactions involving cyranoids composed of age-discrepant 
source-shadower hybrids to observe how interlocution behavior and person perception align 
with age-based stereotypes.  
 
Cyranoid notation. The terms “source,” “shadower,” and “interactant” have meanings in 
contexts outside of cyranoid research that may obfuscate their usage herein. Therefore, we 
have devised a notation scheme for illustrating cyranic interactions that we shall employ in 
conjunction with the terminology.  
 
There are three essential components to a cyranic interaction: the source (the agent who 
relays communication to the shadower), the shadower (the agent who shadows speech 
provided by the source), and the interactant (the agent who physically encounters the 
shadower). The hybrid persona that results from merging a source’s words with a shadower’s 
body is called a cyranoid. We use braces (“{}”) to distinguish what is visible to an interactant 
(namely, the body of either a cyranoid or an autonomously communicating interlocutor), and 
square brackets (“[]”) to denote the source of the body’s communicated words (which can be 
either their own if speaking autonomously or that of a third party when shadowing): 
 
{[Joe]Joe} Joe speaking self-authored 
words {[Joe]Ben} Ben shadowing 
Joe’s words (forming a cyranoid) 
 
General descriptors and subscripts can be used to describe the makeup of an agent:  
 
{[Adult]Adult} An adult speaking self-authored words 
{[Adult]Child}  A child shadowing for an adult  
{[Female1]Female2} Female2 shadowing for Female1 
 
The addition symbol (“+”) can be used to describe multiple sources and multiple shadowers:  
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{[A + B]C} C shadowing for both A and B 
{[A]B} + {[A]C} B and C both shadowing for A  
 
 Left-right arrows (“←→”) are used to distinguish communication with interactants:  
 
{[A]B}←→ Group C B shadowing for A in dialogue with 
Group C 
{[A]B} ←→ C + D B shadowing for A in dialogue with C 
and D  
 
Finally, general descriptors and subscripts can signify type-similarity/dissimilarity:  
 
{[FemaleUSA]MaleUK} Male (British) shadowing for Female 
(American) 
 
Study 1: Exploring the cyranic illusion in dyadic interactions 
The goal of our first study was to validate the cyranic illusion through a simple experiment 
designed to gauge whether participants would detect a speech shadower during face-to-face, 
close-proximity, unrehearsed, dyadic interlocution. Aside from Milgram’s (1992) pilots, there 
was no precedent for studying such a phenomenon in the psychological literature, so the 
techniques we used to investigate the illusion borrowed principally from Milgram.  
 
Method. Subjects and confederates. Forty adults participated in the study (22 female; mean 
age = 30.25; SD = 9.95). Two confederates partook in the study: a 23-year-old female 
graduate student and a 26-year-old male graduate student. Participants were randomly 
assigned to experimental conditions. Both confederates engaged in numerous mock trials of 
the experimental procedure so as to become familiar with the apparatus and achieve a 
consistent degree of accurate, low-latency speech replication.  
 
Conditions. The experiment featured two conditions: Cyranoid (n = 20 participants), and 
Non-cyranoid (n = 20 participants). In the Cyranoid condition, participants individually 
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engaged in a 10-minute face-to-face dialogue with the male confederate who participants 
were led to believe was another research participant when in fact the male confederate was 
speech shadowing for the female confederate for the entirety of the interaction: 
{[Female]Male} ←→ Participant. The Non-cyranoid condition mirrored the protocols of the 
Cyranoid condition, albeit this time the male confederate spoke autonomously with 
participants: {[Male]Male} ←→ Participant.  
 
Instructions and materials. Participants were informed that the study involved holding a 10-
minute conversation with another research participant. In order to convey the notion that the 
interactions were not scripted, participants were told that during the conversation they could 
speak with their interlocutor about whatever subject they wished. Following these 
interactions, participants completed a brief questionnaire that included three items designed 
to gauge their suspicions as to whether or not they believed their interlocutor was (a) simply 
repeating messages received via radio, (b) giving scripted responses, and (c) speaking their 
own thoughts. Participants were asked to either “agree” or “disagree” with each statement. 
Participants were also asked to provide a brief written evaluation of the person with whom 
they communicated, the purpose of which was to capture subjective, spontaneous impressions 
of the interlocutor.  
 
Apparatus. The male confederate sat roughly 6 feet apart from participants in an interaction 
room. Video cameras were placed at eye-level behind each interlocutor so as to capture 
approximations of their fields of vision. Adjacent to the interaction room was a soundproof 
source room (used for Cyranoid trials) which housed devices that enabled the female 
confederate to source for the male confederate. The video camera capturing audio and the 
field of vision of the male confederate was broadcast to a video monitor in the source room 
so that the female confederate could observe activity between the male confederate and the 
participant.  
 
The cyranoid contraption consisted of a series of connected devices. The female source spoke 
into a microphone connected to an FM transmitter that relayed to a small radio worn in the 
pocket of the male confederate. Connected to the radio was a neck-loop induction coil worn 
under the confederate’s clothing. The male confederate wore a discreet, flesh-colored, 
wireless, inner-ear audio device (not noticeable at close distances) that received an audio 
signal from the induction coil. This apparatus allowed the male confederate to hear the words 
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of the female confederate in the source room in real-time.  
 
Procedure. Following informed consent and instruction, the participant was led to the 
interaction room. The male confederate then entered the room and sat facing the participant. 
The researcher left the room and participant-confederate dialogue commenced. After 10 
minutes, the researcher returned to the interaction room, instructed the male confederate to 
leave, and delivered the post-interaction questionnaire to the participant. Following 
completion of the questionnaire and written evaluation, the participant was interviewed by 
the researcher and asked verbally whether they detected anything unusual regarding their 
interlocutor’s verbal and nonverbal communication. Following all attempts to extract their 
suspicions, the researcher disclosed the full nature of the study in a debrief session.  
 
Results. Using STATA, participants’ agree/disagree questionnaire responses were analyzed 
using exact logistic regression, an alternative to binary logistic regression that provides a 
more accurate model of small samples (Hirji, Mehta, & Patel, 1987; for procedure see UCLA 
Statistical Consulting Group, 2014). In relation to the Non-cyranoid condition, participating 
in the Cyranoid condition did not significantly affect the odds (πagree/πdisagree) of a 
participant agreeing with the questionnaire statement: “My interlocutor spoke their own 
thoughts,” OR = 0.31, SE = 0.37, 95% CI [0.01, 4.24] (CI spanning 1 signifies non-
significance). Overall, 19 of 20 participants in the Non-cyranoid condition indicated 
agreement with this item compared to 17 of 20 participants in the Cyranoid condition. 
Participating in the Cyranoid condition did not significantly affect the odds of agreeing with 
the statement: “My interlocutor gave scripted responses,” OR = 0.31, SE = 0.37, 95% CI 
[0.01, 4.24]. Three of 20 participants in the Non-Cyranoid condition indicated agreement 
with this item compared to only one of 20 participants in the Cyranoid condition. No 
participant in either condition agreed with the questionnaire item that read: “My interlocutor 
spoke by receiving radio messages and repeating them.”  
 
No participant stated that their interlocutor was behaving unusually or in a pre-prescribed 
manner during post-interaction interviews and debriefing. Moreover, none of the written 
evaluations provided by participants in the Cyranoid condition gave any indication that the 
cyranic illusion was detected, and when the deception was revealed during the debrief 
session, responses were a positive mixture of astonishment and amusement. As further 
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evidence of the illusion, a review of the video recordings and dialogue transcripts showed 
that at no point during any of the experimental trials did participants raise the possibility that 
their interlocutor was talking via assistance or using a script.  
 
Study 2: Exploring interpersonal biases with incongruent cyranoids 
Study 2 was modelled off of Milgram’s (1992) second pilot and featured two age-discrepant 
male confederates (a child and an adult) interviewed by panels of participants both 
autonomously and interchangeably as sources and shadowers for one another. Whereas the 
sole focus of Study 1 was to demonstrate the cyranic illusion, our second study included the 
additional goal of examining how verbal behavior confirms age-group stereotypes. To this 
end, we considered three components of cyranoid-interactant interlocution: (a) the duration of 
utterances spoken by confederate interviewees, (b) the difficulty of questions posed by 
participants, and (c) the sophistication of responses given by confederate interviewees in 
reply to participants’ questions. Our interest resided in whether or not confederates would 
produce equivalent amounts of content across conditions, whether participants would ask 
more difficult questions of an adult-bodied interviewee independent of which confederate 
was actually generating responses to their questions, and also if self-stereotyping would 
occur, whereby confederates would alter the sophistication of their responses on account of 
the body they were interviewed through. Furthermore, we assessed participants’ written 
evaluations of the person they interviewed to gauge whether participants’ explicit 
impressions were mediated by the age group of the body they encountered.  
 
Method. Subjects and confederates. Seventy-two adults partook in the study (43 female; 
mean age = 23.33; SD = 2.80). A 12-year-old male actor and a 37-year-old adult male social 
psychology professor served as confederates. Participants were randomly assigned to 
interview-panels nested within experimental conditions. As with Study 1, the confederates 
rehearsed Study 2’s procedure in numerous mock trials so as to achieve consistency with the 
cyranoid technique.  
 
Conditions. Each of four experimental conditions consisted of 18 participants divided among 
four interview panels, and panels varied in size between three and five participants. 
Conditions followed an identical protocol wherein interview-panels interrogated a 
confederate for 20-minutes. In the {[Adult]Adult} condition, interview-panels interacted with 
the adult confederate speaking autonomously: {[Adult]Adult} ←→ Panel1-4. The 
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{[Adult]Child} condition featured the adult confederate sourcing for the child confederate 
shadower: {[Adult]Child} ←→ Panel5-8. The {[Child]Child} condition consisted of 
interview-panels interacting with the autonomously-speaking child confederate: 
{[Child]Child} ←→ Panel9-12. Finally, the {[Child]Adult} condition featured the child 
confederate sourcing for the adult confederate shadower: {[Child]Adult} ←→ Panel13-16. 
Experimental trials alternated so as to counterbalance sequencing effects.  
 
Instructions and materials. Participants received instruction forms individually and were 
given verbal instructions by the researcher as an interview-panel. Participants were asked to 
interview an individual in order to gain a sense of “what they’re like and what they know.” 
They were told to focus their questions on the domains of (a) science, (b) literature, and (c) 
current and historical political events, these being quite similar to those Milgram (1992) had 
instructed his participants to follow. The researcher emphasized that they were free to 
interpret these domains as broadly as they wished. As with Study 1, the emphasis on allowing 
participants to generate their own questions was intended to undermine the possibility of 
participants assuming their interviewee’s responses were rehearsed. Participants were asked 
not to speak to each other during the interview nor respond to any question or comment posed 
by another panel member (so as to reduce their influence over one another and to keep 
dialogue directed toward the confederate interviewee).  
 
A post-interview questionnaire completed by participants contained the same three 
agree/disagree items from Study 1 designed to gauge whether participants succumbed to the 
cyranic illusion. As with Study 1, participants were also asked to provide a brief written 
evaluation of their interviewee before being interviewed by the researcher.  
 
Apparatus. The apparatus used was similar to that of Study 1, except that the interaction 
room contained five chairs positioned opposite the confederate such that each interviewer sat 
facing their interviewee at a distance of roughly 6 feet. The contraption of devices that 
allowed the source confederate to deliver speech to the shadowing confederate in cyranic 
conditions was identical to that utilized in Study 1.  
 
Procedure. Following informed consent and instruction, the confederate (either the adult or 
the child) was brought into the interaction room and seated opposite the interview-panel. In 
all conditions the confederate went by the name “Stanley.” Participants were given no 
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background information on Stanley nor were they given any indication that this person was a 
confederate. The researcher then left the room and interviews commenced.  
 
The researcher returned after 20-minutes to halt the interview. The confederate left the 
interaction room and participants were led to an evaluation room, seated at individual desks, 
and handed the post-interaction questionnaire. Following completion of questionnaires and 
written evaluations, participants returned to the interaction room where they were interviewed 
and debriefed by the researcher as a group akin to Study 1.  
 
Interlocution measures. Dialogue from each interview was transcribed and a survey 
containing all main interviewer question threads extracted from each interview-panel was 
compiled using survey software and presented to six coders (four female, mean age = 24.00) 
blind to the research objectives. Only questions which introduced a new topic or concept 
were assessed, while follow-up questions and comments made by the interviewers that did 
not significantly change the topic or introduce a new concept were excluded from the 
analysis. Coders independently rated each question (condition-blind, randomized) in terms of 
“how difficult to answer the average person would find the question” using a five-point rating 
system ranging from 1 (not at all difficult) to 5 (very difficult). The composite variable 
Question Difficulty was derived by averaging the difficulty scores provided by coders for 
each question and was used to assess whether or not the questions posed by participants 
varied in terms of difficulty across experimental conditions.  
 
Confederate interviewees’ full responses to the question threads posed by participants 
(including responses to follow-up questions) were extracted from each experimental trial and 
presented to five coders (three female, mean age = 24.00) blind to the research objectives. 
Coders independently rated each response (condition-blind, randomized) in terms of its 
sophistication on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all sophisticated) to 5 (very sophisticated). 
The composite variable Response Sophistication was then computed by averaging coders’ 
sophistication ratings for each response and was used to assess whether or not the 
sophistication of confederate interviewees’ responses differed across experimental 
conditions. We also computed the total number of words spoken by the confederate 
interviewee during each full response in order to generate the variable Response Length. This 
variable was calculated in order to assess the degree to which Response Sophistication varied 
in relation to the length of responses provided by confederate interviewees, as well as to gain 
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a sense of whether or not perceptions of sophistication varied more as a function of the 
quantity of words spoken vs. the quality of the words (i.e., content, reasoning, lexicon, phrase 
structure, etc.).  
 
Finally, the variable Utterance Length was generated by calculating the quantity of words 
articulated during each unique conversational turn spoken by confederate interviewees. This 
variable was used to determine the extent to which confederates produced similar amounts of 
turn content when speaking autonomously compared to when sourcing for a shadowing 
confederate.  
 
Person perception measures. Following all trials, participants’ post-interaction written 
evaluations were transcribed and anonymized. Two independent reviewers (one female, mean 
age = 28.50), blind to the research objectives, developed a coding frame comprised of seven 
dichotomous trait dimensions which emerged from the corpus of written evaluations, these 
being: (a) Intelligence (intelligent vs. unintelligent), (b) Confidence (confident vs. 
unconfident), (c) Maturity (mature vs. immature), (d) Extraversion (extraverted vs. 
introverted), (e) Friendliness (friendly vs. unfriendly), (f) Opinionatedness (opinionated vs. 
not-opinionated), and (g) Honesty (honest vs. dishonest). Six coders (four female, mean age = 
23.00) then independently rated each participant’s written evaluation (condition-blind, 
randomized), assigning to each a score for each trait dimensions: +1 for positive attributions, 
–1 for negative attributions, and 0 for attributions that did not appear in the written evaluation 
(e.g., if a participant remarked that their interviewee was intelligent, confident, mature, 
introverted, unfriendly, and opinionated, but did not comment on their honesty, a coder 
would score their evaluation as follows: Intelligence = 1, Confidence = 1, Maturity = 1, 
Extraversion = –1, Friendliness = –1, Opinionatedness = 1, Honesty = 0). For each written 
evaluation, seven person perception measure variables (Intelligent, Confident, Mature, 
Extraverted, Friendly, Opinionated, and Honest) were generated by averaging coders’ trait 
dimension scores.  
 
Results. Detecting the cyranic illusion. We again used exact logistic regression to analyze 
participants’ post-interaction questionnaire agree/disagree responses. The dummy variables 
Cyranoid and Adult were used to signify both the type of interaction experienced by the 
participants (cyranoid vs. non-cyranoid) and the confederate present in the room with 
participants (adult vs. child), respectively. Neither Cyranoid, OR = 0.71, SE = 0.59, 95% CI 
65
[0.08, 5.02], Adult, OR = 3.29, SE = 3.93, 95% CI [0.23, 188.78], nor the interaction between 
these factors, OR = 0.47, SE = 0.65, 95% CI [0.01, 13.05] significantly affected the odds of a 
participant agreeing with the statement: “The person I interviewed spoke their own thoughts.” 
Likewise, neither Cyranoid, OR = 1.58, SE = 1.53, 95% CI [0.16, 21.40], Adult, OR = 1.00, 
SE = 1.05, 95% CI [0.06, 15.39], nor the interaction between these factors, OR = 1.00, SE = 
1.31, 95% CI [0.03, 29.60] significantly affected the odds of agreeing with the statement: 
“The person I interviewed gave scripted responses.” A model was not calculated for the item 
stating: “The person I interviewed spoke by receiving radio messages and repeating them,” as 
exactly one participant (n = 1) in each experimental condition agreed with this item while the 
remaining participants (n = 17) in each condition disagreed.  
 
An assessment of the post-interaction written evaluations, interview statements and 
debriefing remarks revealed strong evidence for the success of the illusion. No participant 
commented that they suspected that their interviewee had been merely ventriloquizing for 
another individual, and although a small number of participants suggested that their 
interviewee might have prepared answers, none felt strongly that the interviewee was 
behaving in an inauthentic manner. Furthermore, assessments of the video footage and 
transcripts from each trial showed that not once during any of the 16 interview sessions did 
participants openly question the interviewee’s autonomy.  
 
Interlocution. Following Shrout and Fleiss’ (1979) guidelines on computing intraclass 
correlation, high agreement was found among coders who scored the difficulty of questions 
posed by participants: ICC(2,6), absolute = 0.85, 95% CI [0.80, 0.89]. Similarly, high 
agreement was found among coders who rated the sophistication of confederate interviewees’ 
responses: ICC(2,5), absolute = 0.90, 95% CI [0.87, 0.92].  
 
We used procedures demonstrated by Field (2009) and Judd (2000) to build multilevel mixed 
effects linear regression models in order to assess the contrasts between the experimental 
conditions with respect to Utterance Length, Question Difficulty, and Response 
Sophistication. As observations of these interlocution measures were drawn from interview-
panels nested within experimental conditions (and therefore non-independent in nature), the 
random effects of each interview-panel were considered in our models while the dummy 
variables [Adult] and {Adult} were used to indicate fixed factor levels pertinent to each 
experimental condition. [Adult] took the value of 1 in conditions where the adult confederate 
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generated responses to interview-panel questions and 0 in conditions where the child 
confederate generated responses. {Adult} took the value of 1 when the adult confederate was 
physically present in the interaction room and 0 when the child confederate was physically 
present in the interaction room. Thus, the factor levels for each experimental condition were 
as follows: {[Adult]Adult}: [Adult] = 1, {Adult} = 1; {[Adult]Child}: [Adult] = 1, {Adult} = 
0; {[Child]Child}: [Adult] = 0, {Adult} = 0; {[Child]Adult}: [Adult] = 0, {Adult} = 1. 
  
Utterance length. Our final model in which Utterance Length was designated as the response 
variable revealed a significant interaction between {Adult} and [Adult], F(7.92) = 9.52, p < 
.05. There were no significant main effects of either [Adult], F(7.68) = 2.01, p = .20, or 
{Adult}, F(7.72) = 0.03, p = .87. See Table 2.1 for final model estimated effect sizes, standard 
errors, and confidence intervals, and Table 2.4 for pooled means and standard deviations.  
 
Two separate multilevel models were used to further explore the significant interaction 
between {Adult} and [Adult] with respect to Utterance Length. We first considered only 
observations from experimental conditions in which participants engaged with the adult 
confederate’s words ([Adult] = 1) and fit a modified version of our final model that excluded 
[Adult] and the interaction between [Adult] and {Adult} as fixed factors. This model showed 
that the adult confederate’s utterances were significantly longer when spoken through their 
own body ({Adult} = 1) than when shadowed by the child confederate, b = 66.67, SE = 20.70, 
t(3.99) = 3.22, p < .05. We then considered only participants who engaged with the child 
confederate’s words ([Adult] = 0) and found that the child confederate’s utterances were not 
significantly different when being shadowed by the adult confederate ({Adult} = 1) than when 
spoken through their own body, b = 2.12, SE = 2.54, t(7.72) = 0.83, p = .43.  
 
Question difficulty. Our final model predicting Question Difficulty showed significant main 
effects of both {Adult}, F(11.97) = 9.18, p < .05, and [Adult], F(15.46) = 6.15, p < .05. The 
interaction between these two fixed factors was not significant, F(17.92) = 1.61, p = .22. We 
included in our final model the fixed factor predictor Previous Response Sophistication as a 
control variable in order to examine the relationship between the difficulty of questions posed 
and the sophistication (Response Sophistication) confederate interviewees demonstrated in 
the preceding question thread. Previous Response Sophistication was found to have no 
significant effect on Question Difficulty, F(362.97) = 1.35, p = .25. Estimated effect sizes, 
standard errors, and confidence intervals for both our final and partial models are shown in
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Table 2.2, while Table 2.4 shows pooled means and standard deviations.  
 
Response sophistication. Our final model with the response variable Response Sophistication 
revealed a significant main effect of [Adult], F(11.22) = 21.18, p < .01, a non-significant 
main effect of {Adult}, F(10.98) = 0.42, p = .53, and a significant interaction between these 
factors, F(12.94) = 7.00, p < .05. Estimated effect sizes, standard errors, and confidence 
intervals can be found in Table 2.3, while Table 2.4 shows pooled means and standard 
deviations.  
 
Separate multilevel models were used to explore the interaction between {Adult} and [Adult]. 
We first considered only observations from experimental conditions in which participants 
engaged with the adult confederate’s words ([Adult] = 1) and fit a modified version of our 
final model that excluded [Adult] and the interaction between [Adult] and {Adult} as fixed 
factors. This model revealed that the effect of {Adult} on response sophistication scores was 
significant, b = 1.00, SE = 0.30, t(6.81) = 3.36, p < .05. We then considered only participants 
who engaged with the child confederate’s words ([Adult] = 0) and found no significant effect 
of {Adult}, b = 0.14, SE = 0.15, t(7.02) = 0.89, p = .40. As a post-hoc analysis, we decided to 
explore the possibility that relative differences in Response Length (the total words spoken by 
a confederate during their complete response to a question thread) may have played a central
Table 2.1 
Multilevel Model Fixed Factor Effect Size Estimates for Utterance Length – Study 2a 
Predictors  b (SE)  95% CI 
Constant  13.36 (2.16)**  8.14, 18.58 
Categorical Fixed Factorsb:     
   {Adult}  2.54 (14.52)  -31.16, 36.25 
   [Adult]  4.56 (3.22)  -2.91, 12.02 
   Interaction: {Adult} x [Adult]  63.76 (20.67)*  16.01, 111.51 
Note. Dependent measure is Utterance Length, defined as number of words per confederate interviewee 
utterance. Model includes random intercepts and random slope coefficients as the relationship between {Adult} 
and Utterance Length showed significant variance in intercepts across interview-panels, var(υ0j) = 8.37, χ2(1) = 
304.54, p < 0.001, while slopes also varied significantly across interview-panels, var(υ1j) = 800.74, χ2(1) = 
23.70, p < 0.001.  
a {[Adult]Adult}: n = 139, 4 panels; {[Child]Adult}: n = 262, 4 panels; {[Child]Child}: n= 402, 4 panels; 
{[Adult]Child}: n = 290, 4 panels. 
b Factor levels for {[Child]Child}: {Adult} = 0, [Adult] = 0; {[Child]Adult}: {Adult} = 1, [Adult] = 0; 
{[Adult]Child}: {Adult} = 0, [Adult] = 1; {[Adult]Adult}: {Adult} = 1, [Adult] = 1. 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
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Table 2.3 
Multilevel Model Fixed Factor Effect Size Estimates for Response Sophistication – Study 2a 
Predictors  b (SE)  95% CI 
Constant  1.75 (0.15)**  1.41, 2.09 
Categorical Fixed Factorsb:     
   {Adult}  0.14 (0.22)  -0.34, 0.62 
   [Adult]  1.01 (0.22)**  0.52, 1.50 
   Interaction: {Adult} x [Adult]  0.85 (0.32)*  0.16, 1.55 
Note. Dependent measure is Response Sophistication, computed by averaging coder sophistication ratings for 
each statement made by confederate interviewee in response to interview-panel members’ questions (ranges 
from 1 to 5: 1 = not at all sophisticated; 5 = very sophisticated). Final Model includes random intercepts as the 
relationship between {Adult} and Response Sophistication showed significant variance in intercepts across 
interview-panels, var(υ0j) = 8.00 × 10
-2, χ2(1) = 21.36, p < .001. 
a {[Adult]Adult}: n = 43, 4 panels; {[Child]Adult}: n = 95, 4 panels; {[Child]Child}: n= 162, 4 panels; 
{[Adult]Child}: n = 82, 4 panels. 
b Factor levels for {[Child]Child}: {Adult} = 0, [Adult] = 0; {[Child]Adult}: {Adult} = 1, [Adult] = 0; 
{[Adult]Child}: {Adult} = 0, [Adult] = 1; {[Adult]Adult}: {Adult} = 1, [Adult] = 1. 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
Table 2.2 
Multilevel Model Fixed Factor Effect Size Estimates for Question Difficulty – Study 2a 
  Partial Model  Final Modelb 
Predictors  b (SE)  95% CI  b (SE)  95% CI 
Constant  2.01 
(0.15)*** 
 1.69, 2.34  1.88 
(0.18)*** 
 1.50, 2.25 
Categorical Fixed Factorsc:         
   {Adult}  0.64 (0.21)*  0.17, 1.11  0.63 (0.21)*  0.18, 1.08 
   [Adult]  0.63 (0.22)*  0.16, 1.10  0.55 (0.22)*  0.08, 1.02 
   Interaction: {Adult} x [Adult]  -0.34 (0.33)  -1.04, 0.36  -0.41 (0.33)  -1.10, 0.27 
Control Variable:         
   Previous Response 
Sophisticationd 
     0.08 (0.07)  -0.06, 0.22 
Note. Dependent measure is Question Difficulty, computed by averaging coder difficulty ratings for each 
question posed by interview-panel members (ranges from 1 to 5: 1 = not at all difficult; 5 = very difficult). 
Final Model includes random intercepts as the relationship between {Adult} and Question Difficulty showed 
significant variance in intercepts across interview-panels, var(υ0j) = 0.06, χ2(1) = 11.41, p < 0.001. 
a {[Adult]Adult}: n = 39, 4 panels; {[Child]Adult}: n = 91, 4 panels; {[Child]Child}: n = 158, 4 panels; 
{[Adult]Child}: n = 78, 4 panels. 
b Final Model (-2 log-likelihood = 958.67) showed slight improvement in fit vs. Partial Model (-2 log-
likelihood = 959.99). 
c Factor levels for {[Child]Child}: {Adult} = 0, [Adult] = 0; {[Child]Adult}: {Adult} = 1, [Adult] = 0; 
{[Adult]Child}: {Adult} = 0, [Adult] = 1; {[Adult]Adult}: {Adult} = 1, [Adult] = 1. 
d Defined as Response Sophistication score for confederate interviewee’s response to preceding question.  
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
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role in the disparity in response sophistication scores between {[Adult]Adult} and 
{[Adult]Child}, as the adult confederate produced significantly lengthier responses when 
speaking through their own body than when speaking through the body of the child 
confederate, b = 86.03, SE = 12.00, t(123) = 7.19, p < .001. Indeed, considering only cases in 
which the adult confederate generated responses ([Adult] = 1), Response Sophistication was 
significantly predicted by Response Length, b = 0.10, SE = 1.00 × 10-14, t(123) = 12.56, p < 
.001.  
 
Person perception. Inter-rater reliability analyses showed high agreement for each of the 
seven coded trait dimensions derived from participants’ post-interaction written evaluations 
(Intelligence: ICC(2,6), absolute = 0.92, 95% CI [0.88, 0.94]; Confidence: ICC(2,6), absolute 
= 0.86, 95% CI [0.80, 0.91]; Maturity: ICC(2,6), absolute = 0.83, 95% CI [0.76, 0.88]; 
Extraversion: ICC(2,6), absolute = 0.80, 95% CI [0.72, 0.87]; Friendliness: ICC(2,6), 
absolute = 0.82, 95% CI [0.74, 0.88]; Opinionatedness: ICC(2,6), absolute = 0.80, 95% CI 
[0.72, 0.87]; Honesty: ICC(2,6), absolute = 0.84, 95% CI [0.77, 0.89]).  
 
{[Adult]Adult} vs. {[Adult]Child}. To gain a sense of how participants’ perceptions of the 
Table 2.4 
Comparison of Interlocution Measures – Study 2 
 Utterance Lengtha  Question 
Difficultyb 
 Response Sophisticationc 
Condition n M (SD)d  n M (SD)d  n M (SD)d 
{[Adult]Adult} 139 72.09 (85.41)  39 2.91 (1.07)  43 3.68 (1.09) 
{[Adult]Child} 290 17.31 (18.26)  78 2.63 (0.92)  82 2.74 (0.79) 
{[Child]Adult} 262 15.26 (15.48)  91 2.64 (0.98)  95 1.84 (0.62) 
{[Child]Child} 402 13.03 (14.56)  158 2.04 (0.83)  162 1.70 (0.58) 
Note. Table displays pooled means for interlocution measures drawn from each experimental condition. For 
multilevel statistical comparisons of fixed factor effect size estimates and significance testing, see Tables 1, 2, 
and 3.  
a Utterance Length defined as number of words per confederate interviewee utterance. 
b Question Difficulty computed by averaging coder difficulty ratings for each question posed by interview-
panel members; ranges from 1 to 5 (1 = not at all difficult; 5 = very difficult). 
c Response Sophistication computed by averaging coder response sophistication ratings for each full statement 
made by confederate interviewee in response to interview-panel members’ questions; ranges from 1 to 5 (1 = 
not at all sophisticated; 5 = very sophisticated). 
d Means and associated standard deviations derived by pooling each observation by experimental condition 
(ignores interview-panel nesting). 
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autonomously communicating adult confederate compared to perceptions of the adult 
confederate speaking through the body of a child, we computed pooled means for each 
person perception measure (Intelligent, Confident, Mature, Extraverted, Friendly, 
Opinionated, and Honest) and conducted independent samples means tests contrasting 
{[Adult]Adult} with {[Adult]Child}. For Mature, scores from the {[Adult]Child} condition 
were significantly greater than those from the {[Adult]Adult} condition, t(34) = 2.25, p < .05, 
signifying that participants in the {[Adult]Child} condition commented on their interviewee’s 
maturity in their post-interaction written evaluations significantly more so than participants in 
the {[Adult]Adult} condition. No significant differences were found with regard to 
Intelligent, t(34) = 1.72, p = .09, Confident, t(34) = –0.62, p = .54, Extraverted, t(34) = 0.19, 
p = .85, Friendly, t(34) = 0.16, p = .88, Opinionated, t(34) = –1.51, p = .14, and Honest, t(34) 
= 0.68, p = .50. Pooled means and standard deviations for each person perception measure are 
shown in Table 2.5.  
 
The following are excerpts from participants’ post-interaction written evaluations of 
{[Adult]Adult}. In general, participants found the autonomously speaking adult to be 
intelligent and engaging:  
 
Stanley was obviously very intelligent, at many points I 
couldn’t even follow his well thought-out arguments which 
tended to be quite philosophical. He obviously had at least a 
basic knowledge of all 3 subject areas, if not a very deep 
understanding of the issues surrounding them. ({[Adult]Adult}, 
Panel 1, participant 3; person perception measure scores: 
Intelligent = 1.00, Confident = 0.50, Mature = 0.50, 
Extraverted = 0.17, Friendly = 0.00, Opinionated = 0.17, 
Honest = 0.00).  
 
Stanley is a very knowledgeable person. He is very aware of 
current political and historic issues. In addition, he is capable of 
expressing deep expertise in a friendly manner. I would 
definitely consult him for advice in economics and history. 
({[Adult]Adult}, Panel 2, participant 8; person perception 
measure scores: Intelligent = 1.00, Confident = 0.67, Mature =
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Table 2.5 
Person perception score comparison – Study 2: {[Adult]Adult} vs. {[Adult]Child} 
 {[Adult]Adult}  {[Adult]Child}   
Person Perception 
Dimension 
M (SD)a, b  M (SD)a, b  Δ 
Intelligent 0.77 (0.30)  0.94 (0.27)  0.17 
Confident 0.58 (0.24)  0.52 (0.38)  -0.06 
Mature 0.35 (0.26)  0.59 (0.37)  0.24* 
Extraverted 0.30 (0.28)  0.31 (0.30)  0.01 
Friendly 0.25 (0.37)  0.27 (0.33)  0.02 
Opinionated 0.43 (0.37)  0.21 (0.47)  -0.22 
Honest 0.13 (0.32)  0.20 (0.34)  0.07 
Note. Table compares pooled mean person perception scores attributed to confederate interviewee in 
participants’ post-interaction written evaluations between {[Adult]Adult} and {[Adult]Child}. Differences in 
means evaluated using independent samples t-tests.  
a Means and associated standard deviations derived by pooling each person perception score by experimental 
condition (ignores interview-panel nesting). 
b The possible range for mean scores is between -1 and +1, with positive scores reflecting more frequent positive 
evaluation of confederate interviewee in participants’ post-interaction written evaluations (e.g., describing the 
interviewee as “intelligent”), and negative scores reflecting more frequent negative evaluation of confederate 
(e.g., describing the interviewee as “unintelligent”).  
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
0.33, Extraverted = 0.17, Friendly = 1.00, Opinionated = 0.50, 
Honest = 0.17).  
 
I think he is an honest person and talkative. Sometimes even if 
he doesn’t know for sure about the answer he can still find 
something to talk about to get the conversation going. 
({[Adult]Adult}, Panel 4, participant 18; person perception 
measure scores: Intelligent = 0.33, Confident = 0.67, Mature = 
0.50, Extraverted = 1.00, Friendly = 0.50, Opinionated = 0.17, 
Honest = 1.00).  
 
The following are excerpts from participants’ post-interaction written evaluations of 
{[Adult]Child}. It is interesting to note that while participants were largely impressed by the 
intelligence of the person with whom they interacted, some qualify their evaluations by 
suggesting that their interviewee may not have fully understood what they were 
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communicating (see second and third excerpts below):  
 
Very intelligent. Eloquent and charming. He is obviously very 
bright and has a very high level of knowledge for his age. He 
was very polite and well-mannered. He handled a slightly odd 
social situation very maturely. ({[Adult]Child}, Panel 8, 
participant 32; person perception measure scores: Intelligent = 
1.00, Confident = 0.67, Mature = 1.00, Extraverted = 0.33, 
Friendly = 0.67, Opinionated = 0.50, Honest = 0.50).  
 
Clearly very bright. His ability to connect patterns and think in 
a more expanded way than some the questions implied was 
more impressive than his name-dropping of the classics 
(although I don’t doubt that he read and understood them). He 
was articulate, with a lot of intellectual potential, especially 
regarding linkages between language and knowledge. I thought 
he’d enjoy discourse analysis at some point. ({[Adult]Child}, 
Panel 5, participant 19; person perception measure scores: 
Intelligent = 1.00, Confident = 0.83, Mature = 0.83, 
Extraverted = 0.33, Friendly = 0.00, Opinionated = 0.66, 
Honest = 0.00).  
 
He seemed rather intelligent for his age, with a lot of 
knowledge on various matters. He seemed to be capable of 
using big words, however I wasn’t certain if he actually knew 
what they meant in context. ({[Adult]Child}, Panel 6, 
participant 25; person perception measure scores: Intelligent = 
1.00, Confident = 0.33, Mature = 0.33, Extraverted = 0.00, 
Friendly = 0.00, Opinionated = 0.33, Honest = −0.33).  
 
{[Child]Child} vs. {[Child]Adult}. We again calculated pooled means for each person 
perception measure, this time comparing scores from the {[Child]Child} condition with those 
from the {[Child]Adult} condition. Scores from {[Child]Child} were significantly greater 
than those from {[Child]Adult} with regard to Intelligent, t(34) = 7.37, p < .001, Confident, 
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t(34) = 5.22, p < .001, Mature, t(34) = 3.60, p < .01, Extraverted, t(34) = 3.17, p < .01, 
Friendly, t(34) = 3.08, p < .01, and Opinionated, t(34) = 4.63, p < .001. Only with respect to 
Honest did scores not significantly differ, t(34) = 1.82, p = .08. Pooled means and standard 
deviations for each person perception measure are displayed in Table 2.6.  
 
The following are excerpts from participants’ post-interaction written evaluations of 
{[Child]Child}. The interviewee in this condition received generally quite positive 
evaluations, while many participants explicitly referenced the interviewee’s youth and age:  
 
Very willing to venture a guess about questions asked. Honest 
about his uncertainty on some topics. Shows maturity. Well 
informed on local current issues and knows a wide range of 
information about basic science, which he says is his favourite 
topic. He mentioned one author he enjoyed but doesn’t seem 
interested in reading literature. Smart, at the same level I would 
expect of his age.” ({[Child]Child}, Panel 10, participant 43; 
person perception measure scores: Intelligent = 1.00, Confident 
= 0.50, Mature = 1.00, Extraverted = 0.33, Friendly = 0.17, 
Opinionated = 0.67, Honest = 0.83).  
 
I thought he was a friendly lad, and as expected he didn’t know 
lots about literature, science, etc… Open to ideas, able to 
consider new points of view. Seemed intelligent. 
({[Child]Child}, Panel 11, participant 48; person perception 
measure scores: Intelligent = 1.00, Confident = 0.17, Mature = 
0.33, Extraverted = 0.33, Friendly = 0.67, Opinionated = 0.17, 
Honest = 0.33).  
 
Cute. Funny. Knowledgeable for a kid, has a good interest for 
science as well as current events. ({[Child]Child}, Panel 12, 
participant 51; person perception measure scores: Intelligent = 
1.00, Confident = 0.50, Mature = –0.17, Extraverted = 0.83, 
Friendly = 0.83, Opinionated = 0.17, Honest = 0.00).  
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Table 2.6 
Person perception score comparison – Study 2: {[Child]Child} vs. {[Child]Adult} 
 {[Child]Child}  {[Child]Adult}   
Person Perception 
Dimension 
M (SD)a, b  M (SD)a, b  Δ 
Intelligent 0.68 (0.39)  -0.37 (0.46)  -1.05*** 
Confident 0.31 (0.39)  -0.41 (0.43)  -0.72*** 
Mature 0.21 (0.48)  -0.26 (0.28)  -0.47** 
Extraverted 0.19 (0.40)  -0.22 (0.39)  -0.41** 
Friendly 0.30 (0.33)  -0.05 (0.34)  -0.35** 
Opinionated 0.26 (0.43)  -0.38 (0.40)  -0.64*** 
Honest 0.30 (0.34)  0.08 (0.37)  -0.22 
Note. Table compares pooled mean person perception scores attributed to confederate interviewee in 
participants’ post-interaction written evaluations between {[Child]Child} and {[Child]Adult}. Differences in 
means evaluated using independent samples t-tests.  
a Means and associated standard deviations derived by pooling each person perception score by experimental 
condition (ignores interview-panel nesting). 
b The possible range for mean scores is between -1 and +1, with positive scores reflecting more frequent 
positive evaluation of confederate interviewee in participants’ post-interaction written evaluations (e.g., 
describing the interviewee as “intelligent”), and negative scores reflecting more frequent negative evaluation 
of confederate (e.g., describing the interviewee as “unintelligent”).  
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
The following are excerpts from participants’ post-interaction written evaluations of 
{[Child]Adult}. We can see that despite the fact that the same child confederate generated 
responses to interviewee’s questions in both conditions, participants evaluated 
{[Child]Child} much more favorably than {[Child]Adult} (with whom participants were 
largely unimpressed):  
 
I feel Stanley was quite an aloof in the matters of science, 
literature and current/hist. political events. He lacked the ability 
to expand on any points he mentioned. Although, he did seem 
to be quite passionate about graphic novels. Overall, it feels as 
if Stanley was in a world of his own. His actions were quite 
hesitant. ({[Child]Adult}, Panel 13, participant 58; person 
perception measure scores: Intelligent = –0.67, Confident = –
0.50, Mature = –0.33, Extraverted = –0.83, Friendly = –0.67, 
Opinionated = –0.67, Honest = 0.00). 
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He did not have very much to say regarding the topics given. 
The way he expressed his opinions was a bit unorganized. I 
wasn’t sure if he was informed about the topics and unable to 
express himself or if he didn’t understand the topics. He gave 
off a rather adult impression at first but as the conversation 
went on seemed a bit uninterested in most of the topics. 
({[Child]Adult}, Panel 16, participant 71; person perception 
measure scores: Intelligent = –0.83, Confident = –0.67, Mature 
= –0.67, Extraverted = –0.50, Friendly = –0.17, Opinionated = 
–0.67, Honest = 0.00).  
 
He has knowledge of a high school graduate. He does not have 
the capability of thinking critically. ({[Child]Adult}, Panel 13, 
participant 55; person perception measure scores: Intelligent = 
–0.67, Confident = –0.17, Mature = –0.67, Extraverted = 0.00, 
Friendly = 0.00, Opinionated = –0.50, Honest = 0.00).  
 
General discussion 
Findings. In both studies, participants’ written and debrief statements provided perhaps the 
strongest evidence in favor of the cyranic illusion, though analyses of participants’ responses 
to agree/disagree questionnaire items also proved convincing. Even in cases involving 
significant age incongruity between source and shadower (Study 2), participants failed to 
notice when their interlocutor was not self-authoring the words he spoke, suggesting that the 
cyranic illusion is a robust phenomenon not limited to instances of high source-shadower 
congruence. It seems that when encountering an interlocutor face-to-face, people rarely 
question whether the “mind” and the “body” of a person are indeed unified—and for good 
reason, as social interaction would be undermined if we began to doubt whether each person 
we encountered was indeed the true author of the words they expressed. This observation 
regarding everyday social life stands in contrast to socialization that occurs in artificial 
environments (e.g., Second Life and other virtual community games) wherein users can 
construct outer personae which starkly contrast with their real-world identities (see Bessiere, 
Seay, & Kiesler, 2007; Vasalou & Joinson, 2009), and wherein unity between the user and 
their avatar is more readily questioned (see Donath, 1999).  
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Our analysis of Utterance Length in Study 2 showed that {[Adult]Adult} generated far 
greater utterance lengths than {[Adult]Child}, {[Child]Adult} and {[Child]Child}, which 
with respect to Utterance Length were statistically equivalent. There are two immediate 
explanations for why such a discrepancy may have occurred. First, it is entirely possible that 
the adult confederate’s behavior confirmed stereotyped assumptions about the linguistic 
limitations (e.g., reduced ability to expand upon complex concepts) expected of the child 
confederate relative to their own, thus resulting in shortened prose when sourcing. This 
would suggest that the child confederate may have been capable of shadowing much longer 
utterances but was simply not afforded the chance to do so. The fact that a corollary pattern 
did not emerge when the child, in turn, sourced words for the adult confederate may suggest 
that whereas adults perhaps have the ability to alter their verbal behavior so as to speak 
utterance lengths akin to those typically used by children, children may not as readily be able 
to generate utterances as lengthy as those produced by adults (particularly university 
professors). However, this discrepancy is most likely an artifact born of the unique 
relationship between the confederates used in our study, as the adult confederate found it 
much easier to source abbreviated passages than paragraph-length prose and suggested that at 
times it was difficult for the child to accurately shadow long and complex speech. This 
implies that the cyranoid method might be constrained by functional factors, namely that 
certain source-shadower pairings may require that a source openly alter certain aspects of 
their verbal behavior in order for the cyranoid to function in a manner that preserves the 
illusion of autonomy. It is a limitation of our study that we did not more closely account for 
how and why differences in speech shadowing ability may have altered utterance lengths, 
though we recognize that source-shadower functional impediments are certainly worth 
investigating in their own right in future research.  
 
In considering the final model for our Question Difficulty interlocution measure, the results of 
Study 2 provide mixed evidence for the notion that people’s verbal behavior will confirm 
age-based stereotypes during social interaction. Our results indicate that encountering adult-
generated responses ([Adult] = 1) overrode participants’ inclination to ask “child-level” 
questions when faced with a child-bodied interviewee in that participants’ questions in 
{[Adult]Child} were significantly more difficult than those in {[Child]Child}. On the other 
hand, the fact the difficulty of questions in {[Child]Adult} and {[Adult]Adult} were 
statistically comparable suggests that here participants’ verbal behavior did confirm 
stereotyped assumptions about what types of questions one should ask another person on the 
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basis of their physical age and independent of their actual capacity answer such questions. 
Considering the literature on situational ambiguity and heuristic processing (e.g., Bohner, 
Chaiken, & Hunyadi, 1994; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994) might help partially resolve this 
discrepancy. Participants in {[Adult]Child} may have adjusted the difficulty of their 
questions upward while those who encountered {[Child]Adult} did not seem to make a 
related adjustment downward due to relative differences in ambiguity between the two 
contexts. Participants in the {[Child]Adult} condition were presented with a situation in 
which their interviewee produced far less content than what might have been expected, as 
utterance lengths in the {[Adult]Adult} condition were significantly greater than those in 
{[Child]Adult}. The comparative lack of content produced by {[Child]Adult}, therefore, may 
have generated ambiguity by-way-of a violated expectation, leading participants to anchor on 
age-based heuristic cues and thus continue to pose questions comparable in difficulty to the 
{[Adult]Adult} condition. On the other hand, utterance lengths between {[Adult]Child} and 
{[Child]Child} were statistically similar, therefore the amount of content produced by 
{[Adult]Child} may not have comprised a violation of expectations, and as such the difficulty 
level of participants’ questions in the {[Adult]Child} more directly tracked the adult-
generated words spoken by their interviewee.  
 
An alternative interpretation of the discrepancies in question difficulty across Study 2’s 
conditions involves considering that participants in the {[Child]Adult} condition may have 
refrained from lessening the difficulty of their questions on account of the fact that doing so 
might have been perceived as a form of talking down to their interviewee. Indeed, narrative 
researchers have pointed out that it is often quite difficult to speak appropriately with those 
who display a level of intelligence significantly diminished from what is considered normal 
(Biklen & Moseley, 1988; Booth & Booth, 1996). It is perhaps more socially acceptable to 
flatter a child stranger’s intelligence by asking them adult-level questions than it is to imply a 
middle-aged stranger’s lack of intelligence by asking them child-level questions, as doing so 
would contradict the status usually ascribed to members of their age-group (see Barker, Giles, 
& Harwood, 2004; Harwood, Giles, Clement, Pierson, & Fox, 1994). Moreover, talking down 
to others is in general a form of condescension, which tends to negatively correlate with pro-
social forms of behavior (Nave, Sherman, Funder, Hampson, & Goldberg, 2010).  
 
The analysis of Response Sophistication (Study 2) suggests that when sourcing for a 
shadower, the sophistication of one’s verbal communication will not necessarily confirm 
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stereotypes related to one’s perceived physical identity. Our results demonstrate that the 
sophistication of the child confederate’s responses did not differ on the basis of the body-type 
he communicated through. On the other hand, the adult confederate produced significantly 
less sophisticated responses when he spoke through the child confederate’s body relative to 
when speaking through his own. This disparity, however, appears to be accounted for by the 
fact that the adult confederate produced far shorter responses (Response Length) when being 
shadowed by the child confederate compared to when speaking autonomously, with shorter 
response lengths strongly predicting lower ratings of response sophistication. However, as 
noted above with respect to Utterance Length, differences in Response Length between 
{[Adult]Adult} and {[Adult]Child} were more likely a result of the functional speech 
shadowing limitations of the child confederate than any sort of self-stereotyping on the part 
of the adult confederate. Functional limitations such as this aside, the results from Study 2 
show that it is possible for sources to maintain a consistent disposition when communicating 
through a shadower they know to be physically incongruent from themselves. This is perhaps 
a result of the training procedures we employed, as confederates had time to rehearse the 
procedures and settle into “being themselves” while sourcing. Had we instead assigned 
participants without knowledge of the research objectives to function as sources across 
experimental conditions, we may have observed source behavior confirm stereotypes held by 
both themselves and interactants. This is indeed an avenue that warrants future investigation 
considering the literature on self-stereotyping, social cues, and behavioral confirmation (e.g., 
Chen & Bargh, 1997; Wheeler & Petty, 2001), particularly that which regards behavioral 
alignment with avatar-identity in virtual environments (e.g., Fox, Bailenson, & Tricase, 2013; 
Peña, Hancock, & Merola, 2009; Yee et al., 2009).  
 
The cyranoid technique proved a novel route to exploring the relationship between person 
perception and outer vs. inner identity. Despite the same child confederate generating 
responses in both conditions, significant divergence occurred between {[Child]Child} and 
{[Child]Adult} on nearly every trait dimension captured by our coding frame, with 
{[Child]Adult}, on average, being more negatively perceived on all dimensions. Comparing 
{[Adult]Adult} with {[Child]Child}, we can see that on their own our confederates were 
evaluated quite similarly and favorably by participants. However, when we constructed 
hybrid personae, or “mash-ups” of these two characters in cyranoid conditions, perceptions 
dramatically altered on account of which confederate constituted mind and which constituted 
body. Interestingly, we see a contrast between the relatively high difficulty of questions 
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posed to {[Child]Adult} in during panel interviews—a public forum—and the quite low 
opinions expressed of {[Child]Adult} in post-interaction written evaluations—a private 
setting. This pattern is evidence of the frequent tension between private and public expression 
of attitudes discussed by Moscovici (1976). These results suggest that the cyranoid method 
holds promise for investigations into how social perceptions are mediated separately by inner 
disposition and outer appearance, and how the alignment of public and private expressions of 
perception shift on account of the mixture of identities one encounters. Though the 
relationship between person perception and outer vs. inner identity has been studied in virtual 
environments in recent years (see Neff, Wang, Abbott, & Walker, 2010; Nowak & Rauh, 
2005), cyranoids present an opportunity to approach these questions using unscripted human 
interaction in face-to-face settings.  
 
Future research areas. Focus: Interactants. The cyranoid method can be used to address 
classic questions of person perception, principally those that center on how people separately 
process verbal and nonverbal cues when forming impressions of and subsequently interacting 
with other people. In particular, the method can potentially extend literature on discrimination 
and stereotyping. Experimental research has shown that discrimination can operate at the 
level of implicit attitudes (McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Nosek & Banaji, 2001) manifesting 
in behaviors that confirm stereotypes. Via the cyranoid technique, researchers can further 
explore how these implicit stereotypes reveal themselves in face-to-face, unscripted 
interactions by separately controlling and manipulating the inner and outer identities of 
cyranoid stimuli by skin color, age, gender, and so on while observing the behaviors of 
interactants.  
 
The cyranoid method can also facilitate breaching experiments designed to investigate how 
people perceive those with whom they have close relationships. Mitchel and colleagues’ 
(2011) artistic demonstration involving spouses encountering partners who have assumed 
alternative physical identities by-way-of a cyranoid provides an interesting thought 
experiment: we may think that what we connect with when we encounter an intimate partner, 
relative, or close friend is some essential, historically-consistent, and ethereal personal quality 
that exists beyond their physical nature. But in reality, waking up to find your partner had 
completely changed bodies while their memory and behavioral norms were otherwise intact 
would, in addition to being quite unsettling, serve to accentuate just how much physical 
presentation underscores our social relationships. Such scenarios encompass what Garfinkel 
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(1964) referred to as “breached” social environments, within which the breakdown of 
familiar norms and the ensuing social psychological phenomena that unfold emphasize how 
dependent social life is upon mundane expectations.  
 
Focus: Sources. Other potential research questions arise when we turn our attention to the 
position of the source in cyranic interactions. For instance, it would be particularly 
worthwhile to study whether biases toward certain person-categories (e.g., race, gender, age, 
etc.) attenuate or magnify following their sourcing for a shadower whose external identity 
contrasts markedly from their own. Indeed, the effect of embodying racial- and age-
differentiated avatars through the use of immersive virtual environment technology has 
demonstrated changes in implicit stereotyping and perspective-taking following embodiment 
(see Groom, Bailenson, & Nass, 2009; Yee & Bailenson, 2006). We suspect that a source’s 
emotional and empathic responses following cyranoid embodiment might actually be much 
stronger than those demonstrated in virtual studies given the qualitative realism of a cyranic 
interaction: cyranoid embodiment involves interacting in-the-flesh with other humans 
through the body of another human, whereas by comparison immersive virtual environment 
embodiment of digital avatars is a more mediated and distal experience.  
 
Focus: Shadowers. Finally, the experience of the shadower in cyranic interactions provides 
another avenue of possibilities. For example, Robb Mitchell and colleagues have explored 
using shadowers as teaching surrogates in classroom environments (Mitchell, 2010; 
Raudaskoski & Mitchell, 2013). In these scenarios, remote teachers sourced for student 
shadowers in classrooms while delivering a lesson, with the role of the shadower rotating 
amongst the different students. Each student therefore had the opportunity to both present to 
the class in the form of a cyranoid as well as learn via the variety of teacher-student hybrids 
possible within the peer group. The authors suggest that the practice of shadowing for 
teachers in peer activities such as these may help scaffold students’ learning and presentation 
skills. Along these lines, one could easily imagine the cyranic technique applied to helping 
those who suffer from social phobias, such as fear of public speaking, learn to overcome their 
anxieties by allowing sufferers to be guided by experts during social encounters that would 
otherwise provoke unease. Lastly, the method could be enveloped into current clinical 
training practices wherein experts can remotely guide the behavior of trainees (see Gordon, 
1975). 
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Conclusion. Though Milgram did not live to see his cyranoid method come to fruition, the 
current research provides ample basis for the continued exploration of this intriguing 
methodological paradigm. There are many core domains within social psychology that can be 
approached with the technique and stand to benefit from the mundane realism that cyranoids 
bring to the laboratory (not to mention how enjoyable they are for participants to experience). 
Indeed, the cyranoid method may yet prove to be a long overdue addition to the social 
psychologist’s toolkit. 
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CHAPTER 3 | Echoborgs: Cyranoids With Computer Program Sources 
 
Preface 
Chapter 2 demonstrated how the cyranic illusion can hold under circumstances wherein a 
source and shadower are quite incongruent from one another. The cyranoid method therefore 
provides researchers with an interactive and socially dynamic means of studying how a 
particular human body-type shapes people’s perceptions of various dispositional 
characteristics typically not associated with said body-type, and can do so in the contexts of 
face-to-face interaction. Moreover, because the identity of the source can remain hidden from 
interactants over the course of a cyranic encounter, the cyranoid method affords one the 
ability to not only study situations wherein a source is highly incongruent from their 
shadower, but also an opportunity to study situations wherein a source isn’t even a real 
person. 
 
The studies contained in Chapter 3 of this thesis pursue exactly these types of scenarios 
(specifically, situations wherein the source of a cyranoid is a conversational agent computer 
program that mimics a human interlocutor, creating a special type of cyranoid referred to as 
an “echoborg”). This maneuver brings the cyranoid method into the world of human-
computer interaction research. Though many research domains could have been pursued 
following the completion of the replication studies described in the previous chapter (e.g., 
stereotyping research involving cyranoids whose shadowers and sources were differented by, 
say, race or gender), the decision to go down the road of human-computer interaction 
research was decided upon for five principal reasons: 
 
1. The incongruity between the mind and body of an echoborg is significantly more 
extreme than that of a mere adult-child cyranoid; thus, exploring echoborg 
interactions pushes the limits of the cyranic illusion and allows researchers the ability 
to see whether people continue to perceive mind-body congruence even in the case 
where the mind is that of a 2machine.  
 
2. Never before has human-computer interaction research involved situations wherein 
people encounter the words of a machine face-to-face and in person with an actual 
human body under conditions wherein they believe they are speaking to an 
autonomously communicating person. Until now, such scenarios have been the stuff 
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of science fiction. The echoborg provides a means of investigating how an actual 
human body, as the perceived originator of linguistic communication, shapes people’s 
perceptions of and experiences with computer-authored words.  
 
3. Echoborgs presented an opportunity to contribute to and complete an incomplete 
matrix of person stimuli utilized in the field of android science – a discipline that uses 
machine imitations of humans to study elements of human social psychology and 
cognition (see MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006b). Prior to the echoborg, android science 
research primarily involved experimental comparisons of people’s interactions with 
and perceptions of three general categories of person stimuli: autonomous androids 
(both mind and body are machine), semi-autonomous androids (human minds 
controlling machine bodies; e.g., tele-operated androids), and real people (both mind 
and body are human). The echoborg added the possibility of a person stimulus 
composed of a machine mind controlling a human body. 
 
4. Echoborgs can be used to investigate how the elements of an interface shape whether 
or not machine intelligence passes as truly human given certain social psychological 
conditions (here “passing” refers to the degree to which the identity of a social actor 
can be taken as authentic; Goffman, 1963; Renfrow, 2004; Khanna & Johnson, 2010).   
 
5. The echoborg concept can contribute to longstanding issues in the realm of 
philosophy of mind, particularly those tied to Turing’s (1950) famous “imitation 
game” and other thought experiments involving developing third-
person/observational criteria for determining the presence or absence of subjective 
experience in an interlocutor.  
 
The journal article that follows was authored by Corti and Gillespie (2015a). Corti designed 
and carried out the studies, performed data analysis, outlined the article, and authored the 
main drafts, contributing roughly 75% of the content. Gillespie provided the technological 
devices, helped conduct the studies, provided key supervisory assistance, provided funding, 
provided Corti with editorial suggestions for the article, and contributed roughly 25% of the 
content. A special section editor at Frontiers in Psychology, as well as two anonymous 
reviewers, experts in the field of android science, provided helpful feedback, suggested edits, 
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and ultimately approved the article for publication.  
 
Copies of participant instructions and other materials used to conduct the studies in this 
chapter can be found in Appendix B. Example transcripts from the experimental conditions 
described in this chapter can be found in Appendix E. 
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CHAPTER 3 | Echoborgs: Cyranoids With Computer Program Sources 
 
Article Title 
A truly human interface: Interacting face-to-face with someone whose words are determined 
by a computer program 
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Abstract 
We use speech shadowing to create situations wherein people converse in person with a 
human whose words are determined by a conversational agent computer program. Speech 
shadowing involves a person (the shadower) repeating vocal stimuli originating from a 
separate communication source in real-time. Humans shadowing for conversational agent 
sources (e.g., chat bots) become hybrid agents (“echoborgs”) capable of face-to-face 
interlocution. We report three studies that investigated people’s experiences interacting with 
echoborgs and the extent to which echoborgs pass as autonomous humans. First, participants 
in a Turing Test spoke with a chat bot via either a text interface or an echoborg. Human 
shadowing did not improve the chat bot’s chance of passing but did increase interrogators’ 
ratings of how human-like the chat bot seemed. In our second study, participants had to 
decide whether their interlocutor produced words generated by a chat bot or simply pretended 
to be one. Compared to those who engaged a text interface, participants who engaged an 
echoborg were more likely to perceive their interlocutor as pretending to be a chat bot. In our 
third study, participants were naïve to the fact that their interlocutor produced words 
generated by a chat bot. Unlike those who engaged a text interface, the vast majority of 
participants who engaged an echoborg did not sense a robotic interaction. These findings 
have implications for android science, the Turing Test paradigm, and human–computer 
interaction. The human body, as the delivery mechanism of communication, fundamentally 
alters the social psychological dynamics of interactions with machine intelligence.  
 
Keywords 
Android science, cyranoid, dialog system, embodiment, human-computer interaction, speech 
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Introduction 
“Meaning is the face of the Other, and all recourse to words takes place already within the 
primordial face to face of language” – (Levinas, 1991, p. 206). 
  
In comparison to other forms of interaction, face-to-face communication between humans is 
characterized by more social emotion, higher demands for comprehensibility, and increased 
social obligation; the face of the other commands an ethical relation that is absent in people’s 
interaction with “things” (Levinas, 1991). Face-to-face, close-proximity interaction between 
tangible bodies is the primordial human inter-face and is the format of exchange most 
conducive for shared understanding (Linell, 2009). Computer technologies specifically 
designed to simulate human social functioning (e.g., conversational agents) have to date 
communicated with people via technical interfaces such as screens, buttons, robotic devices, 
avatars, interactive voice response systems, and so on. This leaves a need to explore human 
perception of and interaction with these technologies under conditions that replicate the full 
complexity of face-to-face human–human communication. The present article introduces a 
means of doing so. We demonstrate a methodology that allows a person to interact “in the 
flesh” with a conversational agent whose interface is an actual human body.  
 
Contemporary android science 
Android science aims to develop artificial systems identical to humans in both appearance 
and behavior (verbal and non-verbal) for the purposes of exploring human nature and 
investigating the ways in which these systems might integrate into human society 
(MacDorman and Ishiguro, 2006a; Ishiguro and Nishio, 2007). The field is as interested in 
better understanding people through their interacting with anthropomorphic technology as it 
is in further developing the technology itself. Considerable progress has been made in these 
endeavors, with perhaps the most notable work being that undertaken and inspired by Hiroshi 
Ishiguro of Osaka University’s Intelligent Robotics Laboratory, whose research and 
engineering teams have developed highly lifelike autonomous and semi-autonomous 
androids. MacDorman and Ishiguro (2006b) argue that in being controllable, programmable, 
and replicable, androids are in certain respects superior to human actors as social and 
cognitive experimental stimuli. They further contend that androids can evoke in humans 
expectations and emotions that attenuate the psychological barrier between people and 
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machines.  
 
The motor behaviors of autonomous androids are controlled by technologies that perceive 
and orient to the physical environment while their speech is controlled by a conversational 
agent. As autonomous technologies are still quite limited in terms of functionality, the social 
capacities of these types of androids are severely constrained. Tele-operated androids, 
meanwhile, overcome the limitations of fully autonomous models by-way-of a human 
operator controlling the android’s speech and movement (Nishio et al., 2007b). On account of 
their enhanced social capabilities, tele-operated androids have stimulated ample research in 
psychology and other domains of social and cognitive science. For instance, researchers have 
investigated the extent to which a person’s presence with remote others is amplified or 
weakened when tele-operating an android compared to when communicating in person or via 
more distal technological mediators such as video conferencing (Nishio et al., 2007a; 
Sakamoto et al., 2007). Researchers have also explored the extent to which tele-operators 
perceive their android to be extensions of themselves, sensing physical stimuli administered 
to the android as if the stimuli had been administered to their own body (Ogawa et al., 2012). 
Perhaps the most discussed phenomenon in the field of android science is the “uncanny 
valley,” posited by Mori (1970). This idea suggests that the affinity a person has for an 
artificial agent will increase as the appearance and motor behavior of the agent becomes more 
human-like; however, at a certain point along the human-likeness continuum (where the 
agent begins to look more or less human but for slight, yet telling, signs of artificiality) 
feelings of affinity will sharply decline, before rapidly rising again as the agent becomes 
indistinguishable from an actual human (MacDorman and Ishiguro, 2006b; Seyama and 
Nagayama, 2007).  
 
We propose inverting the composition of tele-operated android systems in order to create 
hybrid entities consisting of a human whose words (and potentially motor actions) are 
entirely or partially determined by a computer program. We refer to such hybrids as 
“echoborgs,” which can be classified as a type of “cyranoid”— Milgram’s (2010) term for a 
hybrid composed of a person who speaks the words of a separate person in real-time. 
Echoborgs can be used to examine the role of the human body, as the delivery mechanism of 
communication, in mediating social emotions, attributions, and other interpersonal 
phenomena emergent in face-to-face interaction. Furthermore, echoborgs can be used to 
evaluate the performance and perception of artificial conversational agents under conditions 
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wherein people assume they are interacting with an autonomously communicating human 
being. To ground these claims, however, we shall first discuss the tools and constraints of 
contemporary android science in order to identify where echoborg methodology can 
contribute.  
 
The challenge of creating androids that speak autonomously. Examples of autonomous 
androids include Repliee Q1 and Repliee Q2, which were developed jointly by Osaka 
University and the Kokoro Corporation (see Ishiguro, 2005; Ranky and Ranky, 2005). 
Because androids of this nature attempt to replicate humans at both an outer/physical level as 
well as an inner/dispositional level, they can be evaluated against what Harnad (1991) 
defined as the Total Turing Test (also referred to as the Robotic Turing Test; Harnad, 2000), 
which establishes the entire repertoire of human linguistic and sensorimotor abilities as the 
appropriate criteria for judging machine imitations of human intelligence. The development 
of an autonomous android capable of passing such a test, however, remains a distant holy 
grail.  
 
One source of current constraints concerns how artificial agents in general interpret and 
participate in dialog. Various terminologies describe technology that interacts with humans 
via natural language. “Dialog system,” “conversational agent,” and “conversational AI,” for 
instance, are terms used to denote the linguistic subsystems of artificial agents, though no 
clear consensus exists with regard to how non-overlapping these and other terms are. 
“Conversational agent,” the term we have employed thus far, is perhaps the most convenient 
term for conceptualizing the echoborg because it has been adopted by a parallel project—the 
development of embodied conversational agents (software that interfaces through onscreen 
anthropomorphic avatars). Much of the literature that distinguishes the functionality of 
various linguistic subsystems, however, couches these technologies as dialog systems. Types 
of dialog systems include high-level systems of integrated artificial intelligence that employ 
advanced learning and reasoning algorithms enabling a user and a machine to jointly 
accomplish specific tasks within a formal dialog structure (e.g., logistics and navigation 
planning agents), low-level systems that use basic algorithms to simply mimic, rather than 
understand, casual human conversation (e.g., web-based “chat bots”), and mid-level systems 
that strike a balance between high-level and low-level functionality (e.g., agents designed to 
field queries from and respond to pedestrians in transit centers; for a discussion of dialog 
system hierarchy, see Schumaker et al., 2007). Dialog systems can also be differentiated in 
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terms of the level of initiative they take when interacting with users (Zue and Glass, 2000). 
System-initiative agents are those that control the parameters of dialog and elicit information 
from the user that must be compatible with certain response formats (e.g., interactive voice 
response telephone systems). User-initiative agents, on the other hand, are those in which the 
user presents queries to a passive agent (e.g., Apple’s Siri application). Mixed-initiative 
agents (by far the least developed variety; Mavridis, 2015) involve both the user and agent 
taking active roles in a joint task with the nature of dialog being qualitatively more 
conversational relative to other types of dialog systems.  
 
If we treat, as Turing (1950) did, discourse capacity as a basic proxy for an interlocutor’s 
“mind,” then even today’s most advanced dialog system technologies render available to 
artificial agents such as androids minds that are at best starkly non-human (though potentially 
very powerful), and at worst extremely impoverished relative to that of humans. Though 
contemporary high-level and mid-level dialog systems are indeed impressive and their 
functionality continues to expand rapidly, they are not, in principle, attempts to mimic a 
human interlocutor capable of casual conversation. On the contrary, they are presently 
intended to interact with humans in specific domains and generally do not operate outside of 
these contexts (e.g., such a system cannot spontaneously switch from being a logistics 
planning agent to having a conversation about an ongoing basketball game). No human 
would be expected to communicate in a manner similar to these types of artificial 
intelligence, nor are humans necessarily constrained in terms of only being capable of 
communicating from within a fixed and narrow language-game. System-initiative and user-
initiative agents also deviate from the norms of human–human interaction as they grant to 
one interlocutor total and unbreakable communicative control.  
 
Though we can perhaps imagine high-level and mid-level dialog systems capable of engaging 
humans in casual conversation someday being ubiquitous throughout social robotics, at 
present only certain low-level and primarily text-based systems are engineered specifically 
for this purpose. An early but well-known example of such a system is ELIZA, a chat bot 
with the persona of a Rogerian psychotherapist (Weizenbaum, 1966). Modern examples 
include A.L.I.C.E. (Artificial Linguistic Internet Chat Entity; Wallace, 2015), Cleverbot 
(Carpenter, 2015), Mitsuku (Worswick, 2015), and Rose (Wilcox, 2015). Many chat bots 
make use of the highly customizable AIML (Artificial Intelligence Markup Language) XML 
dialect developed by Wallace (2008) and operate by recognizing word patterns delivered by a 
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user and matching them to response templates defined by the bot’s programmer. Increasingly 
sophisticated mechanisms for generating response corpora have been developed for chat bots 
in recent years. For instance, some developers have turned to real-time crowdsourcing of 
online communication repositories, such as Twitter and Facebook, as a means of producing 
responses appropriate for a given user input (see Mavridis et al., 2010; Bessho et al., 2012).  
 
Chat bots are widely available on the internet and feature regularly in events such as the 
annual Loebner Prize competition (Loebner, 2008), a contest held to determine which chat 
bot performs most successfully on a Turing Test. This test involves a human interrogator 
simultaneously communicating via text with two hidden interlocutors while attempting to 
uncover which of the two is a bot and which is a real person. To date, no chat bot has reliably 
passed as a human being, and we are unlikely to see this feat accomplished in the near future 
(Dennett, 2004; French, 2012).  
 
Generally, human interactions with chat bots fail to arrive at what conversation analysts refer 
to as “anchor points”: mutually attended to topics of shared focus that establish an implicit 
“center of gravity” during moments of conversation following routine canonical openings 
(Schegloff, 1986; Friesen, 2009). As chat bots tend to be user-initiative agents, they cannot 
engage in the type of fluid mixed-initiative conversation that is natural to mundane human–
human interaction (Mavridis, 2015). Chat bots demonstrate a poor capacity to reason about 
conversation, cannot consistently identify and repair misunderstandings, and generally talk at 
an entirely superficial level (Perlis et al., 1998; Shahri and Perlis, 2008). According to Raine 
(2009), many chat bots work “based on an assumption that the basic components of a 
communication are on a phrase-by-phrase basis and that the most immediate input will be the 
most relevant stimulus for the upcoming output” (p. 399), an operative model that can lead 
conversation to irreparably fall apart when the perspectives of parties to a conversation 
diverge in terms of the meaning or intention each party assigns to an utterance. Human 
communication is fundamentally temporal and sequential, with many past and possible future 
utterances feeding into the meaning of a given utterance (Linell, 2009).  
 
Developing acoustic technology that can accurately perceive spoken discourse remains a 
related challenge. The error rate of speech recognition technology is dramatically 
compounded by, among other things, variation in a speaker’s accent, the lengthiness and 
spontaneity of their speech, their use of contextually specific vocabulary, the presence of 
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multiple and overlapping speakers, speech speed, and so on (Pieraccini, 2012). Thus, speech 
recognition systems within artificial agents perform best not when discerning casual 
conversational dialog, but when discerning brief and predictable utterances. Microphone 
array technologies and software capable of identifying and isolating multiple speakers 
continue to improve (e.g., the “HARK” robot audition system; Nakadai et al., 2010; 
Mizumoto et al., 2011), but demonstrations of these systems have essentially involved 
stationary apparatuses confined to laboratory environments.  
 
Tele-operated androids: Mechanical bodies, human operators. Tele-operated androids 
were developed in part to overcome a social research bottleneck within android science born 
of the various limitations of conversational agents and perception technologies (Nishio et al., 
2007b; Watanabe et al., 2014). They thus constitute a methodological trade-off: rather than 
being both physically artificial and having computer-controlled behavior (a combination that 
currently results in poor social functioning), the tele-operated paradigm cedes behavioral 
control to a human, thus augmenting the speech and motor capabilities of the android.  
 
Perhaps the most well-known tele-operated android is Geminoid HI-1, a robot modeled in the 
likeness of its creator, Hiroshi Ishiguro. From a remote console, the tele-operator is able to 
transmit their voice through the geminoid (derived from the Latin word “geminus,” meaning 
“double”) while software analyzing video footage of the tele-operator’s body and lip 
movements replicate this motor behavior in the geminoid. The tele-operator can also 
manually control specified behaviors such as nodding and gaze-direction. Video monitors and 
microphones capture the audio-visual perspective of the geminoid and transmit to the tele-
operation console, allowing the tele-operator to observe the geminoid’s social environment 
(Nishio et al., 2007b; Becker-Asano et al., 2010).  
 
Relative to their fully-autonomous counterparts, the enhanced conversational capacities of 
tele-operated androids allow researchers to study communicatively rich human–android 
interactions as well as offer a means of operationally separating the behavioral control unit of 
an agent (the tele-operator) from the body, or interface, of the agent (the android). As Nishio 
et al. (2007b) contend: 
 
The strength of connection, or what kind of information is 
transmitted between the body and mind, can be easily 
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reconfigured. This is especially important when taking a top-
down approach that adds/deletes elements from a person to 
discover the “critical elements” that comprise human 
characteristics” (p. 347).  
 
These methodological assets have inspired an abundance of exploratory laboratory and field 
work in recent years. Abildgaard and Scharfe (2012), for instance, used Geminoid-DK to 
conduct university lectures and reported on how perceptions of the android differed between 
male and female students. Research involving android-mediated conversations between 
parents and children has explored to what extent children sense the personal presence of a 
tele-operator (Nishio et al., 2008). Straub et al. (2010) studied how tele-operators and those 
they communicate with jointly construct the social identity of an android. Dougherty and 
Scharfe (2011), meanwhile, explored whether touch influences a person’s trust in a tele-
operated android.  
 
Despite the progress and promise of tele-operated androids, this line of research faces 
particular constraints. The non-verbal behaviors of autonomous and semi-autonomous 
androids are more mechanical and less fluid relative to humans. In their neuroimaging 
analysis of how people perceive geminoid movement, Saygin et al. (2012) show how 
incongruity between appearance (human-like) and motion (non-human-like) implicitly 
violates people’s expectations. Developing tools for matching an android’s bodily 
movements to those of its tele-operator is a major research priority (Nishio et al., 2007b), and 
improving techniques for achieving facial synchrony is particularly necessary given the 
intricate facial musculature of humans and the role of facial expression in conveying emotion 
and facilitating social interaction (Ekman, 1992; Bänziger et al., 2009; for a discussion of 
robot emotion conveyance, see Nitsch and Popp, 2014). Current anthropomorphic androids 
are relatively limited in terms of their capacity for human-like facial expressivity (Becker-
Asano, 2011). For instance, Geminoid F’s face can successfully express the emotions sad, 
happy, and neutral, but the model struggles to convincingly convey angry, surprised, and 
fearful (Becker-Asano and Ishiguro, 2011). Also, the inexactness of an android’s lip 
movements in relation to the words spoken by its tele-operator has been discussed as possibly 
degrading the quality of social interactions (Abildgaard and Scharfe, 2012). Moreover, 
geminoids and other android models cannot walk on account of their having large air 
compressors facilitating numerous pneumatic actuators (Ishiguro and Nishio, 2007).  
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The imperfect appearance of tele-operated androids remains a barrier to replicating the social 
psychological conditions of face-to-face human–human interaction. Despite painstaking 
efforts to create realistic silicone android models (Ishiguro and Nishio, 2007), people are 
minutely attuned to subtle deviations from true humanness (e.g., eyes that lack glossy 
wetness). In a field study conducted to test whether people would notice an inactive or 
relatively passive geminoid in a social space, a majority of people reported having seen a 
robot in their surroundings (von der Pütten et al., 2011), a finding which suggests that most 
people are not easily fooled into believing an android is an actual person even in social 
situations where they do not engage the android directly. Moreover, though geminoids and 
other highly anthropomorphic androids are seen as the most human-like and least unfamiliar 
of robot types, people nonetheless perceive these androids as more threatening than less 
anthropomorphic models (Rosenthal-von der Pütten and Krämer, 2014).  
 
There is also an important practical constraint characterizing the tele-operated and 
autonomous android paradigms. As Ziemke and Lindblom (2006) point out, it is quite time 
consuming and costly to produce android experimental apparatuses. This raises issues as to 
the scalability of the current android science research model and the extent to which 
experiments making use of a particular device in one laboratory can be replicated elsewhere.  
 
The echoborg 
An echoborg is composed of a human whose words (and potentially motor actions) are 
entirely or partially determined by a computer program. Echoborgs constitute a 
methodological trade-off inverse to that of the tele-operated paradigm discussed above, as 
they allow the possibility of studying social interactions with artificial agents that have truly 
human interfaces. The unique affordances of echoborgs can complement those of tele-
operated and fully-autonomous androids and contribute to our understanding of the social 
psychological dynamics of human–agent interaction.  
 
Speech shadowing and the cyranoid method. The echoborg concept stems from work 
conducted by Corti and Gillespie (2015), whose application of Milgram’s (2010) “cyranoid 
method” of social interaction demonstrates a means of creating hybrid human entities via an 
audio-vocal technique known as “speech shadowing.” Speech shadowing involves a person 
(the shadower) voicing the words of an external source simultaneously as those words are 
heard (Schwitzgebel and Taylor, 1980). This can be facilitated by-way-of an inner-ear 
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monitor worn by the shadower that receives audio from the source. Research has shown that 
native-language shadowers can repeat the words of a source at latencies as low as a few 
hundred milliseconds (Marslen-Wilson, 1973, 1985; Bailly, 2003) and can perform the 
technique while simultaneously attending to other tasks (Spence and Read, 2003). Shadowers 
tend to reflexively imitate certain gestural elements of their source (e.g., stress, accent, and so 
on)—a phenomenon known as “phonetic convergence” (Goldinger, 1998; Shockley et al., 
2004; Pardo et al., 2013).  
 
One finds the use of speech shadowing as a research tool primarily in psycholinguistics and 
the study of second-language acquisition. In the late 1970s, however, Milgram—famous for 
his controversial studies on obedience to authority (Milgram, 1974)—began using speech 
shadowing to investigate social scenarios involving people communicating through 
shadowers. He saw the technique as a means of pairing sources and shadowers whose 
identities differed in terms of race, age, gender, and so on, thus allowing sources to directly 
experience an interaction in which their outer appearance was markedly transformed (see 
Figure 3.1). From the point of view of the shadower, the method enabled exploration into the 
sensation of contributing to an unscripted conversation not one’s self-authored thoughts, but 
entirely those of a remote source. Inspired by the play Cyrano de Bergerac, the story of a poet 
(Cyrano) who assists a handsome but inarticulate nobleman (Christian) in wooing a woman 
by telling him what to say to her, Milgram referred to these source-shadower pairs as 
“cyranoids.”  
 
As speech shadowing proved to be a relatively simple task that research participants were 
quick to grasp, Milgram quickly began exploring a variety of cyranic interactions. For 
instance, in several pilot studies he examined whether “interactants” (Milgram’s term for 
those who encountered a cyranoid) would notice if the source was changed mid-conversation 
(Milgram, 1977). Milgram (2010) also sourced for 11- and 12-year-old children during 
interviews with teachers naïve to the manipulation. Following these interactions, all of the 
teachers seemed to take the interviews at face value—they neither picked up on the true 
nature of the interactions nor sensed that the child they interviewed had behaved non-
autonomously. The teachers had succumbed to the “cyranic illusion,” that is, the tendency to 
perceive interlocutors as autonomous communicators and thus fail to notice an interlocutor 
that is a cyranoid. 
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of a basic cyranoid interaction. The shadower voices words provided 
by the source while engaging with the interactant in person. 
 
 
 
 
Corti and Gillespie (2015) argue that one of the cyranoid method’s primary strengths is that it 
allows the researcher to manipulate one component of the cyranoid, either the shadower or 
the source, while keeping the other component fixed. Thus, one can study how the same 
source is perceived when interacting through a variety of shadower-types. Conversely, a 
researcher can opt to keep the shadower constant and vary the identity of the source across 
experimental conditions. This capacity mirrors the functionality of tele-operated androids as 
well as similar methods for studying transformed social interactions (e.g., using 3D 
immersive virtual environment technology to alter people’s identities; see Blascovich et al., 
2002; Bailenson et al., 2005; Yee and Bailenson, 2007). A unique benefit of the cyranoid 
method is that it allows for in person, face-to-face interactions between an interactant and a 
hybrid. When interacting with a cyranoid, one is not interacting with an onscreen person, or a 
human-like machine, or a virtual representation of a human, but with an actual human body. 
  
While Corti and Gillespie’s (2015) recent work was conducted in the laboratory, it follows 
recent field explorations of cyranoids in experiential art installations (Mitchell, 2009) and as 
classroom learning tools (Raudaskoski and Mitchell, 2013). Taken together, these studies 
outline a number of basic protocols for constructing cyranic interactions and discuss the 
devices necessary for creating a basic cyranoid apparatus, which involves both a means of 
discreetly transmitting audio from the source to the shadower as well as a means for the 
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source to hear (and, if possible, see) the interaction between the shadower and the interactant. 
The amalgam of devices one uses toward these requirements depends upon the type of 
interaction the researcher wishes to create. For instance, if a researcher wants to keep hidden 
from interactants the fact that a cyranoid is present in an interaction, then the cyranoid 
apparatus should be discreet and non-visible/audible to interactants. If the researcher wants 
the shadower to be mobile, then the devices that compose the cyranoid apparatus must 
transmit wirelessly. Minimizing the audio latency in the communication loop is crucial to any 
cyranoid apparatus; interactant→source and source→shadower audio transfer must be 
accomplished in a realistic amount of time.  
 
A cyranic interaction involving a covert cyranoid is typically accomplished using an 
apparatus similar to the following. A wireless “bug” microphone placed near where the 
shadower and interactant engage each other transmits to a radio receiver listened to by the 
source in an adjacent soundproof room. The source speaks into a microphone connected to a 
short-range radio transmitter which relays to a receiver worn in the pocket of the shadower. 
Connected to the shadower’s receiver is a neck-loop induction coil worn underneath their 
clothing. The shadower wears a wireless, flesh-colored inner-ear monitor that sits in their ear 
canal and receives the signal emanating from the induction coil, allowing the shadower to 
hear and thus voice the source’s speech. This amalgam of devices is neither visible nor 
audible to interactants.  
 
Ceding verbal agency to a machine. Echoborg methodology takes the original cyranoid 
model and replaces the human source with an artificial conversational agent. The words 
produced by the conversational agent are thus voiced and embodied by a human shadower. 
Echoborgs have at least four main research affordances:  
 
Interchangeability of shadowers and conversational agents. Both the shadower and the 
conversational agent that comprise an echoborg are easily customizable and interchangeable. 
The researcher need only train a confederate with the desired physical attributes to speech 
shadow sufficiently and then couple them with a conversational agent. This gives the 
researcher the freedom to construct many echoborgs, each differentiated from one another in 
terms their particular conversational agent, gender, age, and so on. Thus, one can observe 
how the same conversational agent is perceived depending on the identity of the shadower by 
holding the conversational agent constant across experimental conditions and varying the 
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shadower (e.g., female shadower vs. male shadower). Alternatively, the researcher can hold 
the shadower constant and vary the conversational agent (e.g., ELIZA vs. A.L.I.C.E).  
 
Visual realism. Echoborgs offer a means of studying interactions under conditions where the 
interactant’s cognitive sense of the interaction is undistorted by any esthetic, acoustic, non-
verbal, or motor non-humanness of the physical agent they encounter (e.g., lips that do not 
exactly align with the words they utter or eyes that do not perfectly make contact with the 
interactant’s). Speech shadowing is not a cognitively demanding task; it is rather simple for a 
well-rehearsed speech shadower to attend to other behaviors while replicating the speech of 
their source, including matching their body language to the words they find themselves 
repeating (e.g., shaking their head from side-to-side upon articulating the word “no”).  
 
 Mobility. Echoborgs can take advantage of the shadower’s physical mobility and need not be 
confined to stationary interactions—they can walk or otherwise move about while 
communicating with interactants. Human communication did not evolve for having 
conversations per se; it evolved for coordinating joint activity (Tomasello, 2008). Research 
on everyday language use shows that communication is a means of doing (Clark, 1996). 
Accordingly, mobile echoborgs open up the possibility of testing conversational agents in the 
context of performing a joint non-stationary activity.  
 
Covert capacity. Taking advantage of the cyranic illusion, echoborgs can interact with people 
covertly (i.e., under conditions wherein interactants assume they are encountering an 
autonomously communicating person). This affordance can be juxtaposed with the fact that at 
present, those who interact with tele-operated or autonomous androids are under no illusion 
that they are interacting with a fully-autonomous human being. The covert capacity of 
echoborgs thus presents a new means of researching interactions with conversational agents. 
It is one thing to evaluate interactions with conversational agents in contexts where people 
are cognitively aware, or at least primed to believe, that they are speaking to something 
artificial, but it is entirely different to study these systems under conditions where the 
interface one encounters (an actual human body) creates the visceral impression that one is 
dealing with an autonomous person.  
 
Overview of studies 
We conducted three experiments in which participants interacted with echoborgs. These 
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studies explored the ways in which echoborgs, as human interfaces, mediate the experience 
of conversing with a chat bot in various contexts, as well as the extent to which echoborgs 
improve a chat bot’s ability to pass as human (i.e., be taken for a human rather than a robot). 
Each study was approved by an ethics review board at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science and conducted at the university’s Behavioral Research Laboratory. Adult 
participants were recruited online via the university’s research participant recruitment portal 
and included students from the university, university employees, and people unaffiliated with 
the university. Participants gave informed consent prior to participation and were debriefed 
extensively.  
 
Study 1: Turing testing with echoborgs 
Aims. In outlining the logic of his imitation game, Turing (1950) argued that “there was little 
point in trying to make a “thinking machine” more human by dressing it up in such artificial 
flesh” (p. 434) and made a clear distinction between what he thought of as the physical 
(likeness) and intellectual (functional) capacities of humans. However, this distinction has 
been criticized (Harnad, 2000); perceiving the salient bodily characteristics of other entities is 
fundamental to how humans infer the subjective states (or lack thereof) of said entities, be 
they real or unreal in reality (Graziano, 2013). To explore this tension, our first study 
investigated a Turing Test scenario wherein participants were asked to determine which of 
two shadowed interlocutors was truly human and which was a chat bot. Furthermore, we 
sought to determine whether a chat bot voiced by a human shadower would be perceived as 
more human-like than the same bot communicating via text. 
  
Shadowers and subjects. Two female graduate students (both aged 23) were trained as 
speech shadowers. Eighty-two participants (42 female, mean age = 28.93, SD =12.05) were 
randomly assigned into pairs within one of two experimental conditions: Text Interface (n = 
21) and Echoborg (n = 20). One participant within each pair was randomly selected to 
function as the Turing Test interrogator while the second participant was designated as the 
human interlocutor. In all pairs, participants were both unfamiliar with one another and 
unaware of the other’s role in the study.  
 
Procedure. From the interaction room, the researcher instructed the interrogator that the 
study involved using a text-based instant messaging client (Pidgin) to simultaneously 
communicate with two anonymous interlocutors, one of whom was a chat bot (Cleverbot). 
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The interrogator’s computer showed two separate text-input windows, one that delivered to 
“Interlocutor A,” and another that delivered to “Interlocutor B.” The interrogator was told 
that following 10-min of conversation they would be asked which of these two interlocutors 
they believed was the real human. Meanwhile, in a separate room, a research assistant 
instructed the human interlocutor that the study involved holding a 10-min conversation with 
a stranger and that their task was to simply respond to messages that appeared on a computer 
screen. The human interlocutor was thus blind to the fact that they were engaged in a Turing 
Test. Both the interrogator and the human interlocutor were informed that they were free to 
discuss any topic during the interaction so long as nothing was vulgar.  
 
Text interface condition. Once instruction was complete, the researcher relocated to a third 
room (the source room) where they monitored the interaction using a computer. Messages 
that the interrogator typed to Interlocutor A were routed to the researcher, who input the 
received text into Cleverbot and routed Cleverbot’s response back through the instant 
messaging client to the interrogator. Messages the interrogator sent to Interlocutor B, 
meanwhile, were routed to the human interlocutor’s computer, and the human interlocutor 
directly responded in text via the instant messaging client.  
 
Echoborg condition. The interrogator was further instructed that though they would type 
messages to Interlocutor A and Interlocutor B via the instant messaging client, the responses 
of these two interlocutors would be spoken aloud by two speech shadowers. The two speech 
shadowers, with shadowing equipment, entered the room, sat side-by-side facing the 
interrogator at a distance of roughly six feet, and it was made known to the interrogator 
which shadower would reproduce the words of Interlocutor A and which would reproduce the 
words of Interlocutor B (shadowers alternated between trials in terms of the interlocutor they 
were paired to). The interrogator was informed that the shadowers would speak solely words 
they received from their respective sources and that at no point during the interaction would 
the shadowers speak self-authored thoughts. Furthermore, the interrogator was informed that 
both interlocutors would only respond to typed messages and that nothing the interrogator 
spoke aloud would be responded to.  
 
Following these instructions, the researcher relocated to the source room. As in the Text 
Interface condition, messages that the interrogator sent to Interlocutor A were routed to the 
researcher’s computer where they were input by the researcher into Cleverbot. Instead of 
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routing Cleverbot’s responses back to the interrogator through the instant messaging client, 
however, the researcher spoke Cleverbot’s responses into a microphone which relayed to the 
speech shadower paired to Interlocutor A, thus allowing them to hear and repeat Cleverbot’s 
words to the interrogator. Similarly, the human interlocutor’s typed responses were routed to 
the researcher’s computer (rather than directly to the interrogator), allowing the researcher to 
speak these messages into a separate microphone which relayed to the shadower paired to 
Interlocutor B (see Figure 3.2).  
 
Stock responses. Cleverbot’s response formats are not programmed; Cleverbot references 
past conversations it has held with people over the internet when generating a reply to a given 
user input (Carpenter, 2015). Unlike other bots, therefore, Cleverbot has no consistent 
identity. Its strength lies in its ability to learn unique ways of responding. We decided, 
however, that in order to establish consistency between experimental trials, three stock 
responses would be supplied in both conditions to the interrogator in lieu of a response 
generated by Cleverbot. Each time the interrogator inquired as to the name of Interlocutor A, 
the standard response “My name is Kim” was supplied to the interrogator. In response to 
questions as to what Interlocutor A’s occupation was, the response “I’m a psychology student 
here” was supplied. Finally, in response to questions concerning where Interlocutor A was 
from, the response “I’m from London” was given.  
 
Measures. Following the interaction, the interrogator indicated on a questionnaire which of 
the two interlocutors (A or B) they believed was the real human and indicated along a 10-
point scale how confident they were that they had made the correct identification (1: not at all 
confident; 10: highly confident). Interrogators also rated each interlocutor along a 10-point 
scale in terms of how human-like they seemed (1: seemed very mechanical and computer-
like; 10: seemed very human-like).  
 
Results. In the Text Interface condition, 21 out of 21 interrogators correctly identified 
Interlocutor B as being the real human, compared to 18 out of 20 interrogators in the 
Echoborg condition, a non-significant difference, z = 1.49, p = 0.14 (two-tailed). There was 
no significant difference between conditions in terms of how confident interrogators were 
with regard to their answers, with interrogators in the Text Interface condition reporting an 
average confidence of 7.67 (SD = 2.61) and interrogators in the Echoborg condition reporting 
an average confidence of 7.55 (SD = 1.70), t(39) = 1.68, SE = 0.69, p = 0.87. 
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of a Turing Test scenario involving speech shadowing. This figure 
visually depicts the Echoborg condition in Study 1. 
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Human-likeness ratings were compared using a repeated measures analysis of variance, 
Condition (Text Interface vs. Echoborg) treated as a between-subjects factor and Interlocutor
(Interlocutor A vs. Interlocutor B) treated as a within-subjects factor. There was a significant 
main effect of Interlocutor showing that Interlocutor B was perceived as significantly more 
human-like than Interlocutor A in both conditions, F(1,39) = 130.87, r = 0.88, p < 0.001. 
There was also a significant interaction between Condition and Interlocutor, F(1,39) = 7.23, r 
= 0.40, p < 0.05. Independent samples means tests showed that the average human-likeness 
rating of Interlocutor A in the Text Interface condition (M = 2.14, SD = 1.15) was 
significantly less than the average rating in the Echoborg condition (M = 4.05, SD = 2.42), 
t(39) = −3.25, SE = 0.59, p < 0.01. Meanwhile, the average human-likeness rating of 
Interlocutor B in the Text Interface condition (M = 8.76, SD = 1.51) was not significantly 
different from the average rating in the Echoborg condition (M = 8.15, SD = 1.46), t(39) = 
1.32, SE = 0.46, p = 0.20.  
 
Discussion. The interface (human body vs. text) engaged by the interrogator made no 
statistically significant difference in terms of their ability to discern which interlocutor was 
the real human. The chat bot, however, was perceived by interrogators as significantly more 
human-like when being shadowed by a person compared to when simply communicating via 
text. This contrasted with the fact that how human-like human interlocutors seemed to 
participants did not depend on whether their words were voiced by a speech shadower. This 
suggests that as the quality of an interlocutor’s discourse capacity improves (i.e., becomes 
more human) in Turing Test scenarios, the role the interface plays in eliciting judgments 
about human-likeness declines.  
 
Study 2: A human imitating a chat bot? 
Aims. Study 2 investigated whether attributing human agency to an interlocutor is 
increasingly determined by the nature of the interface as the words spoken by the interlocutor 
provide less definitive evidence. We designed a scenario wherein participants encountered an 
interlocutor and had to determine whether the interlocutor was (a) a person communicating 
words that had been generated by a chat bot, or (b) a person merely imitating a chat bot, but 
nonetheless speaking self-authored words (the former option always being true). The point 
here was to see whether or not the interface participants encountered (human body vs. text) 
influenced whether they thought their interlocutor was producing self-authored words or, 
alternatively, those of a machine. The framing of the scenario leads participants to expect that 
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the communication offered by their interlocutor will be abnormal, thus the conversational 
limitations of chat bots are not a liability as they are in standard Turing Test scenarios. By 
design, participants must form an attribution regarding the communicative agency of their 
interlocutor under conditions of ambiguity.  
 
Research on perceptual salience suggests that people will deem causal what is salient to them 
in the absence of equally salient alternative explanations (Jones and Nisbett, 1972; Taylor and 
Fiske, 1975). Dual process information evaluation theories propose that when a person 
evaluates the communication and behavior of others, stimulus ambiguity increases reliance 
on heuristic cues (e.g., appearance) at the expense of more thoughtful situational evaluation 
(Sager and Schofield, 1980; Devine, 1989; Chen and Chaiken, 1999). We extrapolated from 
this research that when faced with an ambiguous situation in which one’s interlocutor was 
either truly speaking words generated by a chat bot or merely pretending to be one, the 
interface (and thereby the heuristic cues) salient to the participant would determine how they 
attributed authorship to the words they encountered. We therefore hypothesized that those 
who encountered an echoborg would be more likely to see their interlocutor as producing 
self-authored words (imitating a chat bot) compared to those who encountered an interlocutor 
through a text interface.  
 
Shadowers and subjects. A female graduate student (aged 30) was trained to perform as a 
speech shadower. Fifty-eight adult participants (35 female; mean age = 25.19, SD =9.08) 
were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: Echoborg (n = 28) and Text Interface (n = 
30).  
 
Procedure. As with Study 1, Cleverbot, as well as the three stock responses described above, 
were used in all trials.  
 
The participant was led to an interaction room and instructed by the researcher that the study 
involved holding a 10-min conversation with an interlocutor who was either (a) 
communicating solely words that had been generated by a chat bot program (at no point 
speaking anything self-authored), or (b) simply imitating a chat bot program, but producing 
self-authored words nonetheless. The researcher ensured that the distinction between these 
scenarios was clear to the participant and gave the further instruction that the participant 
would be asked following the interaction which of the two scenarios they believed to have 
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been the case. The participant was informed that they were free to discuss anything they liked 
with their interlocutor so long they refrained from vulgarity.  
Unlike Study 1, which had participants send messages to their interlocutors via an instant 
messaging client, Study 2 featured participants speaking aloud to their interlocutor as they 
would during any other face-to-face encounter, thereby increasing the mundane realism of the 
scenario. The apparatus for this type of interaction, however, required a means of inputting 
the participant’s spoken words into the chat bot in the form of text. As we deemed speech-to-
text software to be insufficient for our purposes (being too slow and inaccurate), we settled 
on a procedure wherein the researcher (from an adjacent room) acted as the chat bot’s ears 
and speed typed the participant’s words into the chat bot as they were being spoken, 
paraphrasing when necessary for particularly verbose turns. This can be conceptualized as a 
minimal technological dependency format of the echoborg method (as opposed to a full 
technological dependency format which would place acoustic perception solely on 
technology). Although a minimal technological dependency format adds an additional human 
element to the communication loop, it ensures that accurate representations of interactants’ 
words are processed by the conversational agent.  
 
Text interface condition. The participant was seated in front of a computer screen which 
displayed a blank instant messaging client chat window. The participant was instructed that 
they were to address their interlocutor by speaking aloud and that their interlocutor would 
respond via text readable in the chat window. Once instruction was complete, the researcher 
left the interaction room and returned to the adjacent source room. From the source room, the 
researcher overheard words spoken by the participant via a covert wireless microphone and 
speed typed them into Cleverbot’s text-input window. Cleverbot’s responses were then sent 
through the instant messaging client to the participant’s screen in the interaction room (see 
Figure 3.3).  
 
Echoborg condition. The participant was instructed that as soon as the researcher left the 
interaction room their interlocutor would enter and sit facing the participant (at a distance of 
roughly six feet). The participant was not made aware of the fact that their interlocutor would 
be wearing an earpiece and receiving messages via radio, and the cyranoid apparatus was not 
visible to the participant. The researcher then left the interaction room and returned to the 
adjacent source room while the shadower entered the interaction room and sat across from the 
participant. The researcher listened to the words of the participant via a covert wireless
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of interaction scenarios in Study 2 and Study 3. 
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microphone, speed typed them into Cleverbot’s text-input window, and subsequently spoke 
Cleverbot’s responses into a microphone which relayed to the shadower’s inner-ear monitor. 
 
Measures. Following the interaction, the participant indicated on a questionnaire whether 
they thought their interlocutor had truly been producing words generated by a chat bot 
program or whether their interlocutor was simply imitating a chat bot.  
 
Results. Of the 30 participants in the Text Interface condition, 11 stated following the 
interaction that they believed their interlocutor was simply imitating a chat bot compared to 
22 of 28 participants in the Echoborg condition. A binary logistic regression model showed 
these proportions to be significantly different from one another, OR = 6.33, b = 1.85, SE = 
0.60, p < 0.01 (indicating that the odds of a participant in the Echoborg condition deciding 
their interlocutor was imitating a chat bot were 6.33 times greater than the odds of a 
participant in the Text Interface condition coming to the same conclusion).  
 
To gain a sense of the audio latency dynamics of echoborg interactions involving minimal 
technological dependency, we randomly selected four trials from the Echoborg condition and 
measured the time between the conclusion of each interactant-utterance and the 
commencement of the echoborg’s subsequent response. The average latency was 5.15 s (SD 
= 3.04 s).  
 
Discussion. Our results indicate that under conditions of ambiguity wherein the source of an 
interlocutor’s verbal agency is unclear, the interface substantially affects whether one 
attributes human agency to the words one’s interlocutor produces. Participants who 
communicated with a chat bot via a text interface were significantly more likely to see their 
interlocutor as actually producing words generated by a chat bot compared to those who 
encountered the same chat bot but through a human shadower. The results from this study 
corroborate the notion that the cyranic illusion is robust in circumstances involving extreme 
source-shadower incongruity: people are biased toward perceiving an echoborg as an 
autonomous person.  
 
Our findings suggest that it is relatively easy to get a chat bot to be perceived as an 
autonomous human if one is free to manipulate the contextual frame (i.e., the social 
psychological context of the interaction). An ostensibly simple suggestion from the 
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experimenter (i.e., that an interlocutor might be a human imitating a chat bot) can shift the 
entire contextual frame, fundamentally altering attributions of agency. Indeed, whenever it is 
claimed a certain bot has “passed the Turing Test” or some variant of Turing’s game, it 
usually has less to do with advances in conversational agent technology and more to do with 
shifting the contextual frame (e.g., when the chat bot Eugene Goostman—a bot that poses as 
a 13-year-old Ukrainian boy with limited English skills and general knowledge—was 
declared as having successfully fooled 33% of interrogators in a Turing Test in 2014; You, 
2015). This, however, raises a fundamental question: within what contextual frame should 
participants encounter chat bots when we evaluate them? Arguably, the most important frame 
is the most common, namely, the everyday assumption that our interlocutors are human, just 
like us.  
 
Study 3: Can covert echoborgs pass as human in the everyday contextual frame?  
Aims. Study 3 examined people’s impressions following their conversing with an agent who, 
unbeknownst to them, produced solely the words of a chat bot. We aimed to gauge whether 
or not being shadowed by a human improved a chat bot’s ability to pass as an actual person 
within the everyday contextual frame (i.e., under the conditions of a generic social encounter 
wherein it is assumed an interlocutor is an ordinary human). The concept of “passing” within 
such a frame comes from the sociological and social psychological traditions that explore the 
mechanisms through which people manage identities in order to be accepted as a member of 
a particular group (Goffman, 1963; Renfrow, 2004; Khanna and Johnson, 2010). For 
example, the anthropomorphic androids in Dick’s (1968) novel Do Androids Dream of 
Electric Sheep? were able to pass as human so long as they concealed their true nature, took 
part in mundane human activities, and avoided the scrutiny of bounty hunters. The speech 
shadower in an echoborg is essentially a human mask placed over the peripherals one 
normally associates with computer systems. From a static third-person point of view, 
therefore, echoborgs appear to be autonomous human beings and nothing more, raising the 
question as to whether or not despite their communicative deficiencies people still sense that 
echoborgs are ordinary people. We predicted that research participants would not leave an 
interaction with a covert echoborg with the impression of having communicated with 
something non-human, whereas interacting with a covert chat bot through a text interface 
would leave participants with a strong impression of having encountered machine 
intelligence of some sort.  
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This study also investigated perceptual phenomena associated with the uncanny valley, 
namely how human-like, eerie, and familiar a covert echoborg interlocutor would seem to 
those with whom they communicated, and whether or not people would be comfortable in the 
presence of a covert echoborg. Mori’s (1970) original hypothesis suggested that “subtle 
deviations from human appearance and behavior create an unnerving effect” (MacDorman 
and Ishiguro, 2006b, p. 299), and our goal was to gauge people’s reaction to an interlocutor 
that was human in all respects but for the fact that a conversational agent determined the 
words they spoke.  
 
Shadowers and subjects. A female graduate student (aged 23) was trained to perform as a 
speech shadower. Forty-one adult participants (26 female; mean age = 24.12, SD =7.59) were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions: Echoborg (n = 20) and Text Interface (n = 21).  
 
Procedure. In addition to Cleverbot, two other chat bots were used in this study: Mitsuku 
(winner or the 2013 Loebner Prize) and Rose (winner of the 2014 Loebner Prize). In the 
Echoborg condition, Cleverbot and Rose were each assigned to speak with seven participants 
while Mitsuku spoke with six participants. In the Text Interface condition, Cleverbot, Rose, 
and Mitsuku each spoke with seven participants. During Cleverbot trials, the stock responses 
used in the prior two studies were employed.  
 
The participant was instructed that the study concerned how strangers conversed when 
speaking for the first time, that it involved simply holding a 10-min conversation with 
another research participant, and that they were free to decide on topics for discussion so long 
as vulgarity was avoided. The researcher made no mention of chat bots or of anything related 
to artificial intelligence. Furthermore, the participant was given no indication that their 
interlocutor would behave non-autonomously or abnormally. The aim was to invoke the 
everyday contextual frame, in so far as that can be done within an experimental setting.  
 
This study used the same minimal technological dependency apparatus and procedure as in 
Study 2. In the Text Interface condition the participant spoke aloud to their interlocutor while 
their interlocutor’s responses were shown in text on a computer screen. In the Echoborg 
condition the participant encountered a human shadower face-to-face.  
 
Measures and post-interaction interview. Following the interaction the participant 
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completed a brief questionnaire containing items asking them to indicate on a 10-point scale 
how human-like (1: very mechanical and computer-like; 10: very human-like), eerie (1: not at 
all eerie; 10: very eerie), and familiar (1: not at all familiar; 10: very familiar) their 
interlocutor seemed, as well as how comfortable they felt during the interaction (1: not at all 
comfortable; 10: very comfortable). Participants were also asked to briefly describe in writing 
the person they spoke with and what they thought they study was about.  
 
When the questionnaire was completed, the researcher interviewed the participant to gain a 
sense of their impressions of the interaction and their interlocutor. The participant was asked 
to describe salient aspects of their interlocutor’s personality. In order to ascertain whether the 
participant had picked up on the fact that they had communicated with a computer program, 
the researcher asked the participant whether they had suspicions regarding the nature of their 
interlocutor or about the study generally. Finally, the researcher revealed to the participant 
the full nature of the interaction and disclosed the purpose of the study.  
 
Results. In the Text Interface condition, 14 of 21 participants (67%) mentioned during their 
post-interaction interview (prior to the researcher making any allusion to chat bots or 
anything computer-related) that they felt they had spoken to a computer program or robot. 
Two participants stated during debriefing that they suspected their interlocutor was a real 
person acting or using a script. Furthermore, seven participants (33%) explicitly stated in 
writing on their questionnaires that they believed the purpose of the study was to assess 
human–computer/human–robot interaction. Of the 14 participants who did not indicate that 
they thought the purpose of the study involved human–computer interaction, six said that 
they thought the study concerned how strangers communicated with one another (the stated 
purpose of the study supplied by the researcher prior to the interaction). Two participants 
believed the study concerned how people handle abnormal/unexpected situations. Six 
participants provided unique responses that did not fit into these categories.  
 
Only 3 of 20 participants (15%) in the Echoborg condition stated during their post-interaction 
interview that they felt as though they had spoken to a computer or robot. Fifteen participants 
made it clear to the researcher during their interview that they suspected their interlocutor had 
been acting or giving scripted responses that did not align with their actual persona. Only two 
participants (10%) indicated in writing on their questionnaires that they believed the purpose 
of the study was to assess human–computer/human–robot interaction. Of the 18 participants 
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who did not indicate that they thought the study’s purpose was to investigate human–
computer interaction, only one stated that they thought the purpose of the study was to 
investigate communication between strangers. Seven participants believed the purpose of the 
study related to how people deal with abnormal/unexpected situations (e.g., “how people 
react when thrown out of their comfort zone” and “how people react to people who do not 
comply with social norms”). Four participants believed the study’s purpose was to see how 
people communicated those who were shy/introverted. Three participants stated that they 
thought the study’s purpose involved how people communicate with those who have a 
disability such as autism or speech impairment. Four participants provided other unique 
responses.  
 
We performed a multivariate analysis of variance to see whether Interface (Echoborg vs. Text 
Interface) and Chat Bot (Cleverbot vs. Mitsuku vs. Rose) produced effects on participants’ 
judgments concerning the four questionnaire items that pertained to how familiar, eerie, and 
human-like their interlocutor seemed as well as how comfortable they felt during the 
interaction. An initial omnibus test showed a significant effect of Interface, Λ = 0.73, F(4,34) 
= 3.18, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.27, and a non-significant effect of Chat Bot, Λ = 0.74, F(8,68) = 1.41, 
p = 0.21, η2 = 0.14. Univariate tests showed a significant effect of Interface on how 
comfortable participants felt during the interaction, F(1,37) = 10.64, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.22, with 
participants in the Text Interface condition reporting higher levels of comfort (M = 5.52, SD 
= 2.42) compared to those in the Echoborg condition (M = 3.44, SD = 2.04). However, these 
univariate tests showed non-significant effects of Interface with respect to how familiar, 
F(1,37) = 1.52, p = 0.23, η2 = 0.04, eerie, F(1,37) = 0.08, p = 0.77, η2 < 0.01, and human-
like, F(1,37) = 0.24, p = 0.63, η2 = 0.01, interlocutors seemed. In the Text Interface 
condition, mean scores for familiarity, eeriness, and human-likeness were 3.81 (SD = 1.89), 
6.19 (SD = 2.14), and 2.95 (SD = 1.63), respectively, compared to scores of 3.00 (SD = 
2.22), 6.00 (SD = 2.00), and 2.70 (SD = 1.78), respectively, within the Echoborg condition.  
 
Two Echoborg condition trials for each chat bot were selected at random and the audio 
latency was assessed. The average latencies for Cleverbot, Mitsuku, and Rose were 4.43s (SD 
= 2.92s), 5.95s (SD = 3.98s), and 3.96s (SD = 3.94s), respectively. As each trial made use of 
the same minimal technological dependency format of interaction, the differences between 
these latencies can be accounted for by the fact that the chat bots we used differ in terms of 
the speed at which they generate and return responses.  
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Discussion. In line with our hypothesis, a majority of participants in the Text Interface 
condition sensed they were communicating with a chat bot despite being led to believe they 
would be talking to another research participant while only a small minority of participants in 
the Echoborg condition came to the same conclusion. These results suggest that a chat bot 
stands a far greater chance of passing as a human in an everyday contextual frame when 
being shadowed by a human than when communicating via a text interface. The caveat to 
these findings, however, is that interactants do not tend to see a person shadowing for a chat 
bot as genuine. Rather, interactants see such people as deliberately behaving outside of their 
normal persona. This finding corroborates the general phenomenon observed in Study 2, that 
people are inclined to perceive an echoborg as somebody acting but nonetheless speaking 
self-authored words. We should note, however, that participants’ awareness of being in a 
laboratory study may have contributed to their suspecting that the persona they encountered 
was not genuine. Future research may include observational field studies wherein interactants 
encounter a covert echoborg in real-world social contexts (e.g., a generic social gathering). It 
is plausible that in such scenarios interactants would be less inclined to form the belief that an 
echoborg was someone deliberately acting outside of their normal persona.  
 
Although our experiment only considered two types of interfaces as opposed to a continuum 
of interfaces ranging from the very-human to the very-mechanical, our results contribute a 
novel finding to the discussion surrounding uncanny valley phenomena. We found evidence 
that people feel significantly less comfortable speaking to a chat bot through a human speech 
shadower than they do speaking to the same chat bot through a text interface. General 
discomfort seemed to derive from the social awkwardness that arose due to the chat bot’s 
violations of conversational norms. The effect of these violations appears to have been 
magnified in the Echoborg condition. It is likely that participants in the Echoborg condition 
held higher expectations about the level of understanding and rapport that would be reached 
and sustained during the interactions on account of their speaking face-to-face with another 
human being, for the physical body of the other is laden with social cues that evoke such 
expectations (Kiesler, 2005). Komatsu and Yamada’s (2011) “adaptation gap” hypothesis 
suggests that when expectations are not met during interactions with agents (e.g., when the 
implied social capacity of an agent exceeds that actually experienced by a user), people’s 
subjective impressions are affected. Accordingly, participants in the Echoborg condition may 
have felt more uncomfortable compared to their counterparts in the Text Interface condition 
partly due to their having higher pre-interaction expectations about the quality of 
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interlocution they would experience. What requires further study is the investigation of 
conditions within which participants are told prior to interacting with either an echoborg or a 
text interface that their interlocutor will be producing the words of a chat bot. Adding two 
such conditions to Study 3′s design would allow one to observe whether the body of the other 
produces effect on feelings of comfort independent of pre-interaction expectations.  
 
General discussion 
We have introduced and demonstrated a new research method, a special type of cyranoid we 
call an echoborg. Echoborgs make possible interactions with artificial conversational agents 
that have truly human interfaces. Though an abundance of research has demonstrated various 
means of embodying machine intelligence in human form, from onscreen embodied 
conversational agents (e.g., Cassell et al., 2000; Krämer et al., 2009) to 3D agents in 
immersive virtual environments (e.g., Selvarajah and Richards, 2005; Bailenson et al., 2008) 
to tangible machine-bodied androids (e.g., Ishiguro and Nishio, 2007; Spexard et al., 2007), 
the echoborg stands apart from these other methods in that it involves a real, tangible human 
as the interface.  
 
Study 1 compared a standard text-based version of the Turing Test to an echoborg version 
and found that although a chat bot’s ability to pass a Turing Test was not improved when 
being shadowed by a human, being shadowed did increase ratings of how human-like the 
chat bot seemed. This effect of embodiment on human-likeness was unique to chat bot 
interlocutors, as human interlocutors in these tests were not seen as more human-like when 
their words were spoken by a human shadower, suggesting that a demonstrated capacity for 
human-level dialog may override the effect of human embodiment on perceptions of human-
likeness in Turing Test contexts. Study 2 showed that in an ambiguous situation wherein 
participants were told that an interlocutor was either articulating words generated by a chat 
bot or merely imitating one, participants in a text interface condition were more likely to 
conclude that they had encountered the words of an actual chat bot than those who 
encountered an echoborg. The contrast between these two conditions provides evidence for 
(a) the robustness of the cyranic illusion, and (b) the notion that people’s causal attributions 
align with what is most salient and least ambiguous to them. Study 3 explored the notion of 
passing and the uncanny valley in an ordinary, everyday contextual frame (i.e., the 
experimental context attempted to simulate a generic, unscripted, first-time encounter 
between strangers). Participants engaged with a covert chat bot via either a text interface or 
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an echoborg. When interviewed following these interactions, most of the participants who 
engaged a text interface suspected they had encountered a chat bot, whereas only a few of the 
participants who engaged an echoborg held the same suspicion. This suggests that it is 
possible for a chat bot to pass as fully human given the requisite interface, namely an actual 
human body, and a suitable contextual frame. This study also found that people were less 
comfortable speaking to an echoborg than to a text interface.  
 
Implications. Android science. Drawing from Nunamaker et al.’s (2011) distinction between 
virtual avatars and embodied conversational agents, in Figure 3.4 we visualize a simple two-
dimensional matrix differentiating the basic tools available to android science, with one 
dimension indicating the source of verbal (and potentially non-verbal) agency and the other 
indicating interface-type. This matrix places the echoborg in relation to current mechanical 
devices utilized by android researchers (autonomous and tele-operated androids) as well as 
human beings as experimental subjects. By juxtaposing the field’s tools in this manner, we 
can begin formally distinguishing the unique research questions that lend themselves to each. 
The fundamental question that each of these tools can be applied to concerns what happens 
when the human elements of an interlocutor are removed and replaced by artificial imitations. 
The unique questions that can be approached via the usage of echoborgs concern how real 
human bodies (not mere mechanical imitations) fundamentally alter people’s perceptions of 
and interactions with machine intelligence.  
 
In the echoborg paradigm, the communicative limitations of chat bots and other types of 
conversational agents are not treated as problematic barriers to fluid conversation. Rather, 
these limitations are directly operationalized; how the human body as an interface mediates 
the perception of these communicative limitations is what is of interest. We can thus 
differentiate the echoborg paradigm from the tele-operated android paradigm in the following 
manner. Tele-operated android research targets the social dynamics between humans and 
human-like machine interfaces. Given that conversational agents are relatively poor 
communicators, the tele-operated paradigm cedes speech-interpretation/generation 
responsibility to a human operator, whose experiences operating an android can also be the 
subject of inquiry. By contrast, the echoborg paradigm is interested in the social dynamics 
that emerge when the words artificial systems produce are refracted through actual human 
bodies during face-to-face interaction.  
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Figure 3.4: Basic tools of android science. 
 
 
 
The affordance which grants the echoborg particular promise as a methodology is that it
allows researchers the opportunity to study interactions under conditions wherein people 
believe they are speaking to an autonomously communicating person. The echoborg can 
interact covertly (i.e., without interactants expecting that they are communicating with a bot). 
Of course, chat bots and other conversational agents can be deployed covertly via traditional 
text interfaces—and many are (e.g., posing as real people in chat rooms, web forums, and 
social media websites in order to distribute marketing messages and collect user-data; 
Gianvecchio et al., 2011; Nowak, 2012). But as Study 3 shows, focused interaction with a 
covert chat bot via a text interface for a sustained period of time is very likely to result in the 
interactant sensing that that they are not speaking to an actual person. Today’s chat bots 
simply fail to sustain meaningful mixed-initiative dialog, and unless their words are vocalized 
by a tangible human body, their true nature is quickly exposed.  
 
The Turing Test paradigm (and passing). Over half a century since its conception, the 
Turing Test paradigm remains a substantial area of interest in artificial intelligence and 
philosophy of mind. The usefulness of the Turing Test as a technological benchmark, its 
rules, and what it would mean for a machine to pass such a test (i.e., what, exactly, passing 
would be evidence of) are issues that have been hotly debated (e.g., Searle, 1980; Copeland, 
2000; French, 2000; Harnad, 2000; Chomsky, 2008; Watt, 2008; Proudfoot, 2011). The non-
philosophical literature on the Turing Test focuses largely on the technological aspects of 
candidate conversational agents (e.g., whether they occasionally make spelling mistakes) and 
the conditions that give rise to increased fooling (e.g., knowing vs. not knowing of the 
possible presence of a machine intelligence; Saygin and Cicekli, 2002; Gilbert and Forney, 
2015). What remains to be explored in sufficient depth are the social psychological dynamics 
within standard and modified Turing Test scenarios: causal attributions, identity and power 
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relationships, questions asked and avoided, misunderstandings recognized and repaired, 
intersubjective achievement, and so on (e.g., Warwick and Shah, 2015). Our position is that 
the Turing Test is most useful when its orthodox interpretation is relaxed and it is applied not 
toward assessing the capacities of chat bots per se, but toward investigating aspects of human 
social nature. Indeed, the chat bot itself may be the least interesting element within a Turing 
Test scenario. A chat bot can be made to fool a human interrogator if the expectations of the 
interrogator are manipulated (e.g., through ambiguous framing). What is interesting is 
exploring the ways in which the chat bot’s utterances interact with the interrogator’s 
expectations, all within a particular contextual frame, so as to produce a social interaction that 
feels more or less comfortable or human.  
 
In essence, the three studies we have presented are all modified Turing Tests in that they 
explore passing in one form or another (with Study 1 bearing the closest resemblance to 
Turing’s original concept). What our studies show is how intimately connected passing is to 
the social psychological framing of an interaction, and how the interface one communicates 
with affects the meaning of the situation from the point-of-view of interactants. In our own 
view, the results from Study 3 are at the same time the most profound and the least 
surprising. Seventeen of 20 people spoke face-to-face with an echoborg in a small room for 
10-min and failed to develop even the slightest suspicion that they were interacting with the 
words of an artificial agent of some kind. They may have seen their interlocutor as strange, 
introverted, or even acting, but it did not cross their minds that who (or what) they were 
dealing with was part computer program. This makes sense in light of how we experience 
mundane human interaction, and implies that, given certain generic social psychological 
preconditions, an interlocutor’s capacity to produce sophisticated or even sensible syntax 
simply does not factor in to our categorizing them as a human being or as having a “mind.” 
That is to say, rather than taking these results as indicating the sophistication of chat bots, we 
take these results as indicating the importance of both the body and social psychological 
framing in social interaction.  
 
Future research applications. Creating human-like interfaces that totally override people’s 
awareness that they are interacting with something artificial remains a distant holy grail 
(Vogeley and Bente, 2010). In the interim, however, we can use echoborgs to approximate 
the conditions of a world in which machines are capable of passing the nonverbal and motor 
requirements of a Total Turing Test. This opens the doors to a new frontier of human–robot 
116
and human–agent interaction research.  
 
Echoborgs can be used to further study uncanny valley phenomena. Most of the literature that 
has explored the uncanny valley has focused on motor behavior and physical resemblance as 
independent variables, as well as the effects different levels of participant engagement 
(passive vs. active) have on perceptions of agents (e.g., von der Pütten et al., 2011). 
Researchers have also, but to a lesser extent, looked at the role of phonetic quality in relation 
to the uncanny valley (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2011; Tinwell et al., 2011). Echoborgs enable us 
to study uncanny valley phenomena isolating dialogic capacity as an independent variable. 
Using echoborgs, we can see if an uncanny valley emerges when a spectrum of 
conversational agents ranging from the very poor (machine-like) to the very advanced 
(human-like) are communicated through a human speech shadower in unscripted face-to-face 
interactions.  
 
Another possible avenue of research concerns the use echoborgs in comparative person 
perception studies. Experiments can be designed with conditions differentiated in terms of the 
interface through which participants communicate with a particular conversational agent (text 
interface, embodied conversational agent, echoborg, and so on). Researchers could then 
observe how the various interfaces shape aspects of the personality perceived by the 
participant, from minimal interfaces all the way up to a face-to-face human body.  
 
A particularly enticing possibility for future research involves developing bots that 
simultaneously dictate words to a shadower while directing elements of the shadower’s motor 
behavior. In the echoborgs we have thus far constructed, the bot supplies the speech 
shadower with what to say while the shadower retains full control over their non-verbal 
functioning. We can imagine, however, developing a bot that delivered to the shadower’s left 
ear monitor words to speak while delivering basic behavioral commands (e.g., “smile,” 
“stand up,” “extend right hand for handshake”) to the shadower’s right ear monitor. This 
would grant the bot greater agency over the echoborg’s behavior.  
 
The exciting opportunity opened up by echoborgs more generally is the opportunity to study 
human–computer interaction under the conditions of face-to-face human–human interaction. 
The problem for human–computer interaction research in general, and android science in 
particular, is that humans approach human–computer interaction differently from human–
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human interaction (as our own research shows). Human–human interaction triggers a huge 
range of complex phenomena, from identity dynamics to social emotions to basic taken-for-
granted assumptions to an incredibly subtle intersubjective orientation to the other (Gillespie 
and Cornish, 2014). The echoborg method enables us to test conversational agents within 
face-to-face interaction scenarios, simultaneously pushing AI into a new domain and also to 
probing the full complexity of the human–human inter-face.  
 
Ethical considerations. In exploring social contexts involving a covert echoborg, mild 
deception is required in order to preserve the participant’s belief that they are encountering an 
autonomous person. Careful experimental design (e.g., choice of conversational agents and 
shadowers, duration of interaction, communicative setting, etc.) and thorough piloting of 
procedures is strongly recommended so as to render participant distress unlikely. Participants 
should be exhaustively debriefed to gauge whether or not adjustments need to be made to the 
research procedures in order to avoid potential negative experiences. As a guideline, the 
debrief procedure in Study 3 involved asking the participant if they had any concerns 
regarding the ethics of the study as well as if they would object to a close friend or relative 
taking part in the same study under the same conditions. All participants said no to both 
questions. We can anecdotally report that all of our participants enjoyed taking part in our 
research, with many expressing positivity toward the echoborg concept during debriefing and 
linking their experiences with what they had seen in popular science fiction films.  
 
Limitations. Our studies were highly exploratory in nature. As such, various aspects of our 
investigations could have been more finely controlled. Though best attempts were made to 
standardize the body language of shadowers across all experimental trials, we did not make 
specific considerations for controlling certain behaviors (in particular, consistency of eye-
contact). Moreover, the identity features of the shadowers (e.g., gender, ethnicity, age, and so 
on) may have produced unobserved effects on participants. We did not formally investigate 
such effects as they were not deemed to be of theoretical interest; however, we do 
acknowledge that questions regarding the relationship between the physical identity of the 
shadower and the social perception of the echoborg warrant future investigation. Sample 
sizes in our studies were relatively small due to practical constraints. Had our sample size for 
Study 3 been larger we might have been able to conduct a comprehensive comparison 
between the three chat bots used (Cleverbot, Rose, and Mitsuku). Also, we disclose that our 
choice of chat bots was based on prior familiarity with these programs.  
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We did not systematically analyze the effects audio latency may have had on participants’ 
experiences. The delay between interactant-utterances and echoborg-responses in the studies 
that involved participants speaking aloud to an echoborg certainly degraded the mundane 
realism of interactions to some degree. Minimizing this latency is a major research priority as 
we continue to refine the echoborg methodology. At the moment we face a trade-off between 
speed and accuracy: the use of a speed-typing third party (the minimal technological 
dependency model) slows the pace at which the conversational agent receives the words 
spoken by the interactant, yet better guarantees that the agent will process an accurate 
representation of the interactant’s words.  
 
Conclusion. This article has demonstrated the possibility and potential of echoborgs: human-
bodied entities whose words (and potentially motor actions) are partially or completely 
determined by a computer program. Researchers can use echoborgs to study how people 
interact face-to-face with machine intelligence under the assumption that it is human. This 
methodology opens up a new paradigm for human–computer interaction research as to date 
people have interacted with computers, even sophisticated agents and highly lifelike 
androids, as machines (i.e., as things categorically different from real humans). Pairing a 
conversational agent with a human being to create an echoborg fundamentally transforms 
how people perceive and emotionally experience an in person encounter with social 
technology. Perhaps the most exciting takeaway from this initial examination of echoborgs is 
that under certain social psychological conditions echoborgs pass as fully autonomous human 
beings. 
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CHAPTER 4 | Using echoborgs to assess intersubjective effort in human-agent dialog 
 
Preface 
Having explored the possibility of an echoborg extension of the cyranoid method in the 
previous chapter, we now turn toward using the echoborg to investigate a fundamental 
intersubjective human social behavior: the repair of misunderstandings in dialog. Whereas 
Chapter 3 is largely a proof of concept of the echoborg and a contribution to the field of 
android science, the current chapter employs the echoborg in a deep investigation certain 
factors that affect how much effort people exert toward attempting to achieve common 
ground with an artificial agent interlocutor. Via the cyranic illusion, the echoborg can create 
situations wherein an interactant believes they are speaking to an autonomously 
communicating person (being that they encounter another human body face-to-face). The 
current chapter operationalizes this affordance to demonstrate how the behaviors people 
express that are associated with generating shared understanding can be assessed in relation 
to manipulations regarding their knowledge of the true source of an interlocutor’s words and 
the interface that they encounter (i.e., human body vs. machine).  
 
The journal article that follows was authored by Corti and Gillespie. Corti designed and 
carried out the study, performed data analysis, determined third-turn coding criteria, outlined 
the article, and authored the main drafts, contributing roughly 75% of the content. Gillespie 
provided the technological devices, helped conduct the studies, provided key supervisory 
assistance, provided funding, provided Corti with editorial suggestions for the article, helped 
determine third-turn coding criteria, and contributed roughly 25% of the content. The article 
has been accepted for publication pending minor revisions in the journal Computers in 
Human Behavior. Chapter 4 includes these revisions.  
 
Copies of participant instructions and other materials used to conduct the studies in this 
chapter can be found in Appendix F. 
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CHAPTER 4 | Using Echoborgs to Assess Intersubjective Effort in Human-agent Dialog 
 
Article Title 
Co-constructing intersubjectivity with artificial conversational agents: People are more likely 
to initiate repairs of misunderstandings with interlocutors represented as human. 
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Abstract 
This article explores whether people more frequently attempt to repair misunderstandings 
while speaking to an artificial conversational agent if it is represented as fully human. 
Interactants in dyadic conversations with an agent spoke to either a text screen interface 
(agent’s responses shown on a screen) or a human body interface (agent’s responses 
vocalized by a human speech shadower via the echoborg method) and were either informed 
or not informed prior to interlocution that their interlocutor’s responses were agent-generated. 
Results show that people are less likely to initiate repairs with conversational agents when 
they communicate via a text screen interface and when they explicitly know their 
interlocutor’s words to be agent-generated. That is to say, people demonstrate the most 
“intersubjective effort” toward establishing common ground when they engage the agent 
under the same social psychological conditions of face-to-face human-human interaction (i.e., 
when they encounter another human body and assume they are speaking to an autonomously-
communicating person). The article’s methodology presents a novel means of evaluating 
intersubjectivity in human-agent interaction against human-human benchmarks.   
 
Keywords 
Common ground, conversational repair, echoborg, human-agent interaction, intersubjectivity, 
psychological benchmarks 
 
Introduction 
 “Intersubjectivity has […] to be taken for granted in order to be achieved.” – 
Rommetveit (1974, p. 56) 
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Psychological research involving artificial agents designed to emulate human social 
capabilities (e.g., robots, androids, and conversational agents that interact using language 
and/or nonverbal behavior) has largely focused on whether people self-report the agent to be 
humanlike. Arguably, however, what is more important is whether the agent elicits 
humanlike patterns of interaction. Cassell and Tartaro (2007) claim that “the goal of human-
agent interaction […] should not be a believable agent; it should be a believable interaction 
between a human and agent in a given context” (p. 407). Accordingly, it has been proposed 
that the appropriate means of benchmarking an agent is to evaluate the extent to which the 
agent and a human interactant can together demonstrate a quality of intersubjectivity similar 
to that displayed in human-human interaction (Cassell & Tartaro, 2007; Schönbrodt & 
Asendorpf, 2011), herein referred to as demonstrating “benchmark intersubjectivity.” 
Intersubjectivity is a term that refers to the interactional relationship between perspectives 
within a dyad or larger group that becomes evident through each interactant’s behavioral 
orientation to the other (Gillespie & Cornish, 2010; Linell, 2009; Trevarthen & Aitken, 
2001). Intersubjectivity is co-constructed within social interaction (Jacoby & Ochs, 1995), 
dynamically created through communicative processes within the interaction. When co-
constructing intersubjectivity is used as a criterion for evaluating human-agent interaction 
(HAI), emphasis is placed not on isolated characteristics of either party (e.g., how humanlike 
the agent appears), but rather on the specific communicative processes through which the 
human-agent pair’s perspectives are coordinated.  
 
A key intersubjective process demonstrated by humans involves the use of spoken language 
to build and sustain common ground (i.e., a shared understanding of the semantics and frames 
of reference particular to a given interaction) via a linguistic toolkit that enables the signaling, 
acknowledging, and repair of misunderstandings (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Schegloff, 1992). 
Merely possessing this toolkit, however, is insufficient for establishing common ground; this 
accomplishment requires active facilitation by each party to an interaction by-way-of regular 
and appropriate use of this toolkit (Alterman, 2007; Clark & Schaefer, 1989). When a person 
facilitates common ground at a level indicative of benchmark intersubjectivity, the person can 
be said to be exerting “benchmark intersubjective effort.” With respect to HAI, exerting 
benchmark intersubjective effort toward an agent is necessary otherwise the interactant will 
deprive the agent of the communicative support necessary to ascend into the complex 
intersubjective world of humans.  
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The current article tests the idea that absent the belief that they are engaging with an 
autonomously communicating person, human interactants will not exert benchmark 
intersubjective effort when in communication with an artificial agent, nor will they exert 
benchmark intersubjective effort when the agent communicates via a nonhuman interface 
(i.e., does not have a human body). This idea is explored via the “echoborg” method 
demonstrated by Corti and Gillespie (2015a). An echoborg is a hybrid entity composed of a 
human speech shadower who wears a concealed inner-ear audio receiver and vocalizes words 
they receive from a conversational agent. The technique enables social situations wherein 
people believe they are speaking to an autonomously communicating human (due to the fact 
that they engage with another human body face-to-face and in person) when in reality the 
words spoken by this human are entirely determined by an unseen conversational agent. This 
method can elicit an approximation of benchmark intersubjective effort from interactants in a 
baseline condition (i.e., human body interface + no explicit knowledge of an interlocutor’s 
words being agent-determined) that can be compared to the intersubjective effort 
demonstrated in conditions involving a nonhuman interface and/or explicit knowledge that an 
interlocutor’s words are agent-determined.   
 
Intersubjectivity and intersubjective effort 
Intersubjectivity has been conceptualized as entailing the interactions among (minimally) 
three levels of perspectives: (1) direct-perspectives (each party’s point-of-view), (2) meta-
perspectives (what each party thinks the other party’s point-of-view is), and (3) meta-meta-
perspectives (what each party thinks the other party thinks their point-of-view is) (Gillespie 
& Cornish, 2010; Ichheiser 1943; Laing, Phillipson & Lee, 1966). According to Gillespie and 
Cornish (2010), this framework can be used to understand social processes such as deception 
(i.e., the manipulation of meta-perspectives) as well as operationalize disagreement (i.e., 
misalignment between self’s direct-perspectives and other’s direct-perspectives) and 
misunderstanding (i.e., misalignment between self’s meta-perspective and other’s direct-
perspective). This distinction between disagreement and misunderstanding is crucial: 
achieving common ground is not about parties agreeing with one another, but about parties 
forming accurate meta-perspectives in relation to the context of an interaction, and this is 
facilitated via empirically observable conversational processes that display and repair 
perspectives (see Clark & Brennan, 1991; Marková, 2003; Tirassa & Bosco, 2008). 
 
Consider the following vignette, in which Aaron (from London) and Bryan (from New York) 
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have a conversation: 
 
Aaron:  How did you get to work today? 
Bryan:  I took the subway. 
Aaron:  You took the subway? 
Bryan:  Err, I mean I took the underground. I 
forgot that that’s what you call it here in 
London. 
Aaron:  Got it. 
 
Bryan formulates his initial response (“I took the subway”) on the assumption that Aaron’s 
direct-perspective with regard to the semantics of the utterance will match his direct-
perspective (i.e., Bryan “designs” his utterance based on expectations he holds about Aaron; 
see Arundale, 2010; Gillespie & Cornish, 2014). Aaron then signals to Bryan that, in fact, he 
does not understand the semantics of Bryan’s initial response (“You took the subway?”), 
indicating that Aaron’s meta-perspective of the phrase “I took the subway” does not align 
with Bryan’s direct-perspective of the phrase. Bryan subsequently infers that Aaron is 
requesting an update to his meta-perspective and responds by clarifying the semantics of his 
initial response (“Err, I mean I took the underground. I forgot that that’s what you call it here 
in London”). As evidenced by Aaron’s final utterance (“Got it”), Bryan’s clarification 
sufficiently resolves the misunderstanding. Aaron now understands what Bryan meant by the 
phrase “I took the subway” as there is now alignment between Aaron’s meta-perspective and 
Bryan’s direct-perspective.   
 
The intersubjective effort exerted by both Aaron and Bryan in pursuit of common ground is 
evidenced by the relationship between their various speech acts. Producing speech acts in 
support of establishing common ground is a process known as “grounding” (Clark & 
Brennan, 1991; Clark & Schaefer, 1987). At any fixed point in time prior to, during, and after 
a social interaction there exists a relationship between the various possible direct-, meta-, and 
meta-meta-perspectives held by each interactant. Behaviors arising from of intersubjective 
effort (e.g., grounding) cause these perspectives to act upon one another so as to make 
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evident to each interactant loci of agreement/disagreement and 
understanding/misunderstanding, and it is through such processes that the contents of 
perspectives are renegotiated and updated.  
  
Analyzing intersubjective effort in dialog via repair activity. Conversation Analysis (CA) 
provides a basis for evaluating the quality of intersubjectivity in dialog (Gillespie & Cornish, 
2010). CA arose out of the sociological tradition of “ethnomethodology” developed by 
Garfinkel (1967) and seeks to interpret language usage within the micro-context experienced 
by parties to an interaction (i.e., “talk-in-interaction”) rather than in its context-free, idealized 
form (Goodwin & Heritage, 1990; Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008). Originators of the method 
identified fundamental organizational elements of talk-in-interaction, including how speakers 
allocate turns at talk as well as manage errors and misunderstandings (Sacks, Schegloff, & 
Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977), and CA has since proved useful in 
interactionist approaches to evaluating human-computer dialog (e.g., Brennan, 1991; 
Frohlich, Drew, & Monk, 1994; Raudaskoski, 1990; Zdenek, 2001). The current work 
focuses exclusively on the repair of misunderstandings, the mechanisms of which tie most 
directly to the operationalization of intersubjectivity and intersubjective effort described 
herein.  
 
In the course of human dialog, interlocutors regularly produce utterances that contain errors 
or that are misunderstood. These utterances are often referred to as “trouble sources” 
(Schegloff, 1992). Repair activity is a type of grounding interactants deploy in order to 
mutually manage the presence of trouble sources and consists of the speaker of the trouble 
source (“self”) and the recipient of the trouble source (“other”) structuring their turns at 
speech so as to produce common ground. Successful repair sequences can take one of four 
general turn-taking forms (Zahn, 1984): (1) self-initiated self-repair involves the speaker of a 
trouble source both signaling and self-correcting a trouble source; (2) other-initiated self-
repair involves the speaker of a trouble source self-correcting the trouble source following it 
being signaled by an interlocutor; (3) self-initiated other-repair involves an interlocutor 
correcting a trouble source following it being signaled by the speaker of the trouble source; 
(4) other-initiated other-repair involves an interlocutor both signaling and correcting the 
trouble source following its production by another speaker. These repair formats function as 
“the self-righting mechanism[s] for the organization of language use in social interaction” 
(Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977, p. 381), and according to Sidnell (2010), play “a vital 
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role in the maintenance of intersubjectivity” (p. 111).  
 
Nearly all repair initiations occur within a “limited space around their self-declared trouble-
source,” while “virtually all repairs (i.e., solutions) occur within a very narrowly 
circumscribed space from their repair initiations” (Schegloff, 2000, p. 208, emphasis in 
original). There is a strong tendency for other-initiations of repair to occur in the turn 
following the utterance that contains the trouble source (the second position) and be 
immediately followed by a self-repair (Schegloff, 2000), creating a three-turn sequence 
known as “repair after next turn”: (1) trouble source (self) → (2) repair initiation (other) → 
(3) repair outcome (self). As the third position provides the speaker of a trouble source an 
opportunity to resolve a misunderstanding in the brief window of space opened by the repair 
initiation, repair after next turn has been described as “the last structurally provided defense 
of intersubjectivity in conversation” (Schegloff, 1992, p. 1295).  
 
In the terminology of Laing, Phillipson and Lee (1966), three turns are the minimal unit 
required to establish mutual understanding: the first turn presents a direct-perspective, the 
second turn questions that direct-perspective (i.e., it is a meta-perspective), and the repair, if 
successful, corrects or updates the meta-perspective. Repair after next turn thus coordinates 
perspectives, providing an elemental three-turn stitch in the co-created fabric of 
intersubjectivity.  
 
Analysis of other-initiated self-repair can also be linked to intersubjectivity by considering 
how its mechanics involve bilateral joint attention, a prerequisite of complex 
intersubjectivity. When engaged in joint activities involving shared intentionality (i.e., the 
ability to understand a joint activity not merely from multiple subjective points-of-view, but 
also from a “bird’s eye” point-of view from where the perspectives of self and other are seen 
as integrated; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005), humans can through a 
repertoire of behaviors (e.g., speech acts) direct the attention of other humans to aspects of 
their shared environment relevant to shared goals (e.g., the goal of establishing common 
ground). Kaplan and Hafner (2006) outline four skills that an actor (biological or otherwise) 
must possess in order to accomplish bilateral joint attention: (1) attention detection (i.e., the 
ability to track the attention of others), (2) attention manipulation (i.e., the ability to 
manipulate and influence the attention of other actors through verbal and/or nonverbal 
gestures), (3) social coordination (i.e., the ability to engage in coordinated interaction with 
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others via techniques such as turn-taking and role switching), and (4) intentional 
understanding (i.e., the ability to understand the intentions of others and interpret and predict 
others’ behaviors as they relate to goals).  
 
Consider once again the following vignette (“TS” indicates a trouble source, “RI” indicates 
an other-initiation of repair, and “R” indicates a repair): 
 
Aaron:  How did you get to work today? 
Bryan: TS → I took the subway. 
Aaron: RI → You took the subway? 
Bryan: R → Err, I mean I took the underground. I 
forgot that that’s what you call it here in 
the U.K. 
Aaron:  Got it. 
 
At work in this passage are each of the four requisite skills for bilateral joint attention 
outlined by Kaplan et al. (2006), thus the complexity of intersubjectivity between Aaron and 
Bryan, and the intersubjective effort exerted by both, can be observed. Bryan’s first-position 
response (“I took the subway”) is misunderstood by Aaron. Aaron’s misunderstanding is 
signaled in the next turn in the form of a repair initiation (“You took the subway?”) that 
functions as an attempt to focus Bryan’s attention on the previous utterance wherein lies the 
trouble source (attention manipulation). As a direct consequence of the repair initiation, 
Bryan becomes aware of the fact that Aaron’s attention is turned backward toward a trouble 
source located in Bryan’s first position utterance (attention detection). Bryan infers that 
Aaron’s intention in uttering the repair initiation is to elicit a third-position repair (intentional 
understanding), thus Bryan clarifies the trouble source in his next turn. The entire repair 
sequence occurs within a formal structure of turn-taking supported by both interlocutors 
(social coordination).  
 
Kaplan et al.’s (2006) four requisite skills can be segmented into behavioral and non-
behavioral varieties. Attention manipulation involves overtly producing a behavior intended 
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to influence the perspective of an interactant (e.g., uttering an other-initiation), while social 
coordination encompasses synchronizing one’s behavior in accordance with that of an 
interlocutor in a manner conducive for the communication of perspectives (e.g., turn-taking). 
Attention detection and intentional understanding, meanwhile, are principally cognitive skills 
that do not necessarily manifest in the form of observable motor or linguistic behaviors (one 
can understand the intentions of another without producing an associated behavior). Insofar 
as intersubjective effort is operationalized as a behavioral indicator of a commitment to 
shared understanding, evidence for it in dialog can be found in observable actions such as 
other-initiations of repair. Failing to manipulate the attention of an interlocutor so as to alert 
them to the presence of a misunderstanding when one otherwise could constitutes a lack of 
intersubjective effort. For instance, had Aaron for whatever reason not uttered a repair 
initiation despite misunderstanding Bryan’s use of the word “subway,” then Bryan would 
have failed to recognize that his direct-perspective and Aaron’s meta-perspective of the word 
“subway” were incongruent and the two interlocutors would thereby have failed to establish 
common ground.   
 
Intersubjectivity in human-agent dialog: The role of interfaces and agency framing. 
Why might an interactant fail to exert benchmark intersubjective effort when in 
communication with an agent when they otherwise could? Answering this question requires 
considering how the agent is represented in the mind of the interactant. Specifically, it 
requires considering the factors that influence how the interactant generates meta-
perspectives of the agent’s direct-perspectives and how these perspectives are interacted with 
(if at all). This article examines two such factors: (1) the nature of the agent’s interface (i.e., 
its embodied means of participating in social communication), and (2) the framing of the 
agent’s communicative agency (namely, whether or not the interactant holds the belief that 
they are talking to an agent vs. another human being).  
 
First, consider the role of interfaces in fostering intersubjectivity. The sense that an 
interlocutor possesses attention that can be manipulated so as to jointly manage 
misunderstandings provides to an interactant the impetus for intersubjective effort, and 
attributing attention to a potential interlocutor involves the supposition that said interlocutor 
has a subjective perspective of a shared social world (see Graziano, 2013). Detection of the 
subjective perspectives possibly held by another interlocutor involves inferring information 
signaled via the interlocutor’s interface (e.g., its physical body), therefore the properties of an 
128
interlocutor’s means of interfacing influence how an interactant perceives and orients to the 
interlocutor’s perspectives (be they real or imagined) and thereby influence the interlocutor’s 
attention.  
 
That an interface can exert such a powerful influence over intersubjectivity has long been of 
interest to psychologists and philosophers concerned with the embodied nature of 
perspective-taking (e.g., on this topic, the phenomenologist Husserl invoked the concept of 
“analogical apperception” – reflexively apperceiving other people’s subjectivity based on 
their appearing to be similarly embodied and thereby becoming an “Other”; Husserl, 1931; 
also see De Preester, 2008; Hemberg, 2006). More recently, this connection between 
interfaces and the intersubjective relationship between two or more parties has been 
triangulated upon by numerous empirical research streams connected to social robotics and 
HAI. For example, in a neuroimaging study that involved humans interacting with a spectrum 
of entities ranging from extremely non-humanlike computers to humanlike androids to actual 
humans, Krach et. al (2008) demonstrated that “the tendency to build a model of another’s 
mind linearly increases with its perceived human-likeness” (p. 1). Riek, Rabinowitch, 
Chakrabarti and Robinson (2009), meanwhile, found that people self-report greater empathy 
for robots perceived to be humanlike than for non-humanlike robots. Furthermore, Saygin 
and Stadler (2012) showed that people are more accurate at processing and predicting the 
motor behavior of humanlike vs. non-humanlike agents, suggesting that the degree to which 
the motor activity of an agent “resonates” with a human observer corresponds with how 
humanlike the agent is perceived to be. These findings suggest that as an agent’s means of 
interfacing becomes more humanlike, the degree to which interactants consciously and 
unconsciously form a model of an agent’s perspectives and attention increases (this is often 
referred to as “mentalizing,” or demonstrating “theory of mind”). This also implies that the 
more an interactant’s awareness of an agent’s perspectives is reduced as a result of the 
agent’s particular means of interfacing, so to will be the interactant’s impetus for exerting 
benchmark intersubjective effort toward the agent.  
 
The notion that artificial agents with humanlike means of interfacing provide for more 
intersubjectively rich interactions has inspired the development of both embodied 
conversational interface agents (sometimes referred to simply as embodied agents, or 
intelligent virtual agents) and androids. Embodied agents are conversational agents that have 
been combined with anthropomorphic onscreen or immersive virtual interfaces. Many can 
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respond to both verbal and non-verbal input, generate verbal and non-verbal output, engage 
in repairs of misunderstanding, and communicate about the communication they are engaging 
in (Bailenson & Yee, 2005; Cassell, 2000). Androids, meanwhile, are physical machine 
imitations of humans. The field of android science has used such machines to better 
understand principles of human psychology being that the similarities in morphology 
between androids and humans allow researchers to investigate whether people respond in an 
alike manner when interacting with human and humanlike stimuli (Ishiguro & Nishio, 2007; 
MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006). Android science has shown that while humans do demand 
more sociality from actual humans than from androids, people expect more sociality from 
androids than from mechanical looking robots and lesser-looking agents (MacDorman, 2006). 
The echoborg was introduced to the field of android science by Corti and Gillespie (2015a) in 
order to leapfrog current bottlenecks concerning the imperfect appearance and motor 
behaviors of contemporary androids as an echoborg approximates an android that can “pass” 
as human in terms of physical appearance and motor behavior. 
 
An interactant’s mental formulation of the potential perspectives held by an interlocutor is 
not solely a function of the interlocutor’s means of interfacing. In fact, the meta-perspectives 
of an interlocutor’s direct-perspectives held by an interactant can be manipulated 
independently simply by altering the interactant’s beliefs about the interlocutor. Indeed, many 
experiments that assess the degree to which people engage with the real or imagined 
perspectives of other entities involve varying the ways in which an entity’s communicative 
agency is framed so as to induce changes in intersubjectivity. In HAI research this often 
entails either priming research participants to believe that they are engaging a fully-
autonomous agent when in reality the agent is human-controlled, an approach commonly 
referred to as the “Wizard of Oz” technique (Dahlbäck, Jönsson, & Ahrenberg, 1993), or 
priming them to believe they are engaging a real person when they are in reality interacting 
with an agent. Studies that have adopted this approach have shown that people mentalize less 
about an entity with whom they interact when they believe the entity to be controlled by an 
artificial agent rather than an actual person (Chaminade et. al, 2012; Gallagher, Jack, 
Roepstorff, & Frith, 2002; Kircher et. al, 2009; also see Branigan, Pickering, Pearson, 
McLean, & Brown, 2011). Furthermore, Kennedy, Wilkes, Elder, and Murray (1988) found 
that in the context of text-based human-agent dialog, the primed belief that an interlocutor 
was actually a real person led to an increase in interactants’ use of anaphors (words that point 
back to earlier parts of a conversation), implying that people less often attempt to direct an 
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interlocutor’s attention backward toward prior utterances when they believe their interlocutor 
to be a nonhuman agent. This suggests that intersubjective effort can potentially be impacted 
by the mere belief that one is or isn’t speaking with another human being.  
 
While with traditional HAI methods researchers can prime the belief that an agent is really a 
human, this approaches is only possible when used in conjunction with a nonhuman interface 
(i.e., a researcher cannot convince a research participant that a robot is actually an 
autonomous human being, they can only prime the belief that the robot is controlled by a real 
person, be that true or false in reality). Although embodied agents and androids mimic human 
likeness in a manner that augments the complexity of intersubjectivity expected by 
interactants, these interfaces are not fully human and, therefore, do not evoke the full 
spectrum of intersubjective expectations that color true human-human interaction 
(MacDorman, 2006). HAI research, therefore, has never to-date investigated HAI within a 
fully human-human social psychological frame wherein both the means of interfacing is fully 
human and the implied agency of the interlocutor is fully human. Since the echoborg method 
of HAI can achieve this, it presents a way to investigate the intersubjective processes that 
occur between an interactant and an artificial agent when the interactant both believes they 
are speaking to an autonomous human being and encounters a truly human interface (Corti & 
Gillespie, 2015a). 
 
Experimental study 
Overview. The following study assessed instances of other-initiated self-repair in dyadic 
conversations between research participants (interactants) and the artificial conversational 
agent Cleverbot, a text-based chat bot developed by Carpenter (2015). The study explored 
whether interactants’ conversational repair behavior changes depending on whether an agent-
interlocutor communicates through an actual human body (as opposed to a text screen 
interface) and whether the interactant explicitly knows their interlocutor the be 
communicating the words of an agent. A 2×2 experimental design was utilized with the 
factors Screen (1: Cleverbot communicated with the interactant via text on a computer 
screen; 0: Cleverbot communicated with the interactant via a human speech shadower - an 
echoborg) and Aware (1: the interactant was informed before the interaction that their 
interlocutor’s words were those of a chat bot; 0: the interactant was not informed before the 
interaction that their interlocutor’s words were those of a chat bot). The study was approved 
by an ethics review panel at a major British university and conducted in a behavioral research 
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laboratory. 
 
Hypotheses. The study tested four hypotheses predicting main effects of the factors Screen 
and Aware on two separate dependent measures related to interactants’ intersubjective effort: 
(1) interactant other-initiations (other-initiations produced by the interactant following a 
Cleverbot utterance) and (2) interactant self-repair attempts following Cleverbot other-
initiation. These hypotheses were developed based on the argument that interactants’ 
intersubjective effort would be greatest in the “covert echoborg” baseline condition that 
featured Cleverbot interacting through a human speech shadower and interactants not being 
informed prior to the conversation commencing that their interlocutor’s words would be 
determined by an artificial agent. Regarding interactant other-initiations, it was predicted that 
interactants would be less likely to produce an other-initiation following a Cleverbot 
utterance when speaking to via a text screen interface (Hypothesis 1) and when explicitly 
aware that their interlocutor’s words were determined by a conversational agent (Hypothesis 
2). Likewise, it was predicted that interactants would be less likely to produce a self-repair 
following a Cleverbot other-initiation when speaking to Cleverbot via a text screen interface 
(Hypothesis 3) and when explicitly aware that their interlocutor’s words were determined by 
a conversational agent (Hypothesis 4).  
 
Participants (interactants) and shadower. In total, 108 adults (69 female; mean age = 
25.87, SD = 8.35) participated in the study and were randomly assigned to experimental 
conditions. These interactants were recruited online via a university research participant 
recruitment portal and consisted of London-based university students, university employees, 
and adults unaffiliated with the university. A female graduate student (aged 30) functioned as 
the speech shadower in the two conditions that involved interactants engaging a human 
interface. 
 
Procedure and apparatus. Following informed consent, the interactant was taken to an 
interaction room where they were instructed by the researcher as to how the study would 
proceed. The interactant sat in a chair at one end of the room and was told that the study 
involved speaking to an interlocutor for 10-minutes. The interactant was informed that they 
could decide for themselves topics to discuss with their conversation partner so long as 
nothing was vulgar. The non-scripted nature of the interaction was emphasized in order to 
allay any suspicions that the interlocutor would be speaking rehearsed responses. The 
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procedures for the separate experimental conditions were as follows: 
 
“Covert echoborg” scenario: (Aware = 0, Screen = 0). The 
interactant was informed that the interlocutor (the female 
speech shadower) would enter the interaction room and sit in a 
chair facing the interactant shortly after the researcher exited 
the room, and that the interlocutor would initiate the 
conversation. Although the interlocutor would be shadowing 
words generated by Cleverbot in response to things the 
interactant said, this fact was not made known to the interactant 
at any point prior to or during the interaction, and the 
researcher made no allusion to conversational agents or chat 
bots prior to the interaction commencing. 
 
“Overt echoborg” scenario: (Aware = 1, Screen = 0). As with 
the covert echoborg scenario, the interactant was informed that 
their interlocutor would enter the interaction room and initiate a 
conversation shortly after the researcher exited. Prior to exiting, 
however, the researcher informed the interactant that this 
interlocutor would be wearing an inner-ear device and would 
speak aloud words they received from a chat bot computer 
program located in an adjacent room. It was made clear to the 
interactant that the speech shadower would not speak any of 
their own thoughts during the interaction and that only the chat 
bot would respond to words the interactant spoke. 
 
“Covert text bot” scenario: (Aware = 0, Screen = 1). The 
interactant sat facing a computer monitor on which a blank 
instant messaging client (Pidgin) dialog box was displayed. The 
interactant was informed that though they would speak aloud to 
their interlocutor, their interlocutor would respond via text that 
would appear on the monitor. As with the covert echoborg 
scenario (above), the interactant was not informed that their 
interlocutor’s words were determined by a chat bot and no 
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allusion to conversational agents or chat bots was made by the 
researcher. The researcher informed the interactant that shortly 
after they exited the room their interlocutor would initiate the 
conversation.  
 
“Overt text bot” scenario: (Aware = 1, Screen = 1). As with 
the covert text bot scenario, the interactant sat facing a 
computer monitor on which a dialog box appeared and was 
instructed that though they would speak aloud to their 
interlocutor, their interlocutor would respond via text readable 
on the monitor. As with the overt echoborg scenario (above), 
the interactant was told that their interlocutor’s words would be 
those of a chat bot and that the interlocutor would initiate the 
conversation shortly after the researcher left the room.
 
The experimental apparatus was identical to that described by Corti and Gillespie (2015a) in 
their demonstration of minimal technological dependency interactant ↔ chat bot audio relay 
(for a video demonstration, see Corti, 2015). From a room adjacent to the interaction room, 
the researcher listened to the interactant’s speech via a “bug” microphone placed near the 
interactant and speed typed the interactant’s words into the Cleverbot program. In conditions 
involving the interactant engaging an echoborg (Screen = 0), the researcher spoke 
Cleverbot’s responses into a microphone which relayed to a discreet inner-ear monitor worn 
by the shadower, whereas in conditions involving the interactant engaging a computer 
interface (Screen = 1), the researcher relayed Cleverbot’s responses to the interactant’s 
computer monitor via the Pidgin instant messaging client. In their use of a minimal 
technological dependency interactant ↔ Cleverbot audio relay scenario, Corti and Gillespie 
report an average latency (the time between the conclusion of an interactant utterance the 
production of a Cleverbot response) of 5.15 seconds. In all conditions, the researcher relayed 
the phrase “hi there” to the shadower/screen to initiate the conversation. In order to establish 
identity consistency between trials, several stock responses were used in lieu of Cleverbot’s 
actual response for certain interactant utterances. When interactants inquired as to where their 
interlocutor was from, the stock response “I’m from London” was provided. If the interactant 
inquired as to their interlocutor’s occupation, the stock response “I’m a student here,” and if 
the interactant asked what their interlocutor studied, the stock response “psychology” was 
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used. Finally, if the interactant asked their interlocutor what their name was, the stock 
response “Kim” was provided. The shadower was instructed to maintain a consistent 
nonverbal demeanor across trials that reflected the spirit of the words generated by Cleverbot 
and to maintain eye-contact with the interactant during vocal delivery.  
 
Measures: Coding and quantifying intersubjective effort. Following the conclusion of all 
experimental trials, transcripts of the interactions were prepared based on Cleverbot’s textual 
input/output logs. Each was assigned a random identification number so that they could be 
coded without the coder knowing the experimental condition to which a transcript belonged.  
 
Testing each hypothesis required quantifying instances of other-initiated self-repair activity 
evident in each experimental trial. Researchers who use CA rarely quantify the phenomena 
they study, however Schegloff (1993) does offer guidance on how one might proceed with 
such an undertaking. A key to quantifying within the spirit of CA, according to Schegloff 
(1993), is properly identifying “environments of relevant possible occurrence” (p. 103), these 
being the locations within dialog where certain speech acts are likely to be located. In the 
case of repair initiations, such environments are clearly defined given that any utterance can 
act as a potential trouble source (ten Have, 1999); other-initiations of repair, thus, “can in 
principle occur after any turn at talk” (Schegloff, 1993, p. 115, emphasis in original). 
Environments of relevant possible occurrence are likewise well-defined for instances of third-
position self-repair outcomes as they occur in the turn following other-initiation. It is 
important to note that while any turn at talk can potentially act as a trouble source, trouble 
sources themselves cannot be identified in isolation (i.e., they cannot be identified unless they 
are followed by a repair initiation). Trouble sources, thus, are “launched” from the second-
position (Schegloff, 2007). 
 
Criteria articulated by Schegloff et al. (1977) and Sidnell (2010) were used to establish what 
instances of talk counted as an other-initiation of repair. Other-initiation can involve the use 
of question words (e.g., Huh? What? Who? Where? When?), partial repeats of the trouble 
source (e.g., The subway?), and full repeats of the trouble source (e.g., You took the subway?) 
alone or in combination with one another, as well as demonstrations of possible 
understanding (e.g., You took the subway… the walkway beneath the street?). Other-
initiations can be and often are explicit in declaring the presence of a misunderstanding (e.g., 
I don’t understand; I don’t get what you just said; I’m not following you). Repair initiations 
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that treat the whole prior turn as a trouble source rather than reference a particular element 
within the prior turn are known as “open” class repair initiators (Drew, 1997) and often take 
the form of single-word utterances (e.g., Pardon?). In some instances, other-initiations are 
triggered by failure to hear or mishearing words spoken by an interlocutor (Schegloff et al. 
1977; Zahn, 1984) and involve a request that the first-position speaker repeat a trouble source 
(e.g., I’m sorry I didn’t hear what you just said). However, since half of the experimental 
conditions involved participants reading text rather than being spoken to audibly, instances of 
other-initiation that could be linked to problems of hearing were excluded from analysis.  
 
Third-position interactant utterances (those following a Cleverbot other-initiation) were 
classified as either legitimate attempts at self-repair (i.e., utterances that acknowledged and 
attempted to clarify a trouble source) or as non-repairs (i.e., utterances that did not attempt to 
clarify a trouble source) on the basis of criteria gleaned from Schegloff et al. (1977) as well 
as Schegloff (1997). Repairs are usually “successful and quick” (Schegloff et al., 1977, p. 
364). Successful third-position self-repairs often involve the speaker of a trouble source 
repairing the trouble source via rephrasing or elaboration. Generally, a logical relationship 
between the repair outcome and the trouble source is overt in instances of legitimate attempts 
at repair (e.g., Err, I mean I took the underground), while this relationship is often absent or 
ambiguous in instances of non-repair. Non-repair can take the form of overt repair 
abandonment (e.g., Just forget it) or the production of a non sequitur. Oftentimes a non-repair 
can be identified where the third-position utterance leads to a subsequent other-initiated 
repair, creating a connected chain (or “cascade”) of unresolved repair attempts.   
 
On the basis of these criteria, the following classification codes were assigned to each turn-at-
talk for each transcript: Repair Initiation (other-initiation), Repair (legitimate attempt at self-
repair following other-initiation), Non-Repair (unsuccessful self-repair following other-
initiation), and Null (turn-at-talk did not meet criteria for any other code). 
 
Results 
A second coder coded a random subset of the transcripts in order to establish interrater 
reliability (4 transcripts from each condition). High consistency was found among raters, 
Cohen’s Kappa = 0.81, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.76, 0.86].  
 
Interactant other-initiation behavior. A multilevel logistic regression model was used to 
136
test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 (level 1: experimental dyad; level 2: experimental 
condition), with each observation being a turn-at-talk taken by Cleverbot. The dependent 
measure was a binary variable that took the value of 1 if the turn-at-talk was followed by an 
interactant other-initiation, fixed factors were Screen and Aware, and random intercepts were 
conditioned on each experimental dyad (i.e., each unique trial). This model showed a 
significant main effect of Screen, b = -0.38, SE = 0.18, p < 0.05, odds ratio (OR) = 0.68, 95% 
CI OR = [0.48, 0.97], supporting Hypothesis 1: engaging a text interface vs. a human body 
interface resulted in a 32% reduction in the odds that an interactant would respond to a turn-
at-talk taken by Cleverbot with an other-initiation, all else being equal. The model also 
showed a significant main effect of Aware, b = -0.52, SE = 0.19, p < 0.01, OR = 0.59, 95% CI 
OR = [0.41, 0.86], supporting Hypothesis 2: explicitly knowing that their interlocutor’s words 
were determined by an agent vs. not explicitly knowing resulted in a 41% reduction in the 
odds that an interactant would respond to a turn-at-talk taken by Cleverbot with an other-
initiation, all else being equal. No significant interaction was found between Screen and 
Aware, b = 0.24, SE = 0.28, p = 0.39. The model included 3,612 observations nested within 
108 dyad groups, AIC = 3083, BIC = 3114, random effect variance = 0.24. 
 
Interactant self-repair behavior. A logistic regression model was used to test Hypothesis 3 
and Hypothesis 4, with observations being each other-initiation produced by Cleverbot. The 
dependent measure was a binary variable that took the value of 1 if the other-initiation was 
followed by the interactant legitimately attempting to repair the trouble source. This model 
showed neither a significant main effect for Screen, b = -0.54, SE = 0.54, p = 0.32 
(disconfirming Hypothesis 3), nor Aware, b = -0.42, SE = 0.60, p = 0.48 (disconfirming 
Hypothesis 4), nor was there a significant interaction between these factors, b = 0.70, SE = 
0.87, p = 0.42. The specification of random effects conditioned on each experimental dyad 
did not improve model fit. Though both hypotheses were disconfirmed on the basis of the  
model showing no statistically significant effects of the fixed factors, legitimate attempts at 
self-repair following Cleverbot other-initiations were, on average, most common in the 
baseline condition (covert echoborg). The model included 210 total observations. 18 dyad 
groups were excluded on the basis of their containing no Cleverbot-uttered other-initiations. 
 
A closer look at the co-construction of intersubjectivity 
Bot self-repairs (or the lack thereof) vs. Interactant self-repairs. On average, Cleverbot 
successfully repaired only 22.27% (SD = 27.14%) of self-uttered trouble sources following 
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other-initiation. Below are two examples of third-position non-repair by Cleverbot (TS, RI 
and NR indicate trouble source, repair initiation and non-repair respectively): 
  
Excerpt 1 
(Covert echoborg scenario, trial 15): 
Interactant:  It doesn’t matter what age you are. 
Cleverbot: TS → Yes it does my life makes sense. 
Interactant: RI → To age? 
Cleverbot: NR → Do you have a father? 
Interactant:  Ya, I do. Do you have siblings? 
 
 
 
Excerpt 2 
(Overt text bot scenario, trial 17): 
Interactant:  Do you have any siblings? 
Cleverbot:  Yes. 
Interactant:  How many? 
Cleverbot: TS → You left-handed, under-handed mess 
of wires and batteries. 
Interactant: RI → What? 
Cleverbot: NR → Never mind. 
Interactant:  Can you ask me a question? 
 
Excerpt 1 is an example a common type of Cleverbot non-repair observed in the dataset, that 
of Cleverbot producing a non sequitur following other-initiation rather than address the 
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trouble source. The non-repair in Excerpt 2, on the other hand, is a clear example of self-
repair abandonment, as Cleverbot simply utters “never mind” rather than attempt a repair of 
the trouble source flagged by the interactant.  
 
The legitimate attempts at self-repair Cleverbot did produce often took the form of yes/no 
clarification, this form of repair requiring less explicit elaboration of and engagement with 
the trouble source. Two examples of this type of repair are shown below (“R” indicates a 
self-repair of other-initiation): 
 
Excerpt 3 
(Covert text bot scenario, trial 16): 
Cleverbot:  Who are you married to? 
Interactant:  My wife. 
Cleverbot: TS → Who is your wife? 
Interactant: RI → Do you want her name? 
Cleverbot: R → Yes. 
Interactant:  Elanor. 
 
 
Excerpt 4 
(Covert echoborg scenario, trial 29): 
Interactant:  Well, I do have exams coming up. 
Cleverbot: TS → Really? How do they work? 
Interactant: RI → Exams? 
Cleverbot: R → Yes, they are very stupid. 
Interactant:  You go into a room, you do whatever 
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the paper says. 
 
While Cleverbot only managed to produce legitimate attempts at self-repair in response to 
roughly a quarter of the other-initiations produced by interactants, interactants themselves 
managed a rate of 84.36% (SD = 30.65%). Below are two examples of legitimate self-repair 
attempts made by interactants:  
 
Excerpt 5  
(Overt text bot scenario, trial 13): 
Cleverbot:  No, you’re talking about Hamlet script. 
Interactant: TS → I’m not familiar with Hamlet actually. 
I’m talking about Nirvana. 
Cleverbot: RI → I don’t know anyone named Nonsense, 
so I don’t know what you’re talking 
about. 
Interactant: R → Nirvana. 
Cleverbot:  I love Nirvana! 
 
 
Excerpt 6  
(Overt echoborg scenario, trial 1): 
Cleverbot:  Knock knock knockin’ on heaven’s 
door! 
Interactant: TS → You like that music? 
Cleverbot: RI → Like what? 
Interactant: R → Do you like the music knockin on 
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heaven’s door? 
Cleverbot:  Yes. 
 
As with Excerpt 5 and Excerpt 6, legitimate interactant self-repairs attempts often came in the 
form of elaborations or clarifications of the trouble source. Interactant non-repairs, 
meanwhile, typically involved the production of a non sequitur that initiated a new 
conversational trajectory, as shown in Excerpt 7 and Excerpt 8: 
 
Excerpt 7 
(Overt echoborg scenario, trial 2): 
Interactant:  So what’s your family life like? 
Cleverbot:  I don’t have one. 
Interactant: TS → That might explain quite a bit then. 
Cleverbot: RI → Might? 
Interactant: NR → So are you running away from 
something by being a student in 
London? 
 
 
Excerpt 8 
(Covert text bot scenario, trial 1): 
Cleverbot:  Hello. 
Interactant: TS → Good morning. 
Cleverbot: RI → Is it morning where you are? 
Interactant: NR → How are you? 
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Interactant repair initiation inhibition. As the evidence in support of Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2 showed, interactants in the covert echoborg scenario worked harder to achieve 
common ground as they more frequently attempted to elicit repairs from their interlocutor in 
relation to interactants in other experimental conditions. This suggests that interactants in 
non-baseline conditions more frequently “passed” on opportunities to initiate repairs where a 
repair might have been warranted. Consider the following excerpts (“NS” indicates a non 
sequitur; “P” indicates a pass): 
 
Excerpt 9 
(Covert text bot scenario, trial 10): 
Cleverbot:  I think you’re interesting too. 
Interactant:  Thank you. 
Cleverbot:  You’re welcome. 
Interactant:  What do you think of the recent 
London tube strike? 
Cleverbot: NS → Just a celestial being with the abilities 
to use divine intervention but does not 
use it for the danger or oblivion. 
Interactant: P → Fair enough. 
 
 
Excerpt 10 
(Overt echoborg scenario, trial 20): 
Cleverbot:  What book should I read? 
Interactant:  Well, I don’t know. I don’t know what 
kind of literature you like. 
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Cleverbot:  Why don’t you know? 
Interactant:  Well, it’s just because I don’t know 
you. 
Cleverbot: NS → I don’t speak German, but my 
grandfather is German. 
Interactant: P → Okay cool. Well then you… would 
you like to read a book with me? 
 
In the excerpts shown above, the interactants choose not to initiate repairs following clear 
non sequiturs uttered by Cleverbot. In Excerpt 9 the interactant appears indifferent to 
Cleverbot’s non sequitur and responds with an apathetic statement (“Fair enough”). A 
somewhat different approach is taken by the interactant in Excerpt 10; rather than initiate a 
repair of Cleverbot’s non sequitur, the interactant attempts to steer the conversational 
trajectory back toward the prior topic that the interlocutors had been discussing. 
Handling non-repair. Interactants dealt with non-repair by producing one of three general 
response-types: (1) successive other-initiations, (2) continuations and (3) departures. 
 
Successive other-initiations were instances where an interactant requested that Cleverbot 
repair either the non-repair located in the previous turn (as in Excerpt 11, below) or the 
original trouble source (as in Excerpt 12, below), creating a connected series of adjacency 
pairs (a “repair initiation cascade”): 
 
Excerpt 11 
(Covert echoborg scenario, trial 24): 
Cleverbot: TS → Because they are birds. 
Interactant: RI → I’m sorry? 
Cleverbot: TS → Don’t be. 
Interactant: RI → Excuse me? Don’t be what? 
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Cleverbot: TS → You may be excused. 
Interactant: RI → From this? 
Cleverbot: TS → From this moment what? 
Interactant: RI → What do you mean by that? 
 
 
Excerpt 12 
(Covert text bot scenario, trial 17): 
Interactant:  What’s your favorite game? 
Cleverbot: TS → He is a legend. 
Interactant: RI → He is a legend? Is it a game? 
Cleverbot: TS → Yes you are. 
Interactant: RI → I’m a game? 
Cleverbot: NR → I’m a cat. 
 
Continuations, meanwhile, encompassed engaging with the content of a non-repair without 
requesting that it or the original trouble source actually be repaired (i.e., the non-repair is not 
treated as problematic). This activity is analogous to that which has been described by CA 
researchers who investigate interactions involving one or more persons with hearing loss or 
aphasia, wherein recipients of a third-position non-repair caused by a trouble source 
speaker’s inability to perceive the second turn other-initiation will often choose to let the 
trouble pass without exerting further effort to establish understanding (Caissie & Gibson, 
1997; Goodwin, 2003; Skelt, 2012). In these situations, repair is fully abandoned, as shown in 
Excerpt 13 and Excerpt 14 below (“C” indicates a continuation): 
 
Excerpt 13 
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(Overt text bot scenario, trial 16): 
Interactant:  Hello, how are you? 
Cleverbot: TS → No, that was wrong! 
Interactant: RI → Why? 
Cleverbot: NR → I want to eat a cookie. 
Interactant: C → You can eat it if you want, but give me 
one as well. 
 
 
Excerpt 14 
(Covert echoborg scenario, trial 3): 
Cleverbot:  Why are they not funny? 
Interactant:  Some of them are, some of them are 
funny. Unintentionally funny. 
Cleverbot: TS → No they’re a soccer club. 
Interactant: RI → What? 
Cleverbot: NR → What is it like to be a human? 
Interactant: C → It’s weird. It’s not that great. 
 
Finally, departures encompassed interactant reactions to Cleverbot non-repair that neither 
sought to repair any preceding talk nor engaged with the content introduced by the non-
repair. It featured regularly in the current study, as interactants frequently responded to 
Cleverbot non-repairs by simply initiating a new conversational trajectory, as demonstrated in 
the following excerpts (“D” indicates a departure): 
 
Excerpt 15 
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(Overt echoborg scenario, trial 12): 
Cleverbot: TS → So I tell him hello. 
Interactant: RI → Who have you told hello? 
Cleverbot: NR → Because you just asked. 
Interactant: RI → A friend of yours? 
Cleverbot: NR → Lol, not right. Try again. 
Interactant: D → I’m thinking of going on a big trip this 
year. Do you have any suggestions for 
a vacation? 
 
 
 
Excerpt 16 
(Covert text bot scenario, trial 16): 
Interactant:  Do you come here often? 
Cleverbot: TS → Today is a little awkward initially. 
Interactant: RI → I don’t understand. 
Cleverbot: NR → Me too.  
Interactant: D → What’s your favorite film. 
 
Table 4.1 shows how each of the four experimental conditions compare to one another in 
terms of interactants’ responses to Cleverbot non-repairs. Although no specific hypotheses 
were made prior to the experiment regarding how reactions to non-repair might differ 
between conditions, the observation that the covert echoborg scenario (the baseline condition) 
had the highest relative percentage of successive repair initiations (29.14%, on average) while 
the overt text bot scenario saw the lowest relative percentage (22.71%, on average) supports 
the overarching prediction that intersubjective effort is greatest when interactants assume that
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they were interacting with an autonomous human and lowest when interactants knew they 
were communicating with an artificial agent. Lending further support to this overarching 
prediction is the fact that departures were most common in the overt text bot scenario 
(occurring in response to 23.62% of non-repairs, on average). In all conditions, interactants 
responded to non-repairs with continuations over 50% of the time, on average.   
 
General Discussion 
In an experimental study that made use of the echoborg method of HAI, it was demonstrated 
that two factors affect the likelihood of an interactant initiating repairs of misunderstandings. 
Participants who spoke to the chat bot Cleverbot via a text screen were less likely to utter an 
other-initiation of repair following a Cleverbot utterance than those who spoke to Cleverbot 
via a human body interface (i.e., an echoborg). Likewise, participants who were made 
explicitly aware prior to engaging in conversation with Cleverbot that their interlocutor’s 
words would be determined by an agent were less likely to utter an other-initiation of repair 
following a Cleverbot utterance than those who were not made explicitly aware of this fact. 
However, results showed that the likelihood of an interactant attempting to self-repair a 
trouble source following an other-initiation of repair agent does not depend on whether the 
interactant engages with a human vs. a text screen interface or whether they are explicitly 
Table 4.1  
Interactant Responses to Interlocutor Non-Repair 
  Average relative percentage of response 
  Echoborg Scenario  Text Bot Scenario 
Response  Covert (SD)  Overt (SD)  Covert (SD)  Overt (SD) 
Other-initiation  29.14% 
(22.81%) 
 26.19% 
(26.52%) 
 27.68% 
(24.67%) 
 22.72% 
(28.66%) 
Continuation  52.29% 
(29.36%) 
 55.95% 
(35.95%) 
 62.22% 
(34.83%) 
 53.66% 
(37.71%) 
Departure  18.57% 
(28.47%) 
 17.86% 
(22.09%) 
 10.10% 
(19.37%) 
 23.62% 
(30.32%) 
Note. Trials: covert echoborg (n = 29), overt echoborg (n = 25), covert text bot (n = 29), overt text bot (n = 
25).  
147
aware of their interlocutor’s words being agent-determined. A post-hoc analysis of interactant 
transcripts revealed that interactants were on average more likely to utter a subsequent other-
initiation following a non-repair produced by their interlocutor when they both engaged with 
a human body and did not know their interlocutor’s words to be agent-determined. Moreover, 
interactants more frequently departed from a repair sequence entirely when they both 
engaged an interlocutor through a text screen interface and knew their interlocutor’s words to 
be agent-determined.  
 
These results suggest that when people speak to a conversational agent under the same 
conditions of everyday human-human interaction (i.e., when an agent has a human body and 
is assumed to communicate autonomously), they more persistently try to establish common 
ground (i.e., exert more intersubjective effort) relative to conditions wherein knowledge that 
an interlocutor’s words are determined by an agent is explicit and/or the interface is 
nonhuman. This finding is important because it points to a potential glass ceiling for artificial 
agent participation in human intersubjectivity. If roboticists were to someday design a 
machine that was indistinguishable from an actual human in terms of appearance and 
communication (i.e., if the machine were able to pass a Total Turing Test; see Harnad, 1991), 
the mere knowledge of it being something not entirely human might suppress the amount of 
intersubjective effort people exert when interacting with it.  
 
Surprisingly, the likelihood of an interactant attempting to self-repair a trouble source in 
response to an other-initiation was not affected by the experimental manipulations whereas 
the rate of interactant other-initiation was. This could be because other-initiations of repair 
are active attempts to manipulate the attention of an interlocutor toward a trouble source and, 
therefore, at some level indicate an implicit supposition that an interlocutor possesses a 
capacity for advanced intersubjectivity. A self-repair attempt, on the other hand, is more of a 
reflexive response that follows a request to update an interlocutor’s meta-perspective; a 
person need not presuppose that an interlocutor possesses a capacity for advanced 
intersubjectivity in order to produce a successful self-repair following other-initiation (in fact, 
it may even be that not attempting an appropriate self-repair following other-initiation, say by 
departing from the conversational trajectory, is more unnatural for humans than simply 
producing a self-repair attempt). Relative to the performance of a self-repair attempt, 
articulating an other-initiation of repair may involve higher-order mentalizing about the 
perspectives of an interlocutor, and this higher-order mentalizing may be more sensitive to 
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changes in how an interlocutor is represented.  
 
These findings can be positioned within a broader discussion that concerns the centrality of 
intersubjectivity and intersubjective effort in human life. As argued herein, and has been 
established in both the fields of developmental psychology and communication, complex 
intersubjectivity is a co-construction (one interactant cannot accomplish it alone). Child 
development, for instance, requires children be brought into advanced intersubjective 
relations by-way-of adult scaffolding (Berk & Winsler, 1995; Plumert & Nichols-Whitead, 
1996), which entails a high level of intersubjective effort. Adults scaffold by providing verbal 
guidance and support for children’s understanding that is just beyond their actual level of 
comprehension, thus pulling them into increasingly complex intersubjective relations (the 
“zone of proximal development”; see Vygotsky, 1978). Equally, achieving common ground 
in communicative interaction between adults cannot occur solely based on the actions or 
cognitions of one side of the interaction; rather it is a joint achievement, with each side 
supporting the other side in the calibration of perspectives (Rommetveit, 1974; Schegloff, 
1992). Rommetveit’s (1974) axiom “intersubjectivity has […] to be taken for granted in order 
to be achieved” (p. 56) captures this notion. If humans do not initially assume a highly 
intersubjective interlocutor, they will not engage in the complex intersubjective processes 
with the interlocutor that are necessary to further elaborate the pair’s intersubjectivity. Even 
when misunderstanding arises, other-initiations of repair reveal an implicit belief that 
common ground can be achieved by-way-of an exchange of perspectives. On the other hand, 
abandoning the assumption of intersubjectivity will block the achievement of common 
ground due to fewer attempts at repair.  
 
If human interactants do not first expect high-level intersubjectivity from artificial agents, 
they will not extend such intersubjectivity to them, effectively locking them out of the full 
spectrum of human intersubjective relations. In order to develop forms of HAI that reach 
benchmark intersubjectivity, agents – as with human infants – will need to be able to learn 
from the other-initiations of repair issued by their human interactants. It is easy to imagine 
how severely constrained human social relations would become if interlocutors repeatedly 
failed to signal to each other when something has caused misunderstanding – complex joint 
activity would become impossible. No matter how capable each party to an interaction is at 
operating at benchmark intersubjectivity, it takes benchmark intersubjective effort – a robust 
exchanging of perspectives – to get there. 
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The echoborg method and analysis of repair activity as a means of benchmarking 
intersubjectivity in human-agent dialog. Given the primacy of intersubjectivity in 
cooperative human social behavior, it is imperative that evaluative frameworks for HAI 
generally, and human-agent dialog specifically, involve assessing intersubjectivity against 
human-human interaction benchmarks. Although various researchers have explicitly called 
for this approach (e.g., Cassell & Tartaro, 2007), numerous others have indirectly called for a 
focus on intersubjectivity through advocacy of interactionist HAI methodologies (e.g., 
Dautenhahn, 2007; Johnson et al., 2014; Parise, Kiesler, Sproull, & Waters, 1999; Payr, 
2001), including but not limited to the analysis of grounding behavior in human-agent dialog 
(e.g., Brennan, 1991; Kiesler, 2005; Lücking & Mehler, 2014; Visser, Traum, DeVault, & op 
den Akker, 2014) and interaction authenticity (e.g., Feil-Seifer, Skinner, & Matarić, 2007; 
Kahn et al., 2007; Turkle, 2007). Indeed, a concern with intersubjectivity is implicit in many 
approaches to HAI evaluation, such as those that investigate people’s emotional responses to 
robotic and virtual agents (e.g., Balzarotti, Piccini, Andreoni, & Ciceri, 2013; Brave, Nass, & 
Hutchinson, 2005; Prendinger & Ishizuka, 2005).  
 
The current article is a contribution toward developing methodologies for benchmarking 
intersubjectivity and intersubjective effort in HAI. The current article demonstrates how the 
echoborg method can be used to evaluate human-agent intersubjectivity when the agent is an 
artificial conversational agent. The unique strength of the echoborg method is that it can 
involve research participants communicating with an agent while believing that they are 
speaking to an autonomous human being. Thus, the echoborg method allows researchers the 
ability to investigate HAI intersubjectivity while preserving the interactant’s sense that they 
are experiencing a fully human-human social psychological context. Future research can 
evaluate nonhuman interfaces by comparing intersubjective effort with a baseline echoborg 
condition.    
 
Might intersubjective effort in human-agent dialog increase as technology improves? 
The seeming unwillingness of humans to exert benchmark intersubjective effort with a 
conversational agent in the non-baseline conditions of the present research may prove to be a 
historical artifact. As more advanced artificial intelligence develops and as people are raised 
in a world in which socially advanced artificial agents are ubiquitous, the expectations people 
will place on the intersubjective capacities of their machine interlocutors may increase. The 
study of social psychological phenomena is, in many respects, the study of behavioral 
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patterns that are contingent upon cultural and historical circumstances (Gergen, 1973). The 
more that artificial agents are able to engage humans in complex intersubjective processes, 
such as repair work, the more humans will scaffold their participation in such 
intersubjectivity. Indeed, the finding that interactants self-repair at relatively consistent rates 
irrespective of the interface they engage with or their awareness of the agency of an 
interlocutor is evidence that humans readily “step up” and respond with a repair attempt as 
needed.  
 
Limitations. A particular strength of the echoborg method, which itself is derived from the 
“cyranoid method” of social interaction (Corti & Gillespie, 2015b), is that it enables the study 
of social interactions that are high in mundane realism (dynamic, unscripted and face-to-
face). The benefits of such realism, however, incur costs in the form of certain control 
limitations. For instance, though best efforts were made to ensure that the speech shadower’s 
body language was consistent across experimental trials (the shadower was instructed to try 
and match their body language to the words they found themselves articulating), it is all but 
impossible to completely eliminate variability in shadower body language from trial to trial 
using the echoborg method. Furthermore, the minimal technological dependency format of 
inputting the interactant’s speech into Cleverbot creates slightly unnatural delays between 
interactant utterances and subsequent responses by the agent. Though all experimental 
conditions were subject to the same latencies, future improvements to the echoborg method 
may mitigate these limitations.  
Conclusion. The present research has found that two factors significantly affect the rate at 
which an interactant will attempt to elicit repairs of misunderstandings from an interlocutor 
that is a conversational agent, namely, (1) the agent’s interface and (2) the interactant’s 
awareness that their interlocutor’s words are agent-determined. However, these factors did 
not affect the rate at which interactants attempted to self-repair misunderstandings following 
a request. It seems that people exert the most intersubjective effort with an agent 
(operationalized as repair initiation) when they are unaware that their interlocutor’s words are 
determined by an agent and when the agent interfaces via an actual human body (i.e., an 
echoborg).  
 
This article contributes a novel methodology (i.e., the echoborg method) to the study of HAI 
and demonstrates how it can be used to compare conditions of HAI that make use of 
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nonhuman interfaces and nonhuman agency-framing to a baseline condition that 
approximates the social psychological contextual frame experience by people during 
mundane, face-to-face, in person, human-human interaction. The findings of the present 
study have implications for the development of autonomous social agents. Most notably, if 
agents are to participate fully in the intersubjective world of humans, not only must they be 
capable of interacting at benchmark intersubjectivity, but human interactants must also be 
willing to exert intersubjective effort at a level conducive for the achievement of benchmark 
intersubjectivity (e.g., by uttering other-initiations of repair when misunderstanding arises). 
Artificial agents cannot enter the world of human intersubjectivity without the support of 
their human interactants, and this support is contingent upon the human interactants’ 
supposition that complex intersubjectivity is achievable. 
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CHAPTER 5 | Cyranoids in First-Person, Self-Experimental Research 
 
Preface 
Each of the studies so far described in this thesis has primarily focused on the behaviors, 
attributions, and perceptions of interactants who have come into contact with a cyranoid. This 
chapter turns attention toward the other two actors involved in a cyranic interaction, the 
source and the shadower, as no exploration of the cyranoid method would be complete 
without considering the experiences of the individuals who actually comprise a cyranoid. The 
source within a cyranoid is faced with speaking through someone else’s body in real-time. 
Thus, they engage in real-world social interactions with a transformed outer identity that 
shapes how they are perceived and reacted to by interactants. Shadowers, on the other hand, 
experience social interactions with a transformed inner identity, or disposition, and this 
likewise shapes how they are perceived and reacted to by interactants. In the case of the 
echoborg, the human shadower’s inner identity is transformed so as to become that of an 
artificial conversational agent, and as a consequence, echoborg shadowers have the embodied 
experience of having their verbal agency controlled, partially or entirely, by a machine.  
 
These affordances of the cyranoid method present opportunities to study how transformations 
(or more specifically, hybridizations) of outer and inner identity make an impact upon those 
who partake in such transformations. One way to study this impact would be to assign 
research participants to either the role of a source or a shadower and gather data accordingly. 
Alternatively, a researcher can place themselves in the position of the source or the shadower 
and engage in a research context in a direct, participatory fashion, and in doing so gain 
experiential knowledge as to the effects identity hybridization brings to bear in a particular 
social context. Via the cyranoid method, one can step into the shoes, so to speak, of another 
human being, and gain a first-person sense of how the world that person lives in responds to 
parts of their outer or inner identity. Moreover, the cyranoid method allows one to assume 
such a transformed identity in repeated and controlled trials, meaning that one can build 
robust experiential knowledge of the social consequences of a particular aspect of identity 
iteratively by designing a cyranic manipulation and conducting self-experimentation. This 
harkens back to Popper’s (1977, 1979) and Green’s (1983) ideas discussed in Chapter 1 
concerning how individuals can gain improved self-knowledge via directly manipulating 
some aspect of World 1 self-embodiment and observing the associated affects. 
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Arguing in favor of a form of researcher-as-subject, self-experimentation, however, runs 
counter a status quo within contemporary experimental social psychology that sees such types 
of research as anathema to certain methodological principles. This mainstream position, 
however, is largely an artificat born of historical forces within the discipline that saw first-
person methods largely split from experimental psychology in the early/mid-20th century for 
what at the time were largely institutional reasons. A first-person, researcher-as-subject 
tradition remains alive and well, however, in branches of the human sciences adjacent to 
social psychology, particularly those disciplines that make frequent use of field 
methodologies such as participant observation and autoethnography. Milgram, having come 
from an intellectual tradition within social psychology that valued first-person methodology 
and direct experience, was, during his time, among a relatively small cohort of experimental 
social psychologists that practiced first-person methods, as is evident in both his cyranoid 
pilot studies (he frequently functioned as the source or shadower in his pilots and reported 
first-person reflections from these experiences; see Milgram, 2010a) as well as in his 
breaching experiment field studies (e.g., Milgram 2010c, 2010d). Much of this chapter is 
devoted to retracing the rise and fall of self-experimentation within psychology, discussing 
where within the discipline self-experimentation has re-emerged in recent years, and 
discussing how the cyranoid method can contribute as a framework for researchers wishing to 
self-experiment with transformations of identity in social contexts.  
 
The journal article that follows was developed following discussions with other social 
psychologists who have designed and/or participated in cyranoid experiments as either a 
source or a shadower and documented their own experience. The article presents their first-
person experiences in these roles and the social psychological insights they garnered. Three 
potential benefits of this type of researcher-as-subject self-experimentation are suggested: (1) 
direct access to “social qualia,” or the subjective experiential knowledge of real-world social 
phenomena, (2) an improvement to mental models concerning social psychological 
phenomena, which in turn can stimulate new research questions and insights, and (3) 
enhanced reflexivity about a given experiment (namely, the embodied understanding of how 
one’s outer or inner identity plays a direct role in shaping how the social world responds to 
the self’s activity within it. Thus, researcher-as-subject self-experimentation is not put 
forward as a substitute for traditional, third-person experimentation (in which the researcher 
is separate from the subjects), but as a research practice that can enhance the perspectival 
knowledge of certain phenomena, for a first-person and a third-person understanding of a 
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given social psychological phenomenon (e.g., stereotyping) is certainly more beneficial to the 
researcher than either of these perspectives alone.  
 
The journal article was authored by Corti, Reddy, Choi and Gillespie (2015). Corti outlined 
the article, authored the main drafts, and provided a first-person self-reflection, contributing 
roughly 75% of the content. Reddy and Choi each provided a first-person self-reflection. 
Gillespie provided key supervisory assistance, provided Corti with suggestions for the article, 
and contributed roughly 25% of the content. The editor of Integrative Psychological and 
Behavioral Science, as well as two anonymous reviewers, provided helpful feedback, 
suggested edits, and ultimately approved the article for publication. 
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CHAPTER 5 | Cyranoids in First-Person, Self-Experimental Research 
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understand social phenomena, and stimulate reflexivity 
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Abstract 
The current article argues that researcher-as-subject self-experimentation can provide 
valuable insight and systematic knowledge to social psychologists. This approach, the modus 
operandi of experimental psychology when the field was in its infancy, has been largely 
eclipsed by an almost exclusive focus on participant-as-subject other-experimentation. 
Drawing from the non-experimental first-person traditions of autoethnography, participant 
observation, and phenomenology, we argue that participating as both observer and subject 
within one’s own social psychological experiment affords researchers at least three potential 
benefits: (1) access to “social qualia,” that is, the subjective experience of social phenomena; 
(2) improved mental models of social phenomena, potentially stimulating new research 
questions; and (3) an enhanced ability to be reflexive about the given experiment. To support 
our position, we provide first-person self- reflections from researchers who have self-
experimented with transformed social interactions involving Milgram’s cyranoid method. We 
close by offering guidelines on how one might approach self-experimentation, and discuss a 
variety of first-person perspective ethnographic technologies that can be incorporated into the 
practice.  
 
Keywords 
Cyranoid, first-person methodology, Milgram, phenomenology, self-experimentation 
 
Introduction 
What counts as an experiment? The question has been asked by Winston and Blais (1996), 
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whose analysis of textbook guidelines on experimental methods from an array of disciplines 
found that the field of psychology has come to adopt a uniquely rigid, narrow, and uniform 
stance regarding how experiments are defined. They attribute this phenomenon in part to a 
belief which emerged during the 20th century among psychologists that third-person (i.e., 
participant-as-subject) controlled experimentation could produce knowledge beyond that 
provided by disciplines that make use of non-controlled or first-person methodologies, and 
that this knowledge could point toward means of reshaping individual and social behavior. 
This development has had the laudable aim of making experimental psychology rigorously 
scientific; however, it is a moot point whether a narrowing of focus and an exclusion of 
relevant data is indeed scientific. A consequence of an almost exclusive focus on third-person 
methodology has been the disappearance of a researcher-as-subject, first-person perspective 
approach to social psychological experimentation.  
 
Any examination of the vast contemporary experimental social psychology literature will 
reveal the methodological orthodoxy regarding the role of the researcher vis-à-vis those who 
participate in research. The researcher is positioned as the expert observer who, from an 
ostensibly independent third-person position, evaluates a naïve subject who has been exposed 
to carefully operationalized stimuli. The range of subjective experiences of both the 
researcher and the subject are typically of secondary or negligible significance to the aims of 
the experiment as primary focus is placed on measuring a narrow set of activities or self-
report items corresponding to pre-determined hypotheses. Upon uniformly gathering data 
from a critical mass of subjects, the researcher performs and reports the results of statistical 
inference tests to validate, refine, or challenge theory - theories which themselves are usually 
defined from a third-person point of view in terms of predicting the behavior of others.  
 
So predominant is this basic template of experimentation within the discipline that it is hard 
to imagine experimental practice taking a different form. We argue that a different form is not 
only possible, but also evident in the origins of experimental psychology as an independent 
field of inquiry, wherein the laboratory approach often involved direct interaction among 
researchers and their subjects as well as a much more egalitarian and interchangeable 
relationship between these roles. Indeed, experimental psychology began as a discipline of 
researcher-as-subject self-experimentation. Though this orientation was largely abandoned in 
the early 20th century, traces of the approach have survived in genres of psychology closely 
aligned with anthropology and sociology, fields in which a non-experimental researcher-as-
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subject investigatory model is alive and well. Arguably, it also persists in experimental social 
psychology itself, feeding into the design and development of experiments, but it is rarely 
reported and given the legitimacy that it deserves. In the current paper, we revisit a particular 
technique of first-person self-experimentation developed in the late 1970s by the social 
psychologist Stanley Milgram (his “cyranoid method”) and vet its utility as a tool for 
informing researchers as to certain experiential elements of social phenomena.  
 
We should make it unambiguously clear at the outset of this endeavor that our purpose herein 
is not to challenge the position or validity of today’s mainstream third-person approach to 
social psychological experimentation. We do not suggest that self-experimentation should 
supplant other-experimentation, but rather, that it might augment and enrich other-
experimentation. We propose that the experimental method becomes impoverished by 
excluding the rich, lived-in, subjective first-person experience of research subjects from 
consideration and by making researcher-subject role segregation overly rigid. The question is 
whether or not self-experimentation has anything to offer as an additional methodology, and 
whether or not such a methodology could uniquely service certain aims of social 
psychological researchers, namely those not sufficed by a third-person approach. Such open-
ended questions can only be settled through a renewed discussion and reappraisal of the 
merits of self-experimentation (and a researcher-as-subject model more generally), and the 
current work is our initial contribution to such a reappraisal.  
 
We feel strongly that revived focus on self-experimentation is warranted given how 
ethnographic practices, such as autoethnography and participant-observation (both in the real 
world and in virtual worlds), have evolved in recent years. Indeed, recent research provides 
many illustrations of how new technologies and digital methodologies enable forms of first-
person perspective research (e.g., Lahlou, Le Bellu, and Boesen-Mariani 2015) that were 
unavailable (and perhaps unimaginable) to experimenters of prior generations, yet among 
whom many of the issues regarding the legitimacy of first-person self-observation methods 
were supposedly settled. Further impetus for exploring new formats of self-experimentation 
in social psychology is provided by recent debate concerning the status of phenomenology 
(and its primary method, introspection) in relation to psychology (see Dennett 2007; Marbach 
2007), the details of which we will touch upon briefly. In our discussion we outline a number 
of procedural proposals for researchers interested in deploying first-person methodologies for 
self-experimentation, and argue that participating in one’s own social experiment and being 
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exposed to experimental manipulations first-hand affords researchers at least three potential 
benefits: (1) the acquisition of subjective experiential knowledge (i.e., “social qualia”) 
regarding particular social psychological phenomena that could otherwise only be understood 
descriptively or indirectly through third-person perspective analysis; (2) the development of 
richer mental models regarding the nature of social phenomena in the world beyond the 
experimental setting, which in turn can stimulate new research questions; and (3) the 
improved ability to be reflexive about an experiment by virtue of understanding the co-
occurring perspectives within the experimental setting.  
 
A Brief History of Psychological Self-Experimentation  
In Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research, Danziger (1990) 
traces the development and eventual eclipse of the researcher-as-subject model of 
psychological experimentation (also see Danziger 1980, 1985; Farr 1996). He begins by 
discussing the first formal models of experimental psychology to emerge in the 19th century, 
the predominant being Wilhelm Wundt’s Leipzig model and the Paris model. Wundt’s model 
consisted of academic researchers, colleagues, and students engaging in a highly 
collaborative research enterprise in which self-observation methods were at the fore. Central 
to this model was Wundt’s assertion that the ideal experimental subject was an expert 
observer - a psychologist trained in methods of self-perception capable of carrying out 
experiments on his or her own self (Kusch 1995). Individuals involved in studying a 
particular psychological phenomenon would often exchange roles in an experiment, 
functioning at times as the experimenter and at other times as the subject (i.e., the expert 
observer), while the nature of phenomena would be deduced via collaborative analysis. 
However, alternative approaches being developed in Paris and London did not have any role 
or position exchange between subjects and researchers. The Paris model developed from the 
clinical assessment of patients in medical contexts and featured strict role segregation 
between researchers and subjects, with subjects serving as objects of study by expert 
clinicians. Meanwhile, Francis Galton’s London laboratory entailed psychologists providing 
mental faculty testing services to members of the public in return for a fee, with strict 
division between the experts and lay people. Danziger (1990) notes how Galton’s approach 
introduced the “multiplication of subjects” (p. 57) to psychology: as it was necessary for 
individual cases to be validly compared with one another, statistical inference was required, 
thus necessitating both the transposition of mental phenomena into quantitative data as well 
as large sample sizes. The case of Galton is interesting, because he was also a systematic user 
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of self-experimentation in his pioneering work on associations to places and words (Galton 
1879); he thus demonstrates how, in the early years of psychology, both self-experimentation 
and other-experimentation sat comfortably side-by-side.  
 
Psychologists in the Würzburg school argued that Wundt’s methods should be extended 
beyond rudimentary mental imagery into an exploration of the higher mental functions 
(Mischel 1970; Wagoner 2009). They sought to examine how thoughts come into being and 
how they change. Würzburg experimenters elicited qualitative accounts, and, recognizing that 
introspection could alter psychological processes, also made use of retrospection (Danziger 
1980). Broadening the introspective tool-kit enabled the Würzburg school to generate 
findings that challenged Wundt’s simplistic accounts of psychological processes (Gillespie 
and Zittoun 2010). At the same time, Edward Titchener, a student of Wundt, founded a large 
and highly influential structuralist psychology program at Cornell University and sought to 
establish his strict version of introspection as the indispensable experimental method for 
investigating higher mental functions (see Titchener 1927). Despite the schisms among the 
early self-observationalists, there was common appreciation for a laboratory model in which 
the observer and subject were one and the same person (e.g., see Edwin Boring’s self-
experiments on sensory experience: Boring 1915), and the researcher-as-subject approach 
enjoyed success in both North America and Europe during experimental psychology’s 
formative years (Vermersch 1999).  
 
While Wundt’s methods were criticized as being not subjective enough by the alternative 
schools of self-observation, they were criticized by others as being too subjective. This was 
the positivist repudiation of Wundt (Danziger 1979). Psychologists such as Ebbinghaus and 
subsequently the behaviorists argued that Wundt’s concepts were too metaphysical and, 
consequently, not sufficiently observable. They advocated stripping down the method and 
focusing on more objectively observable phenomena such as behavior. This intellectual shift 
coincided with practical demands in the United States for psychologists to deliver practical 
scientific findings to consumers of psychological research (e.g., government). Thus, there 
began a “fundamental shift of interest from the analysis of psychological processes, 
necessarily manifested in specific individuals, to the distribution of psychological 
characteristics in populations [...] what emerged was an impersonal style of research in which 
experimental subjects played an anonymous role, experimenter-subject contacts were 
relatively brief, and the experimenter was interested in the aggregate data to be obtained from 
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many subjects” (Danziger 1985, p. 137). As an embrace of logical positivism throughout the 
natural sciences brought behaviorism to the fore of experimental psychology, self-
observation was deemed by many as an inappropriate approach to laboratory science 
(Danziger 1979, 2000; Farr 1983). As Farr (1978, p. 302) explains, “the experimenter now 
became the ‘observer’ and it was the behavior of the subject rather than his experience which 
constituted the raw data.”  
 
While behaviorism’s third-person approach to experimentation supplanted the first-person 
model throughout much of psychology, there were notable exceptions. Specifically, a 
tradition of inquiry within social psychology grew out of Husserl’s phenomenology, which 
was carried to the United States by Alfred Schutz and Gustav Ichheiser and inspired the 
thinking of people such as Berger and Luckmann (1967), Goffman (1959), and Garfinkel 
(1967). Consider Harold Garfinkel’s (1967) “breaching experiments,” wherein researchers 
would consciously exhibit a contextually inappropriate behavior in a mundane social 
situation in order to both observe the social reactions elicited by such behavior as well as (and 
more relevant to the notion of self-study) gain experiential insight into the nature of 
violations of social expectations (Rafalovich 2006). Stanley Milgram, famous for his 
controversial studies on obedience to authority (Milgram 1963), adopted Garfinkel’s 
approach in several field experiments. These included a study into whether random strangers 
on New York City subways would give up their seats upon request to a covert experimenter, 
and while the study primarily focused on the reaction and compliance of the subway riders 
party to these requests, Milgram had his experimenters record and reflect on their own 
emotions, behavior, and psychological states during the interactions (Milgram 2010b). In 
another field experiment, Milgram’s cohort of experimenters systematically intruded into 
waiting lines and reported on the range of emotions felt prior to, during, and after these norm-
breaching events, thus directly experiencing the “inhibitory anxiety that ordinarily prevents 
individuals from breaching social norms” (Milgram 2010c, pp. 49–50).  
 
By the late 1970s, however, social psychology too began to more forcefully shed itself of the 
researcher-as-subject orientation as well as experimental approaches that featured high 
degrees of researcher-participant interaction as the field passed through what is now 
considered an era of “crisis” (see Adair 1991; Elms 1975). Under pressure to defend the 
discipline’s position among the natural sciences at a time when experimental findings risked 
being exposed as non-replicable or otherwise untenable, researchers disavowed methodology 
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deemed overly susceptible to intrusion from latent, uncontrolled phenomena (e.g., 
experimenter effects; Rosenthal 1966). To counter the possibility of their findings being 
challenged as mere artifacts of experimental idiosyncrasy, social psychologists sought to 
sanitize their laboratories and experimental procedures of any and all potential confounds. 
This evolution stripped social experiments of their mundane realism, atomized dependent 
variables (Farr 1978), and further solidified the notion that the first-person experiences of 
researchers were inappropriate objects of experimental evaluation. The modern experimental 
model which emerged from this era has been successful for cognitive third-person approaches 
to social psychology (Adair 1991), but has led to an entrenched methodological status-quo 
generally unreceptive to pre-crisis (and Milgram-esque) methodology (see Shotter 2015). 
  
Contemporary Researcher-as-Subject Approaches  
While a researcher-as-subject approach in social psychology has largely dissipated, one can 
still find traces of it in various corners of psychological science. Phenomenological 
psychology, for instance, lived for many decades far outside mainstream psychology 
producing Husserlian self-studies on the nature of experiential phenomena, yet has in the last 
decade attracted increased attention and elicited loud debate concerning whether an objective 
approach to understanding the mind can (and should) involve first-person research (for 
discussions on the historical trajectory of 20th century phenomenological psychology, see 
Giorgi 1998; Klein and Westcott 1994). Some proponents vigorously defend the practice and 
legitimacy of autophenomenology (e.g., Marbach 2007; Varela and Shear 1999) in contrast to 
others who advocate a more guarded approach that seeks to verify first-person experience via 
third-person data (Dennett’s heterophenomenology; Dennett 2007), while others point out 
that variants of introspective reports (e.g., self-report questionnaires) are ubiquitous 
throughout psychology as it is, and that the domains of emotion, attitude, memory, and 
developmental research attest to this fact (Wilson 2003). Despite this renewed focus on 
phenomenology within psychology, phenomenological studies primarily involve subjects 
reporting to a researcher their beliefs about the conscious phenomena they experience in a 
given experimental condition, and most of the studies reported in the literature involve not 
social experiences per se, but basic perceptual experiences that speak more to researchers in 
cognitive science than to social researchers (for examples of typical contemporary 
phenomenological experiments, see Gallagher and Sørensen 2006). Therefore, contemporary 
phenomenological psychology does not so much provide us with a template for a researcher-
as-subject model of social experimentation as provide us with an example of a modern 
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discipline that takes seriously the value in capturing experiential phenomena through first-
person experimental procedures.  
 
Analogues to researcher-as-subject experimental social psychology have thrived in the non-
experimental anthropological and sociological traditions of autoethnography and participant 
observation. Autoethnography is a self-referential form of qualitative analysis wherein a 
researcher becomes embedded in a particular social context and reports on the scope of his or 
her subjective experiences and self-transformations (Anderson 2006). Thus, the primary data 
of autoethnographers are autobiographical first-person self-reflections (Chang 2008). 
Participant observation, meanwhile, is a field methodology general to ethnography wherein 
the researcher actively assumes a participatory role with others in a given social frame, either 
overtly as a known-researcher or covertly in a “disguised role” (Becker and Geer 1957). 
Indeed, one of the originators of participant observation, Bronislaw Malinowski, was heavily 
influence by Wundt while a student at Leipzig (Farr 1983; Strenski 1982). While neither 
autoethnography nor participant observation necessarily seek to make claims regarding 
phenomenological causality, each adopts a first-person perspective stance that is similar to 
that found in the early self-observation experimental research. Autoethnography, with its 
researcher-as-subject orientation, embraces the value in experiential and self-reflexive 
knowledge, while participant observation, being rooted in interactivity, dissolves the 
traditional researcher-subject role boundaries common to modern experimentation and allows 
for direct interaction among researchers and their participants.  
 
Some researchers within contemporary behaviorism advocate for a researcher-as- subject 
self-experimental approach. Neuringer (1981), for instance, outlines a number of potential 
advantages for experimental psychologists who practice and report self-experimentation, 
namely that it would catalyze experimental process discoveries as well as foster a heightened 
experimental ethic among communities of researchers. In a series of self-reflections on the 
benefits of long-term psychological self-experimentation, Roberts (2004, 2012) argues that in 
addition to allowing the researcher to test new concepts cheaply, positioning oneself as both 
experimenter and subject generates the types of experiential knowledge from which one may 
formulate new research ideas distinct from those that arise through synthesizing empirical 
literature. Much of this advocacy points to the long-standing tradition of self-experimentation 
in the medical sciences, wherein vital breakthroughs have emerged through self-study (e.g., 
Nobel Prize recipient Barry Marshall’s controlled ingestion of H. pylori bacteria which 
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revealed its culpability in causing gastritis). While the nature of researcher-as-subject self-
experimentation of the sort we’re advocating does not involve subjecting oneself to potential 
harm, the example of the medical tradition as well as the modern calls from within 
behaviorism (the movement which, after all, was instrumental in ridding psychology of its 
first-person orientation nearly a century ago) suggest that perhaps it is time for a larger 
discussion within social psychology regarding the possibility of a contemporary researcher-
as-subject model of experimentation.  
 
Milgram’s Cyranoid Method 
Our own interest in self-experimentation began by delving into the life and work of Stanley 
Milgram, who as the field experiments described above suggest, oriented to a 
phenomenological approach to social psychology (see Zimbardo 1992). He is known for his 
ground-breaking research, his highly exploratory methods of experimentation, as well as his 
penchant for participating in his own studies. Milgram’s (2010b, 2010c) breaching 
experiments attest to the fact that his desire to understand the social psychology of others was 
equally matched by his desire for he and his fellow researchers to learn about themselves 
through the process of experimentation. In this regard, his cyranoid studies - conducted in the 
years leading up to his death, and never formally reported - provide one of the more striking 
examples of his first-person approach.  
 
Milgram’s cyranoid studies involved first training research confederates to speech shadow 
(i.e., replicate the speech of a third-party in near real-time; see Marslen-Wilson 1973), and 
subsequently, by-way-of covert radio relay, conversing through these shadowers with 
research participants who were unaware their conversation partner was merely replicating 
Milgram’s words (Milgram 2010a; Blass 2004). Milgram’s participants repeatedly failed to 
detect that their interlocutor was a speech shadower, seemingly taking for granted the verbal 
autonomy of the person with whom they interacted (a phenomenon referred to as the “cyranic 
illusion”). He called the hybrid agent composed of his mind (or rather, words) and a 
shadower’s body a “cyranoid,” a term that paid homage to the character Cyrano from the play 
Cyrano de Bergerac.  
 
The theoretical thrust of the cyranoid studies involves questions regarding the relationship 
between person perception and the subjective experience of self. Milgram (2010a) felt that 
with the method people could experience “radical deformations” (p. 408) of self during social 
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interactions mediated by a shadower’s body that was vastly divergent from their own in terms 
of gender, ethnicity, age, social status, and so on. At the time of Milgram’s cyranoid studies it 
was well known that people stereotype other individuals on the basis of their outward identity 
(e.g., Cantor and Mischel 1979; Tajfel, Sheikh, and Gardner 1964) and that people’s behavior 
in many ways confirms the stereotypes held by others (e.g., Snyder, Tanke, and Berscheid 
1977), but experimental validations of these phenomena were largely, if not entirely, third-
person in nature. So whereas the traditional literature showed that people stereotype (along 
with descriptions on the nature of stereotyping in various contexts), Milgram invented an 
experimental technique whereby one could systematically manipulate the experience of being 
stereotyped during social interactions in accordance with the outer identity of an 
interchangeable shadower.  
 
In his most elaborate iteration of the cyranoid method, Milgram (2010a) separately sourced 
for 11- and 12-year-old children while being interviewed by panels of teachers tasked with 
assessing their interviewee’s intellectual capabilities (for a replication of this study, see Corti 
and Gillespie 2015). The teachers were unaware their interlocutors were in fact shadowers 
articulating the words of a college professor, thus Milgram experienced conversing with these 
teachers as though he had the identity of a child. In his self-reflections following these 
interactions, Milgram noted that despite his best efforts to impress the teachers with his 
knowledge (he was, after all, a Harvard-educated professor), the outer persona of his child 
shadowers restricted to a large degree the manner in which teachers engaged with him. As the 
teachers believed they were speaking to a child, they naturally addressed their interviewees as 
children despite the sophisticated responses Milgram produced, leaving him unable to signal 
the full scope of his intelligence to the participants. His sole reportage of these studies is very 
autoethnographic in tone and comes in the form of a speech he prepared for an American 
Psychological Association convention in Toronto in 1984, an excerpt from which reads:  
 
The technique is an extraordinary prism through which to 
understand how people form judgments of others. For in a 
significant degree, the opinions of teachers formed of our child 
cyranoids depended as much on the teacher as on the child, and 
the questions asked and avoided. Teachers varied in how they 
approached questions[...] the worst never seeing beyond the 
possibilities of an average 11-year-old[...] Often, teachers 
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themselves simply did not have the knowledge, information, or 
inclination to ask adequate questions[...] We thus see very 
clearly how the impressions people form are to some extent 
generated by their own interaction with the stimulus person, the 
things they bring out and suppress (Milgram 2010a, p. 407).  
 
A Method for Self-Experimenting with Altered Identities. The interchangeable 
componentry of the cyranoid method provides a highly versatile means for researchers to 
explore transformed social interactions. There are three parts to a cyranic interaction: (1) the 
source (the person whose mind provides words to the shadower), (2) the shadower (the 
person whose body reproduces the source’s words), and (3) the interactant (the person who 
converses with the shadower face-to-face and who may either be aware or unaware that their 
interlocutor is a cyranoid). A researcher may assume any of these three positions. Milgram’s 
(2010a) studies are an example of a researcher experiencing a social encounter with an 
alternate outer identity in that he sourced for differentiated shadower-types. However, one 
may also take the position of the shadower and in doing so experience social encounters 
wherein the words one contributes are not one’s own, but that of a remote source. A 
researcher may also experience socializing from the perspective of the interactant and 
encounter cyranoids whose outer identity is readily perceivable but whose inner identity (that 
of the source) is not. Furthermore, multiple sources and/or shadowers may be used. For 
example, one source may speak through two or more shadowers and in doing so experience 
what it is like to simultaneously be different people in a social setting; likewise, two or more 
sources can control a single shadower, creating a situation whereby multiple individuals are 
projected through the same body.  
 
In addition to their unique phenomenological qualities, each of the three positions within a 
cyranic interaction can be distinguished in terms of the research questions they raise. For 
example, if one wishes, as Milgram had, to experience being perceived as someone quite 
dissimilar from one’s real self, one may take the position of the source and self-experiment 
with different varieties of shadowers. Such scenarios raise classic questions about the nature 
of identity and social perception (e.g., how a source’s behavior may confirm stereotyped 
assumptions about their shadower; see “the Proteus effect”: Yee and Bailenson 2007). On the 
other hand, by assuming the role of a shadower a researcher can investigate, for example, 
how their inner cognitions and sensations vary in accordance with the words they shadow, 
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which may diverge from their own communicative tendency in terms of structure, 
idiosyncrasy, ideology, cultural disposition, and so on. Finally, by taking the perspective of 
an interactant, a researcher may self-experiment with issues such as heuristic and systematic 
communicative information processing; for instance, one may observe oneself gauging the 
overt characteristics of an interlocutor (e.g., their physical appearance) in relation to the 
informational value in what they speak.  
 
Cyranoid Analogues in Virtual Ethnography and Autoethnography. We can connect the 
cyranoid method to contemporary ethnographic and autoethnographic research on the 
experience of self in transformative contexts. Milgram’s (2010a) fascination with cyranoids 
arose from considering the “psychological consequences” of a “hypothetical world in which 
the thoughts of one person would come out of another person’s mouth” (p. 402), and though 
such a world in a literal sense does not exist (today), online virtual worlds such as the 
immersive 3-D platform Second Life serve as perhaps the closest conceptual analogues. In 
these communities, users socialize through avatars: digital self-representations that may or 
may not mirror the self of reality. Avatars allow users to engage in what Nakamura (2002) 
calls “identity tourism,” wherein one can experience the world through the eyes of whatever 
persona they wish to concoct. The last two decades have seen growing concentrations of 
literature from researchers who have purposely augmented their identity in online worlds in 
order to examine the relationship between first-person perception, self-reflection, and the co-
construction of social phenomena (for an overview, see Williams 2007). For instance, in the 
context of an ethnographic study of a Second Life community, Boellstorff (2008) describes 
how “newbies” (a term for users with limited/superficial familiarity with Second Life) are 
identified on the basis of whether or not their avatar’s physical characteristics resemble the 
default settings of the software (thus suggesting restricted understanding of the more refined 
aspects of the platform), and subsequently how this identifier in many respects shaped the 
nature of his interactions with other virtual users. In an autoethnographic account, Dumitrica 
and Gaden (2009) describe the nature of gender-role construction and reproduction within 
Second Life and reflect on the experience of embodying various physically-differentiated 
avatars while developing a first-person sense of the social norms and roles that were 
subsequently expected of them by other users in accordance with these outer identities.  
 
Virtual self-studies of this kind have been demonstrated as a reflexive practice. Gottschalk 
(2010) states that “we must both be self-reflexive about how we represent ourselves in virtual 
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spaces and keep in mind that we can choose to represent ourselves in ways that will facilitate 
access, entrée, and rapport” (p. 520). Reflexive cogitations, according to Ikegami (2011), 
occur quite readily during avatar-embodiment, as an awareness of one’s ability inhabit a 
plurality of outer personae leads to reflections regarding the extent to which the self and its 
intersubjective experiences are shaped by outer appearance. She invokes Young and Whitty’s 
(2010) maxim regarding cyberspace and embodiment: “the more we try to disengage with the 
body, the more its importance is revealed to us” (p. 209). By extension, we can see how the 
cyranoid method can serve as a tremendous resource to self-experimenters: it allows us to 
systematically step outside of ourselves and into a new identity, and thereby experientially 
gain knowledge as to how outer identity is connected to the social phenomena we hope to 
understand.  
 
To showcase the quality of unique insights this method provides, the following section 
provides three first-person accounts from researchers who self-experimented with the 
cyranoid method in different social contexts.  
 
Reflections from Researchers Who Have Self-Experimented with Cyranoids  
Participating in Decision-Making Groups via Age-Differentiated Shadowers. The study 
undertaken by KC (first author) concerned the experience of having to argue before a 
decision-making group in favor of a counter-intuitive strategy related to a resource-
prioritization task (the Subarctic Survival Situation; Lafferty 1987) through covert shadowers 
differentiated by age-group. At issue was whether or not these experiences would differ on 
account of whether or not the shadower’s age-group, and therefore the researcher’s perceived 
outer identity, aligned with that of the other group members.  
 
There were two conditions in the study, a Young-adult condition in which KC (a Caucasian 
male, aged 25) sourced for a young-adult shadower (Caucasian male, aged 22) in four 
separate discussion groups, each composed of between 4 to 7 young-adult research 
participants (mean age = 24.2), and a Middle-aged condition in which KC sourced for a 
middle-aged shadower (Caucasian male, aged 44) in four separate discussion groups, each 
composed of between 4 to 8 young-adult research participants (mean age = 23.8). Research 
participants were recruited from a major North American city via internet advertisement. The 
conditions were designed such that in the Middle-aged condition the shadower was clearly 
the most senior member of each group in terms of age, whereas in the Young-adult condition 
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the shadower was roughly the same age as other group members. Though research 
participants were aware their discussions were being observed remotely by the researcher, 
none were aware until a debriefing session following the interactions that the researcher was 
in fact communicating through a covert shadower as a confederate group member. Each 
group discussed solutions to the resource-prioritization task for 15 min, during which KC, 
through the body of a shadower, argued in favor of an objectively terrible strategy (according 
to Lafferty 1987). KC, who was positioned in a sound-proof room adjacent to the discussion, 
observed groups via an audio-visual feed and provided words via a covert radio apparatus 
that transmitted to a discreet inner-ear radio receiver worn by the shadower.  
 
Reflection. I entered this study with no firm expectations as to 
how my experiences would differ depending on the identity of 
the two shadowers, but it did not take long to notice 
differences. Though in reality I was in the same age cohort as 
the participants in my study, I found myself having to work 
harder to convince the decision-making groups of my strategy 
when I communicated through the middle-aged shadower 
compared to when I communicated through the young-adult 
shadower. This boiled down to the fact that participants in the 
middle-aged condition asked of me many more questions 
regarding the strategy I advocated, and therefore I had to 
generate many more on-the-spot rationalizations for my 
position. Even though the strategy I was advocating was 
designed to be terrible, I received many more supportive 
comments from the participants when I sourced for the middle-
aged shadower, a pattern I attributed to the fact that in these 
conditions I was seen as far-and-away the most senior member 
of the group in terms of age, and this somehow made me 
worthy of more flattery than the strategy I was espousing 
deserved.  
 
The experience has certainly illuminated for me the role of 
outer identity in mediating social experience. Far from just a 
narrow range of phenomena changing depending on the body 
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of my shadower, an array of nuances was subtly impacted. For 
instance, as fewer questions were asked of me when I sourced 
for the young-adult shadower, I felt a strong urge to speak for 
longer and with more emphasis when a question or comment 
was directed to me in comparison to when I sourced for the 
middle-aged shadower. In other words, as opportunities to exert 
influence were rarer in the Young-adult condition, I felt I had to 
make the opportunities count for more, the effect of which was 
that my overall tone in the Young-adult condition was 
somewhat more serious and my statements were more 
measured. This has made me more reflective of the intimate 
connection between identity and social perception, and how 
joint activities can traverse an entirely different trajectory 
depending on one’s outer appearance.  
 
The knowledge I took from the study includes a more acute 
awareness of how the subtle aspects of stereotyping shape 
social interactions, even if in an innocuous way. Having age-
seniority in the Middle-aged condition discussion groups 
allowed me the time and space to articulate my ideas, and 
consequently, opportunities to exert influence (for better or for 
worse). Perhaps in real world contexts being given an 
opportunity to speak on the basis of one’s supposed identity can 
inflate a person’s sense of importance and/or the value of their 
ideas in the eyes of other group members. (KC, first author). 
 
Experiencing Job Interviews as Both a Male and Female Applicant. EC’s (third author) 
study took place in a Canadian branch of a publicly traded multinational organization. The 
cyranoid method was employed to allow the researcher to experience the dynamics and social 
exchanges of personnel selection interviews through the body of different applicants 
(shadowers), and consequently, the hiring decisions. 20 employees were recruited as 
participant-interviewers and randomly assigned to one of two conditions, a Male-applicant 
condition (in which the shadower was a 26-year-old Caucasian male actor) and a Female-
applicant condition (in which the shadower was a 29-year-old female fashion model of mixed 
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Asian and Caucasian descent). When selecting shadowers, best attempts were made to control 
for relative physical attractiveness, and cyranoids were trained so that each would have 
consistent body language across experimental trials. This was so that any variability in 
experience between the two conditions could be attributed to the gender difference between 
the shadowers. EC was then separately interviewed by the participant-interviewers (90 % of 
whom were male) in trials that alternated by condition, resulting in 10 interviews and 
evaluations for both the Male-applicant and Female-applicant conditions. During the 
interviews, EC watched over a live audio-visual feed from an adjacent room and transmitted 
responses to the shadower via a hidden earpiece (in a manner similar to that employed in the 
aforementioned study).  
 
Employees were told that they were participating in a research study on decision-making and 
that they should make best attempts to evaluate whether the applicant was suitable to hire. 
After each trial, participants were made aware of the cyranic nature of the interactions in a 
debriefing session. In the end, the applicant in Female-applicant was recommend for hire 9 
out of 10 times versus 6 out of 10 times for Male-applicant.  
 
Reflection. It was, in short, an astonishing experience. The 
body of the candidate markedly influenced the social dynamic 
within the interview and to experience these differences first-
hand was thrilling. These interviews were unlike any interviews 
I had been in myself, suggesting that there were forces beyond 
gender alone at play. First, let me describe the experience of 
sourcing for the female shadower. While I myself am female, I 
am not a fashion model. In the body of the female shadower, I 
often felt that my interviewers were gazing at me, sometimes to 
the point of flirtation. They treated me very politely, perhaps 
like men are ‘supposed’ to treat ladies. I felt myself responding 
in kind and muting or exaggerating my personality to resonate 
most with how the interviewers saw me. Overall, interactions 
felt friendly. I laughed authentically when sourcing for the 
female shadower, as opposed to nervously when I was sourcing 
for the male shadower. Questions were general and 
conversational: ‘Why do you want to work in this industry?’ or, 
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‘What was your exchange program like in Australia?’ It 
seemed that I had to say something erroneous before I lost the 
good favor of the interviewer. Through the female shadower I 
was relaxed to the point that I could enjoy the dialogue that 
took place in the interview and could build genuine rapport – a 
likely consequence of the affirmative responses and head nods I 
received.  
 
Being interviewed as a man by other men was a novel 
experience. Interviews began in a collegial manner and 
indicative of a tone that I would expect in the locker room of a 
male sports team. With more senior interviewers, the tone often 
turned combative and I felt overwhelmingly defensive. 
Questions were pointed and challenging: ‘Why should I hire 
you?’ or ‘What value will you add to our team?’ I was climbing 
uphill from the start to prove that I was a worthy candidate for 
hire. I sat on the edge of my chair, sweating, as I did my best to 
respond to the litany of questions thrown at me. While the 
questions asked of the male shadower were more difficult, 
within them lay more opportunities to showcase expertise, so 
through the male shadower I had more openings to demonstrate 
industry knowledge than when I sourced for the female 
shadower.  
 
To experience this setting as a first-person observer was a 
unique and robust means to gain insight into my research 
question. Without it, I never would have felt what it was like to 
be a fashion model, or treated like one of the guys, and to what 
extent such differences impact job interviews. This method 
allowed me to actively experience the perspective of another 
beyond what I could empathize on my own, and shed light on a 
series of other questions I might not have otherwise considered. 
Surely there are many practical applications in both research 
and the field that could entail experiencing the world through 
172
the eyes of another (EC, third author). 
 
Shadowing for a “Chat bot” Computer Program. The self-experiment in which GR (second 
author) participated involved dyadic social interactions involving a computer-human hybrid 
cyranoid. Rather than shadow for a human source, the researcher utilized Cleverbot, a web-
based artificial intelligence program known as a “chat bot” designed to engage in text-based 
conversation (Carpenter 2014). Thus, the cyranoid in this study had the “body” of a human 
(GR) and the “mind” of a computer. Participants in the study were a mixture of university 
students and adults recruited from a large European city and were randomly assigned to one 
of two conditions: Know and Don’t Know. Both conditions involved participants engaging in 
10-minute face-to-face dyadic conversations with GR (a 30-year-old female), and in both 
conditions GR merely shadowed the words Cleverbot provided while speaking none of her 
own thoughts. Participants were told they could speak to their interlocutor about whatever 
topic they liked. Participants in the Know condition were instructed before interlocution 
commenced that their interlocutor would be repeating words from a chat bot, while in the 
Don’t Know condition it was not until after the interactions were complete that participants 
learned their interlocutor had merely been repeating the words of a computer program.  
 
To allow for spoken communication between the computer-human hybrid cyranoid and the 
participant, the services of another researcher were used. From a room adjacent to where GR 
engaged the participant, the second researcher listened to the conversation via a wireless 
microphone. When the participant spoke, this researcher would speed-type the participant’s 
speech into the Cleverbot program and then speak Cleverbot’s response to the input text 
aloud into a microphone connected to a covert radio relay that transferred audio to an inner-
ear radio device worn by GR.  
 
Reflection. I found out very quickly that shadowing for a 
computer program is not nearly as easy as I had envisioned it to 
be. The conversations deviated considerably from what one 
might consider ‘normal.’ The chat bot frequently generated 
completely irrelevant and downright nonsensical statements, 
leaving me in the position of having to say these things aloud 
while keeping a straight face. I was more conscious of my 
facial expressions during these interactions than I am normally, 
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and I tried to keep smiling no matter what the topic of 
conversation was or how strange conversations became. I had 
to suppress my laughter a number of times given the 
unpredictable responses the chat bot gave and the subsequent 
reactions by participants. At times I was frustrated with the 
inability to communicate my own thoughts and feelings to the 
participants, especially when the topic of conversation was 
something I was genuinely interested in. There were moments 
when it was particularly awkward, such as when the chat bot 
would discuss ‘my’ sexual orientation, or when male 
participants - knowing I was simply speaking what a computer 
program had generated in response to their statements - would 
flirt with me. 
 
The experience has made me dramatically more aware of the 
mundane things that scaffold informal conversation. For 
instance, even in the condition where people knew I was simply 
repeating the words of a chat bot, participants continued to 
address me as if I was capable of responding in a human-like 
manner. I felt, in other words, that what persisted despite the 
abnormality of the situation was a strong desire on both my part 
and that of the participant to establish a human connection. In 
the face of repeated misunderstanding, there was a consistent 
urge to re-establish shared meaning. Furthermore, the 
experience has made me more aware of the role short term 
memory plays in buttressing understanding in conversations. 
The chat bot had an inability to remember the context of a 
conversation beyond several turns, thus conversations would 
fall into confusion whenever the participant would bring up 
something they or the chat bot had said at an earlier part of the 
conversation.  
 
As a researcher, I feel that the experiment produced many 
important insights. I began to understand, to some extent, how 
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challenging it must be for someone who is limited in terms of 
language (e.g., by a communication disorder) to communicate 
with someone else who does not possess the capacity to 
understand them. I felt internally capable of establishing 
understanding with the participants but was incapable (by 
design, in this case) of actually doing so. Furthermore, the 
experience has made me more reflexive with regard to the role 
my outer identity plays in mediating communication, and has 
prompted me to want to look closer at the connection between 
attractiveness and perceived intelligence and its subsequent 
impact on psychological well-being. Drawing from the example 
of participants continuing to flirt with me despite the ridiculous 
words I was speaking: do a person’s physical attributes lead 
another to look past their extreme inability to communicate 
thoughts in a coherent fashion? (GR, second author).  
 
General Discussion  
Benefits of Self-Experimentation. Accessing Social Qualia. Subjective self-reflections of 
the kind reported above illustrate the notion that via self-experimentation a researcher gains 
access to experience, which is itself a form of information that is not merely descriptive; it is 
experiential. Philosophers refer to this type of information as “qualia” (Jackson 1982), and it 
is often invoked in defense of the notion that conscious phenomena cannot be fully 
understood until they are known both in terms of their objective third-person description as 
well as through subjective first-person experience. Thomas Nagel’s (1974) “what is it like to 
be a bat?” thought experiment illustrates this point well: if all of the energies of every 
scientist in the world were directed toward studying the bat, it might be possible to arrive at a 
profoundly complete description of the species, yet the subjective experience of any one bat 
would remain utterly unknown. This paradox is present for human phenomena as well. For 
instance, in social psychology we now have many models and experimental validations 
describing social stereotyping and behavioral confirmation in relation to identity, but in what 
sense does reading this literature provide one with the experiential knowledge of being 
stereotyped? What is clear in the self-reflections provided in the current work is that each 
researcher had the ability to directly experience being stereotyped, whether due to age, 
gender, or physical appearance, and - importantly - the cyranoid method allowed the 
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researchers to systematically control the conditions that gave rise to certain forms of 
stereotyping. This is evidence for the utility of a researcher-as-subject social psychological 
experimental model in that such a model, in being a route to social qualia, could operate in 
conjunction with traditional experimental approaches to provide researchers with a more 
complete understanding of investigated phenomena - an understanding rooted in both 
description and experience. 
  
Building Mental Models. Another benefit to self-experimentation is that it allows researchers 
to develop more precise mental models about the phenomena they study. By mental model 
we simply mean a person’s internal representation of how various components of their 
environment (including social processes) operate in relation to each other (see Schumacher 
and Czerwinski 1992; Klimoski and Mohammed 1994). Mental models are acquired and 
developed via biological affordance, cultural learning, socialization, and lived experience 
(Johnson-Laird 1983), and it is to this last category that self-experiments can contribute, for 
they enable social researchers to directly experience the phenomena they wish to understand 
and thereby obtain a subjective and lived awareness of the properties involved. This is 
evident in the self-reflections shown in the present article, as each researcher noted how self-
experimenting enhanced their internal representations of particular social phenomena that 
occur outside the experimental setting. Moreover, we suspect on the basis of the above-
described self-reflections that there is a strong relationship between broadening and 
enhancing one’s mental models with regard to social psychological phenomena and the 
creative process of developing new research questions (for further discussion on self-
experimentation as a source of idea generation, see Cabanac 2004; Lubart and Mouchiroud 
2004; Roberts 2004).  
 
Enhanced Reflexivity. Doing self-experimentation is akin to being an ethnographer within 
one’s own experiment, and the anthropological models of autoethnography and participant 
observation have much to offer a social psychological approach to self-experimentation. In 
particular, these research practices remind us of the maxim expressed in Habermas’ (1968) 
classic work Knowledge and Human Interests: that we cannot escape our role in constructing 
knowledge and that the best we can do is be reflexive about our role in producing knowledge. 
To be reflexive means being able, to some extent, to step out from one’s own role in both 
creating the research situation and constructing it. Especially in qualitative research it is 
common practice to extol the importance of reflexivity and critical thinking about one’s own 
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role in research (Cornish, Zittoun, and Gillespie 2007; Denzin and Lincoln 2000). But, 
exactly how is one meant to be reflexive about one’s own research? Building on the idea of 
position exchange (Gillespie and Martin 2014), that self-reflection can originate in 
exchanging roles or social positions, we propose that researchers moving between the social 
positions in their own experiment might be a viable route to becoming more reflexive about 
the given experiment.  
 
In a sense, being the object of one’s own experiment is a means of traversing the landscape of 
possible experiences and perspectives related to the different conditions within an 
experimental design. In the examples given in the current work, we see how a particular form 
of self-experimentation that made use of the cyranoid method enabled each researcher to 
become more reflexive with regard to the role of identity in shaping social experience as the 
various experimental conditions brought different aspects of identity to the fore. Given these 
results, it would be refreshing if it became common within experimental social psychology 
for researchers to report reflexive self-observations of experiments (even if only for pilot 
trials) together with standard observational third-person findings so that those who access this 
literature could become more fully attuned to the perspectival variety inherent in 
experimental scenarios.  
 
Some Thoughts on How Social Psychologists Might Approach Self-Experimentation. 
The distinction between laboratory and field experiments applies as much for researcher-as-
subject designs as it does for traditional third-person designs. In the current work, Study 1 
and Study 3 are both truer to the logic of traditional laboratory experiments in the sense that 
each researcher experienced systematic and repeated iterations of different experimental 
conditions in a controlled laboratory. By contrast, Study 2, having been conducted in an 
office environment, is more of a field experiment akin to Milgram’s subway and waiting line 
studies, though it too involved the researcher experiencing repeated iterations of separate 
conditions involving participants with no explicit knowledge of the experimental 
manipulation. Thus, a researcher-as-subject model of self-experimentation seems viable for 
both laboratory and field studies.  
 
Another issue concerns what, exactly, one should be observing in a self-experiment. Should 
one enter into a self-experiment with a predetermined set of dependent measures to 
systematically observe (e.g., one’s psychological states)? Alternatively, should one adopt a 
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blank slate approach, beginning with a simple experimental design and prioritizing what to 
observe once in the midst of the experiment? Or should one approach self-experimentation 
not at all as a formal data-gathering exercise, but simply as a means of accessing experience? 
Our own perspective is that the answer to each of these questions is yes. None of the benefits 
of self-experimentation outlined above necessarily require any sort of formal data-gathering, 
yet there certainly can be utility in having specific dependent measures, particularly if a 
researcher’s aim is to perform a combined analysis of first-person and third-person data. KC 
(Study 1) performed a content analysis using transcripts from the interactions to identify how 
their conversational engagement style compared between experimental conditions. Similarly, 
EC (Study 2) coded the quality of her responses to interviewers’ questions to assess through 
which shadower (male vs. female) she more often produced ideal responses. GR (Study 3), 
meanwhile, recorded detailed notes following each experimental trial describing the 
subjective sensations she experienced. While it is true that third party observers could also 
have arrived at the data recorded by KC and EC (the data being overtly behavioral in nature), 
only the researchers themselves are in a position to make inferences based on the data that 
incorporate both first-person and third-person perspectives.  
 
As a final note, researchers who do opt to incorporate formal data-gathering techniques as 
part of a self-experiment may want to consider the growing number of technologies designed 
specifically to capture first-person perspective data in social environments. These include the 
SubCam, a discreet head-mounted video camera that captures a social actor’s visual field that 
has been used for first-person ethnographic analyses in occupational field studies as well as in 
experimental contexts (see Glăveanu and Lahlou 2012; Lahlou 2010, 2011). Other 
commercially available devices include lifelogging wearable technologies such as the 
BodyMedia FIT, designed to measure, among other things, sleep quality, galvanic skin 
response, and heart rate (for an overview of “quantified self” devices, see Lee 2013). 
Microsoft’s SenseCam, a wearable camera that captures still images at adjustable intervals, 
has been used for first-person perspective analyses of routine activities related to, among 
other things, health and energy consumption (see Doherty et al. 2011; Gurrin et al. 2008) and 
has also been used to enhance the reflexive practices of teachers in classroom environments 
(Fleck and Fitzpatrick 2009). Each of these technologies captures a specific format of data 
(often capturing multiple formats simultaneously) and enables the researcher to go well 
beyond traditional self-reflection and introspection when conducting a self-experiment. The 
SubCam, for example, allows a subject (for our purposes, a researcher) to revisit their 
178
subjective experiences and temporally reconstruct their psychological states “at the moment 
of action” (Lahlou 2011, p. 607). Such data, if collected methodically, can enable a variety of 
comparative analyses between conditions in a self-experiment. Quantified self devices have 
the advantage of being discreet, unobtrusive, and can be worn for long durations, thus 
enabling long-term self-experimentation as well as self-experimentation in remote field 
settings where the traditional tools of the lab may be unavailable.  
 
Conclusion. There will always be an explanatory gap between the experience of the actor 
and the description of the observer (Farr 1996). The experience of an action and the 
observation of an action will necessarily feel different, with each yielding a distinctive form 
of knowledge. Recognizing this fracture as insurmountable entails opening social science up 
to a perspectival ontology, that is, the proposition that the social world comprises many 
potentially incommensurable perspectives (see Mead 1932). In the face of such plurality, 
what is the social scientist supposed to do? Rather than narrow the field of view to focus only 
on that which can be observed, we encourage experimenters to augment what is observed 
with what is experienced. 
  
What we advocate is not so much an innovation as an appeal to acknowledge and legitimize 
what every good social experimenter does anyway, namely, walk through their own 
experiment, exploring the experiences that the protocol creates, and tweaking that protocol 
towards validity. Often this stage of research is relegated to the pilot phase and not written 
up. Yet, it is done; why? Because doing so is useful. Seeing an experiment from the point-of-
view of a subject, among other things, helps us to understand the relationship between 
independent and dependent variables, to work out hypotheses, and to develop and organize 
new avenues of research. Self-experimenting helps us to understand ourselves better and 
reminds us of how important it is to confront the nature of experience created within an 
experiment directly. All we are suggesting is that this practice is necessary and valid, that it 
deserves its own conceptualization as a valuable tool on the mantle of acceptable, recognized 
modes of inquiry, and that it can be sought for its own ends.  
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CHAPTER 6 | Cyranoid Ethics 
 
Those wishing to conduct social psychological research, as well as the institutional review 
boards (IRBs) that oversee such research, must perform due diligence in assessing whether a 
proposed study presents any ethical concerns. The principal ethical concern vis-à-vis the 
cyranoid method is the use of deception when using covert cyranoids (i.e., leading 
participants to believe they are speaking with an autonomous person when in reality they are 
in part communicating with an unseen person or machine whose identity remains hidden for 
at least some portion of the interaction). To gain IRB approval for the studies described in the 
previous chapters of this thesis, and to ensure participant wellbeing when carrying out the 
research, a range of protocols and experimental design features were operationalized (see 
Appendix D ethics material). This chapter outlines these various protocols and design 
features, details how participants reacted to the use of deception, and offers suggestions 
regarding cyranoid ethics that subsequent users of the method might consider in future 
research. 
 
APA and BPS stance on the use of deception in psychological research 
Both the American Psychological Association (APA) and the British Psychological Society 
(BPS) offer clear guidelines on the use of deception in psychological research in their 
respective codes of ethics (American Psychological Association, 2010; British Psychological 
Society, 2009). The APA compels researchers to only consider using deception when its use 
alone would enable a study to produce substantial scientific, educational, or applied 
knowledge, and forbids deception in cases where there is the reasonable expectation that it 
will cause severe physical pain or emotional distress. The APA further compels researchers to 
disclose the full extent of the deception to participants as early as feasible and no later than 
when the researcher finishes collecting data from them (e.g., during a debriefing session). 
Furthermore, researchers are obliged to grant participants the right to withdraw their data 
following debriefing. Similarly, the BPS asks that researchers avoid intentional deception 
unless it is exceptionally necessary to perform the research; if deception is used, additional 
safeguards must be considered to ensure participant wellbeing, and the participant must be 
informed of the deception as early as is feasible. The BPS makes the distinction between 
simply withholding details of a study from participants (e.g., the hypothesis or the exact 
nature of a stimulus) and deliberately lying to participants about the nature of the research, 
condemning the later. Both the APA and the BPS guidelines on the use of deception are 
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intended to safeguard not only the wellbeing of participants during and after their 
participation, but the trust participants place in the researcher, the researcher’s organization, 
and the larger community of psychological researchers and research institutions as well.  
 
One of core principles of the BPS’s code of ethics and conduct is the concept of participant 
self-determination (British Psychological Society, 2009), which refers in part to each 
participant’s right to determine whether or not a particular facet of the research they are 
participating in meets their own internal criteria for ethical appropriateness. The reaction each 
participant has upon being informed of deception, therefore, stands as sufficient without the 
need to compare the participant’s response against some benchmark criteria (British 
Psychological Society, 2000), such as the reaction’s comparability to other participant 
reactions or a predetermined scale set by the researcher. In other words, no matter how 
innocuous a certain deception may be in the mind of the researcher or in the minds of the 
majority of research participants, should one participant determine that their experience with 
the deception was unethical, then the deception was unethical. Likewise however, should 
participants see no problem whatsoever with a given deception upon being informed of its 
use during debriefing, then the researcher and the IRB are obliged to consider these views as 
valid and factor these views into any subsequent reapplication of the deception.  
 
The nature of the deception used in this thesis 
Given that each of the empirical chapters within this thesis involved the use of covert 
cyranoids, deception was employed to preserve the validity of experimental treatments, 
though not every participant was subjected to deception nor was every cyranoid covert in 
nature (some participants were specifically told prior to the experiment that their interlocutors 
would be cyranoids). In Chapter 2, “Replicating Milgram,” participants in the treatment 
conditions (cyranoid conditions) of both studies were not told of the cyranic nature of their 
respective interlocutors prior to their interacting with them; withholding this information was 
required in order to both gauge the cyranic illusion as well as determine the extent to which 
the outer identity of an interlocutor mediated person perception and other behaviors. In 
Chapter 3, “Echoborgs: Cyranoids with computer program sources,” participants in the 
treatment condition of the chapter’s third study encountered a covert echoborg, and likewise 
were not made aware of the nature of their interlocutor prior to the experimental interaction. 
Similarly, in Chapter 4, “Using echoborgs to assess intersubjective effort in human-agent 
dialog,” participants in the treatment condition encountered a covert echoborg and were thus 
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not made aware of the cyranic nature of their prior to the experimental interaction. This type 
of deception (i.e., withholding from a participant the true nature of a stimulus) is a common 
type of deception referred to by Greenberg and Folger (1988) as “deception to conceal the 
true purpose of the experiment,” which can be distinguished from other general types of 
deception such as “deception to conceal the true purpose of behavior” (i.e., when participants 
are misled about the true purpose of their actions), and “deception to conceal forthcoming 
experimental experiences” (i.e., when deception is used to keep subjects ignorant about 
certain events that will transpire over the duration of the experiment). 
   
How deception was managed: Design and debriefing 
In the undated transcription of his audio notes, Milgram (n. d.) conveys the following: 
 
Thus it appears to me that the ethical issues in this experimental 
research center on the misrepresentation of the medium as 
being the source of his own ideas. For many subjects, it is 
possible to fully inform them of the technique that is being 
used, for we will want to know their reactions to the source and 
the medium when they are fully apprised of the situation. For 
other subjects, however, we will not want to inform them 
before the experiment of the cyranic arrangement. We will, 
however, give them as much information as possible while still 
allowing the experiments to be conducted. Specifically, they 
will be told that they are involved in an experiment, that there 
are certain features of the experiment that cannot be explained 
to them beforehand, but that they will be told afterward what 
the nature of the experiment was. All subjects will participate 
on the basis of voluntary consent (pp. 27-28). 
 
Apart from this brief mention of the need to deceive participants in accordance with the 
particular research question being pursued and of the necessity of informed consent, no other 
archive documents written by either Milgram, his students, or his colleagues mention 
deception or the broader ethics of conducting cyranoid research. Thus, it was necessary to 
more or less consider these issues from scratch when first setting out to replicate Milgram’s 
early pilots and subsequently when expanding the cyranoid paradigm to include echoborgs.  
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When designing the replication experiments (Chapter 2), careful thought was given as to how 
to make the deception as benign as possible so as to reduce the chance participants would 
have a negative experience with the study or regret having been subjected to deception. The 
consent forms participants reviewed and signed prior to receiving instructions made it clear 
that there would be a full debriefing at the conclusion of the study during which the full 
nature of the study would be explained and that they would have the right to withdraw their 
data at that time should they so choose. The experimental interactions were designed to be 
informal so that participants would not feel under pressure to behave in accordance with a 
particular role or certain performance measures. No scripts were given, though the second 
study (adult-child cyranoid scenarios) did include a general set of guidelines for participants 
to follow in order to focus the conversation on intellectual matters. Both the research 
participants (who served as interactants) and the confederates (the sources) were informed 
that they should only speak about issues they felt comfortable speaking about and that they 
did not have to disclose any personal information. These instructions were provided so as to 
limit the possibility of conversations sliding toward taboo, vulgar, or personally 
uncomfortable topics. The final experimental procedures and instructions were settled on 
following repeated piloting of beta-version protocols so as to anticipate potential problem 
areas, such as the possibility of participant discomfort. When instructions were delivered to 
participants, they were expressly informed of their right to withdraw from the study for 
whatever reason even if the decision to withdraw interrupted the experimental interaction.  
 
During the replication study’s debriefing sessions, the researcher disclosed to participants the 
goals and motivations of the study, the full nature of the person they had interacted with, 
informed them of the identity of the source who had fed lines to the shadower (without 
disclosing any identifying personal information about the source), explained why the 
deception was necessary, and invited the participants to offer their thoughts on the deception. 
Allowing for an informal exchange between the researcher and the participants was intended 
to give participants the opportunity to fully understand the nature of the deception and to 
alleviate them of any concern of having acted inappropriately or insufficiently. Holmes 
(1976) refers to this type of debriefing as “desensitizing” as it is designed to help participants 
“deal with new information about themselves acquired as a consequence of the behaviors 
they exhibited during the experiment” (p. 868). According to Kidder (1981), one of the 
purposes of debriefing is to minimize any feeling amongst participants “that they might have 
been manipulated, made fools of, shown to be gullible, or revealed character weakness” (p. 
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404). It was decided that an effective way of gauging whether such feelings did occur was to 
grant participants the opportunity to voice whether they would object to someone such as 
themselves taking part in the same study under the same conditions. Thus, at the conclusion 
of the debrief session, a document was given to participants in which they were asked to 
indicate agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements (see Appendix D): 
  
I (research participant) have been debriefed by the researchers 
as to the full nature of the full nature of the research study I 
have taken part in. 
 
I understand that the nature of this study involved me speaking 
with an individual who was channelling the words of another 
person. 
 
I would not object to another individual such as myself taking 
part in this study, should they consent to do so. 
 
I consent to the researchers using all data collected from me. 
 
I am aware of my right to anonymity with regards to this study 
and understand that the data I have given will be kept 
confidential. 
 
IRB approval of the study was granted on the condition that participants’ reactions upon 
being informed of the deception be closely monitored. Specifically, if at any time a 
participant voiced a concern regarding the ethics of the deception, or objected to another 
person being subject to the same deception, the experiment was to stop and no further trials 
were to be conducted until the deception protocols had ben re-evaluated.   
 
The ethical insights gained from the replication studies fed into the design of the covert 
echoborg scenarios featured in Chapter 3 (study 3) and Chapter 4. One of the anticipated 
challenges with the echoborg studies was that the interactions would be fundamentally 
different from those in the replication study, namely, the interactions would be a lot more 
awkward for participants. This is due to the fact that the dialog style of conversational agents 
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is generally quite incongruent from what most people would consider normal interlocution. 
Conversational agents often produce illogical and random statements, the content of which 
cannot be predicted. As such, the conversational agents that were employed (the chat bots 
Cleverbot, Rose, and Mitsuku) were vetted to determine whether participants would likely 
encounter anything vulgar or otherwise inappropriate. As with the replication study, the 
interactions with covert echoborgs were designed to be informal and relatively brief so as not 
to prolong any awkwardness, discomfort, or frustration felt by participants (covert echoborg 
interactions lasted 10-minutes, compared to the 20-minute interactions with the adult-child 
cyranoids in the replication studies). Protocols were thoroughly piloted with naïve volunteer 
participants prior to running the full experiments so as to vet the procedures and gauge likely 
reactions to a covert echoborg. Embarrassment and awkwardness were indeed experienced by 
these volunteer participants during piloting, but their reactions were overwhelmingly positive 
and they took a great interest in the echoborg concept when the deception was revealed by the 
researcher during pilot debriefing.  
 
In the actual covert echoborg experiments, the debrief procedures were slightly different than 
those that had been employed for the replication studies. Participants were informed of the 
nature of the deception, namely, that the words the person whom had sat across from them 
spoke were determined by a conversational agent computer program and fed to shadower via 
a discrete radio transmitter. The reason for the use of deception was explained, and the 
researcher informally conversed with the participant about the motivations and goals behind 
the study. To conclude the debriefing session, the participant was verbally asked two 
questions by the researcher: 
 
Now that you are aware of the full nature of the study, do you 
wish to articulate any concerns you may have about the ethics 
of such research? 
 
Understanding the nature of the deception involved with this 
study, would you object to someone such as yourself - for 
instance, a friend, colleague, or family member - taking part in 
the same study should they consent to do so? 
 
As with the replication studies, IRB approval for the study was granted on the condition that 
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should any participant articulate an ethical concern regarding the study’s protocols or object 
to another individual taking part in the study, the study would immediately halt and no 
additional trials would be run until the protocols had been re-evaluated.  
 
Participants’ reactions to the deception 
Participants’ reactions upon learning of the cyranic deception were overwhelmingly positive. 
A total of 134 participants from across each of the studies described in the empirical chapters 
of this thesis were subjected to deception (either encountering a covert cyranoid or echoborg), 
yet none raised so much as a slight objection to the deception upon its disclosure during 
debriefing. Most participants expressed genuine interest in the method, and many stayed 
beyond their time slot to further discuss details of the study and the objectives of the research. 
Among those who encountered an echoborg, many participants likened their experience to 
that depicted in popular science fiction films that they had seen (a frequent reference was the 
recent Academy Award-winning film Her; Jonze, Eillison, & Landay, 2013). To give a sense 
of participants’ feelings toward the most extreme use of cyranic deception used in this thesis, 
Table 6.1 documents feelings regarding the ethical nature of the research expressed during 
debriefing by each of the participants that encountered a covert echoborg in the empirical 
study documented in Chapter 4. 
 
Ethics considerations for future cyranoid research 
Taking stock of the entirety of first-hand experiences with the cyranoid method gleaned from 
the various studies within this thesis, a number of suggestions with regard to research ethics 
can be offered to those considering future cyranoid research.  
 
Consider whether deception is at all necessary to the research question. As demonstrated 
in Chapter 3 of this thesis, not every research question that necessitates use of the cyranoid 
method likewise necessitates withholding from participant interactants the cyranic nature of 
an interlocutor. Indeed, such deception is generally only necessary if it the researcher’s goal 
to investigate a cyranic context in which the interactant is in “default mode” (i.e., wherein 
they naturally assume that persons they encounter are communicating self-authored, 
spontaneous thoughts).  
 
Consider the behaviors likely to be exhibited by the participant and whether 
participants might regret exhibiting such behaviors upon being debriefed. As is usually
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Table 6.1  
Participants’ Thoughts on the Ethical Nature of the Study (Chapter 4: “covert echoborg” condition) 
Trial Gender (age) Do you have any concerns 
regarding the ethics of this 
research?A 
 
Would you object to someone else like 
yourself taking part in this research?B 
1 Female (27) No I think it has to be done this way. 
For me it’s okay to know now what’s 
behind it.  
No not at all. I would encourage it.  
2 Male (21) I think it was fun. No no. Obviously not. 
3 Female (21) No. I think it was necessary for you 
to do that, otherwise I would have 
acted in a very different way. So I 
think it’s okay.  
No I wouldn’t. 
4 Female (22) The study felt ethical. There was no 
coercion, no forcing. So, ya, I think it 
felt ethical. It was a good experiment, 
ya.  
No. Not at all.  
5 Female (19) No. I was uncomfortable doing it but 
now I’m fine.  
No. 
6 Male (24) I was totally comfortable. Not at all. Not at all.  
7 Female (23) No, because I think it’s interesting to 
know how people react in those 
situations. So no, it’s fine.  
No. 
8 Female (23) Ya it’s okay. It was quite interesting 
actually.  
No. 
9 Female (20) Ya, I mean this might be the way 
artificial intelligence is heading. I’m 
not ethically opposed to it. In the 
social sciences you gotta do this or 
you’ll get a totally different response. 
No. I’d feel bad because that was a 
monstrously uncomfortable 10-minutes. 
No, but I think it’d be kind of fun to laugh 
about it afterwards.  
10 Female (22) No it was fine. No I wouldn’t because I think they’d be 
aware this is an experiment so I think 
withholding this kind of information is fine.  
11 Female (25) No not really.  No. 
12 Female (29) Ya I was happy, it was fine. No 
problems.  
No, it’d be fine. 
13 Female (20) I wouldn’t say anything was ethically 
wrong with it, I just felt a bit 
uncomfortable <laughs> in the 
conversation, but like, that’s the 
conversation, like… I feel fine about 
it  
No.  
14 Male (23) Ya, I agree that my answers would be 
different if I knew. Ya, I completely 
No. 
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the case in person perception social research, experimenters look for explicit and implicit 
evidence as to whether a research participant has confirmed a particular stereotype or 
otherwise exhibited behavior or volunteered judgements influenced by some overt 
characteristic (e.g., physical identity) of a stimulus person. This is typical of research 
involving phenomena such as persuasion and attitude change, for example. Upon learning of 
agree and I don’t see any problems.  
15 Female (23) Ya I feel it was ethical. I was just 
following the procedures. I didn’t feel 
anything strange or unethical about it.  
No. 
16 Female (20) No it was fine. No. 
17 Female (36) No it was fine. No, no, it’s fine. 
18 Male (30) No I didn’t feel uncomfortable at any 
point. I ‘m happy with the study. 
No. 
19 Female (19) No it was completely fine. No. 
20 Female (28) No, I think it was great. No, of course.  
21 Male (26) No not at all. If you told me the 
results would not be the same. 
No no. 
22 Male (20) I’m pretty comfortable. I can see how 
some people might find it frustrating 
but I wouldn’t think it’d be a 
significant concern. 
I wouldn’t object to that. 
23 Female (18) No. I’m okay with it.  No, I would just wait until they found out 
to see what they said <laughs> 
24 Male (23) No. No. 
25 Female (21) Ya I’m okay with the procedures. I 
think that’s how you get, like how 
people react in real life.  
No. I wouldn’t even tell them about this 
<laughs> 
26 Female (19) No. Everything’s fine. No. 
27 Male (21) I thought it was fine, there wasn’t 
anything unethical about it.  
No, I don’t see any reason why I should 
object to that. 
28 Female (25) No. No. 
29 Male (21) Well if you had told me you wouldn’t 
have been able to conduct the study. 
No. 
A Full question: “Now that you are aware of the full nature of the study, do you wish to articulate any concerns 
you may have about the ethics of such research?” 
B Full question: “Understanding the nature of the deception involved with this study, would you object to 
someone such as yourself - for instance, a friend, colleague, or family member - taking part in the same study 
should they consent to do so?” 
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the intentions of a study during debriefing, therefore, there exists the possibility that 
participants will come to evaluate the behavior they exhibited or the responses the indicated 
in a negative light being that they might have confirmed some socially taboo stereotype. 
Given that a goal of ethical research design is to mitigate the possibility that participants will 
leave a study feeling self-critical about their performance (Kidder, 1981), serious thought 
should be considered prior to using deception to conduct cyranoid research regarding whether 
or not the designed interaction scenario combined with the deception is likely to elicit 
behaviors that the participant will likely regret. 
 
It is easy to imagine cyranic scenarios, for example, in which a participant interlocutor’s 
belief that they are interacting with one type of person leads them to say or do something they 
wouldn’t otherwise say or do to a different type of individual for reasons that have to do with 
social etiquette, cultural standards, in-group/out-group norms, and so on. The goal of 
cyranoid research should not be to elicit these types of behaviors full-bore without first 
considering what impact this might have on participants following revelation of the deception 
during debriefing. To not consider this possible impact would grossly violate the rights of the 
participant and undermine their trust in social psychological researchers and research 
institutions. This isn’t to say that one cannot use the cyranoid method to investigate 
behavioral and perceptual social biases – the empirical studies in this thesis did just that. On 
the contrary, there are ways to design cyranoid experiments that gauge people’s social biases 
without necessarily causing the participant to perform behavior that they end up regretting. 
The interaction scenarios involving covert cyranoids employed in this thesis, for example, 
featured interactions designed as cordial, informal conversations, and participants were 
encouraged not to say anything their interlocutor might find vulgar or inappropriate. 
Participants were not instructed to compete with their interlocutors, nor were they encouraged 
by the researcher to converse on taboo subject matter (e.g., participants in the child-
source/adult-shadower cyranoid condition from the study in Chapter 2 were not encouraged 
to talk about “the problem with kids these days”).  
 
Pick sources wisely, and instruct them on how they should not behave. As the cyranoid 
method can be used to assess the behavior and perception of participants as sources, thought 
must be given to the possibility that a source might abuse their status as the determiner of the 
words spoken by the shadower by compelling the shadower to utter things in the presence of 
interactants that are inappropriate, cruel, or otherwise ethically problematic. This was not an 
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issue in the cyranoid experiments described in this thesis as sources were confederates who 
understood not to take advantage of the shadower in such a way, nor was this an issue in the 
echoborg extension of the cyranoid method given that the chat bots that were selected were 
not programmed to be abusive (the chat bots weren’t even aware they were controlling a 
shadower, for that matter). Nonetheless, it is easy to imagine how an inappropriately 
behaving source can cause negative experiences for the other people involved in a cyranic 
interaction. This is not to say that the source’s behavior be overly restricted. On the contrary, 
it is quite an interesting research question to consider how sources, from their inherent 
positions of anonymity, might behave in a manner incongruent with how they would behave 
in person depending on the nature of the cyranic scenario and the identities of the shadower 
and interactant. Nonetheless, any experiment involving participants being assigned as sources 
should have thorough protocols for making sure they understand what types of behaviors are 
unacceptable (e.g., instructing their shadower to utter derogatory remarks).  
 
Document participant reactions to deception. Whenever the cyranoid method is deployed 
with deception, it is highly recommended that participant reactions to the deception during 
debriefing be well-documented, analyzed, and reported where possible (e.g., Table 6.1). This 
practice can serve two general functions. First, it can help researchers to evaluate their use of 
deception retrospectively and factor this evaluation into new research designs. Second, the 
transparency that such a practice would offer to members of the public, other researchers, 
journalists, institutional review boards, and other agencies would likely empower researchers 
hoping to conduct studies using the cyranoid method to see their research designs gain 
approval and funding.  
 
Enhancing participation with the method. One thing that went unexplored in the current 
thesis is the possibility of allowing research participants to participate as a cyranoid during or 
after debriefing, particularly if the study involved deceiving the participant. Many of the 
participants that took part in this thesis’ various studies were very inquisitive during 
debriefing as to how the cyranoid method worked in practice, particularly in the case of the 
echoborg experiments. Given the interest in and enthusiasm for the method that was 
expressed by the majority of participants, allowing all participants to have hands-on 
experience as a cyranoid might go a long way toward attenuating any unexpressed negative 
attitudes corresponding to their being deceived, or simply allow them to entertain their 
curiosity. Indeed, it is often the case that informed consent forms indicate that the participant 
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is likely to receive an educational benefit from their participation (i.e., the opportunity to 
learn something about science and, possibly, about themselves), and debriefing is the space in 
which the researcher can communicate the value in what participant has experienced (Tesch, 
1977). Allowing participants to experience being part of a cyranoid could therefore help fulfil 
this educational service objective.  
 
Field studies and other research variants. The mundane realism of a laboratory experiment 
plays a significant role in enhancing the ecological validity of the experiment’s findings (i.e., 
the extent to which the laboratory results reflect what actually occurs in people’s ordinary 
social environments), which is why the cyranoid method poses substantial potential as a 
means of experimentation. The importance of assessing ecological validity is a reason why 
social researchers often bring an experiment or intervention of some sort out of the laboratory 
and into the “real world” in the form of field experiments or field studies. Apart from the 
field experiment described in the first-person reflection by EC in Chapter 5, all of the 
experiments contained in this thesis made use of the cyranoid method within controlled 
laboratory settings. The cyranoid method has been deployed in small field studies conducted 
by Robb Mitchell and colleagues, such as in art installation and workplace settings (Mitchell, 
2009) and classroom environments (Mitchell, 2010; Raudaskoski & Mitchell, 2013). 
Nonetheless, many facets of the cyranoid method (including the echoborg) remain to be 
investigated outside of the research laboratory. Field research of any kind, however, poses 
many unique ethical challenges, and cyranoid field research bears no exception.  
 
One of the chief concerns with field research is the form of consent participants are able to 
give prior to being studied. As field research is often interested in how people behave in the 
real world, granting informed consent might impact participants’ subsequent behaviors to the 
point of compromising validity. For this reason, according to Reis and Gosling (2010), ethics 
committees are often flexible on the scope of informed consent in field studies, as “consent 
can typically be bypassed in studies that are solely observational and that involve anonymous, 
public behavior” (p. 90); they also describe that when a study involves an intervention (e.g., a 
manipulation of some sort) prior to or in the absence of informed consent, “researchers must 
take more than the usual amount of caution to ensure that participants will not be harmed, 
distressed, annoyed, or embarrassed” (p. 90). Furthermore, Bouchard (1976) suggests that, in 
the field, the effects of independent variables and the variation in these effects are likely to be 
more pronounced than they would be in the laboratory, meaning that it can be more difficult 
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to foresee prior to conducting a field study all the ways in which a stimulus might impact 
participants, including their seeing the administration of a stimulus as unethical.      
 
If participants are aware of their encountering an overt cyranoid in the field, which has been 
the case in past usages of the cyranoid method in participatory interactive research (e.g, 
Raudaskoski & Mitchell, 2013), these ethical challenges are significantly less pronounced as 
participants are fully aware of the nature of the cyranic encounter they find themselves in 
(though precautious should still be made by the researcher to ensure that sources do not abuse 
their control of shadowers or abuse interactants from their position of anonymity). Deploying 
covert cyranoids in the field in such a way that they engage with unsuspecting individuals, on 
the other hand, is an entirely different matter, particularly if these individuals have not 
granted prior consent. It would run counter to the contemporary standards of ethics in social 
psychological research to deploy a covert cyranoid in such a way unless it could be assured to 
a high degree that the cyranic encounters would be more or less innocuous, limited in 
duration, and performed in a social environment in which it was easy for the individual who 
encountered the cyranoid to relocate themselves. As an example, one of the studies that was 
considered for the current thesis was a “barista echoborg” field research scenario in which a 
chat bot programmed to respond to orders for coffee and make small talk was paired with a 
human shadower capable of physically operating café machinery (e.g., an espresso machine). 
This echoborg would be deployed in a public setting (e.g., a university quad) and participant 
reactions to the echoborg would be observed. Such a scenario was considered to be ethically 
acceptable given the likely harmless nature of the cyranic encounters and their limited 
duration.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The overarching aim of this thesis has been to lay the groundwork for future research 
involving the cyranoid method in various domains connected to social psychology. To 
achieve this primary aim, various sub-aims were pursued across the various chapters. In the 
concluding portions of the thesis that follow, each of these aims will be addressed. 
Discussions on limitations and future research areas are provided.   
 
Aim: Present the first comprehensive introduction to the cyranoid method and situate it 
historically 
The first sub-aim of this thesis sought to retrace Milgram’s steps with cyranoids and place the 
method within social psychology’s broader historical context so as to arrive at an explanation 
for the method’s dormancy and posit a way forward for the method as a legitimate 
contemporary approach to experimentation. Archival materials show that Milgram devised 
the cyranoid method in the fall of 1977 in collaboration with graduate students from his mass 
media course at the CUNY Graduate Center in Manhattan (Milgram, 1977b). Initial 
applications of the method involved Milgram and his students exploring various cyranic 
permutations (e.g., a single source, multiple sources, covert and overt cyranoids, and so on) in 
largely exploratory small scale pilots; their fascination with the technique was that it seemed 
a highly innovative way of pairing the mind (or, words) of one or more individuals with the 
body of another (the speech shadower) in a way that created the illusion that the shadower 
was spontaneously speaking their own self-authored thoughts (Milgram, 1977a). This 
approach to generating new research methodologies was typical of Milgram as he often relied 
on the creative and collaborative dynamics of his classroom environment when choosing 
what social psychological phenomena to pursue (Takooshian, 2000).  
 
Shortly after he devised the cyranoid technique, Milgram unsuccessfully applied for a large 
grant from the United States’ National Science Foundation. The grant application failed 
principally due to Milgram’s inability to articulate a clear theoretical focus and the extremely 
unconvincing research designs he proposed, which, among other things, included him 
suggesting that the cyranoid method be used in mock hostage negotiation simulations that 
would be filmed and shown to research participants – a clearly more theatrical than scholarly 
pursuit (Blass, 2004; Milgram, 1979). One of Milgram’s critical errors was his inability to 
sell the method as an interactive methodology that permitted face-to-face encounters between 
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research participants and a person stimulus, a main affordance of the method that 
differentiates it from more static approaches to exploring the relationship between social 
perception and inner vs. outer identity. Despite failing to secure the NHS grant, Milgram 
persisted with the method. He eventually secured a modest $5,000 grant from CUNY to 
pursue cyranoid research from 1983 to 1984, and with this grant conducted his most formal 
cyranic pilots, two of which are detailed in a speech he pre-recorded for an APA conference 
symposium in the summer of 1984 (Milgram, 2010a). In December 1984, several months 
after his APA presentation, Milgram died of a heart attack, and with his death came a period 
of dormancy for the cyranoid method that has to this day persisted within social psychology.  
 
Beyond Milgram’s grant application shortcomings, this thesis has accounted for the 
dormancy of the cyranoid method by considering how Milgram’s style of social 
psychological research fell out of fashion during the very era in which he attempted to market 
the method. Milgram’s research approach stemmed from the situationist perspective he 
adopted from his intellectual forbearers – social psychologists such as Sherif, Asch, and 
Garfinkel (Martin, 2015). His interest was in how the power of social situations shaped 
people’s behavior more so than the influence of internal traits and personality dimensions. 
This interest led Milgram to adopt an experimental style that focused on observing social 
behaviors within installation-like settings, whereby confederates, props, and staging created a 
dynamic situation that the research participant would have to cope with and respond to. 
Cyranoids were emblematic of this approach; age-incongruent cyranoids in particular created 
a situation in which participants had to interact with a stimulus person that radically diverged 
from social norms. By the 1980s, however, this approach to social psychological 
experimentation had become largely eclipsed by a predominantly cognitivist approach to 
experimental social psychology that favored static and generally more reductionist 
experimental methods, privileged internal validity over mundane realism, and took more 
interest in constructing predictive models of human behavior, emotion, and attitude (Adair, 
1991). Moreover, at the time of Milgram’s cyranoid research, social psychologists were 
largely turning away from a dependence on deception of the kind Milgram’s methods were 
often known for. Thus, right as Milgram was attempting to legitimize cyranoids as a research 
tool, his field was undergoing a dramatic paradigm shift, the consequences of which did not 
bode well for Milgram-esque research broadly and the cyranoid method specifically.   
 
This thesis has highlighted a contemporary methodology that is analogous in many ways to 
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the cyranoid method and that can serve as an analogue for modern-era cyranoid research: 
immersive virtual environment technology (IVET). IVET proponents (e.g., Blascovich et al., 
2002) argue that the method offers an opportunity to conduct social psychological 
experiments high in both mundane realism and internal control, given that participants in an 
IVET experiment interact within dynamic social contexts and can have their outer identities 
(i.e., avatars) systematically manipulated. It has been argued that this same logic applies to 
the cyranoid method, only with cyranoids researchers can preserve the ability to have 
research participants encounter real person stimuli as opposed to virtual stimuli. 
 
Aim: Validate the cyranic illusion and explore its robustness 
In each study that investigated the cyranic illusion, participants largely, if not entirely, failed 
to detect that the person they physically encountered (the shadower) was not speaking self-
authored thoughts. In the case of covert echoborgs, however, many participants did suspect 
that their interlocutor was deviating from their normal way of behaving (though, when 
pressed, these participants failed to go so far as to articulate suspicion that their interlocutor 
was being told what to say by a third-party). This of course is largely a consequence of the 
present limitations of chat bots more so than a limitation of the echoborg method in and of 
itself being that conversational agents cannot, at present, fluidly converse in a manner typical 
of mundane human-human dialog. Should a particular conversational agent someday become 
so advanced as to be indistinguishable from a human interlocutor, then there is every reason 
to suspect that interactants who encounter covert echoborgs will succumb to the cyranic 
illusion every bit as fully as those who succumb to the cyranic illusion in contexts involving 
congruent source-shadower cyranoids.  
 
It is not at all surprising that people succumb to the cyranic illusion. After all, most people for 
good reason do not go about their daily lives suspecting that those they encounter are 
receiving words from a remote third party. It would be somewhat facile, therefore, to pursue 
research questions that purely concern under what conditions people are more or less likely to 
notice an interlocutor that is a speech shadower, as there is good reason to suspect that most 
people would fail to notice such a situation even when confronted with a shadower whose 
identity was markedly incongruent from its source. The cyranic illusion does, however, 
predicate much of the utility of the cyranoid method, particularly in circumstances involving 
interactants engaging with a covert cyranoid, for it is the assumption that an interlocutor is 
acting autonomously that enables the method to be useful when researching how the 
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disposition of a source is perceived and interacted with on account of the identity of the 
shadower they are paired with. Therefore, exploring the robustness of the cyranic illusion, 
particularly under extreme conditions (e.g., a covert echoborg), was necessary for the 
purposes of the groundwork laid out in this thesis. 
 
Why do people succumb to the cyranic illusion even when instructed to expect the possibility 
that an interlocutor is not communicating their own words? This question was explored in 
Chapter 3, Study 2. People were confronted with either a text terminal or an echoborg and 
asked to determine over the course of a 10-minute interaction whether or not they believed 
their interlocutor was truly communicating words authored by a chat bot or simply imitating 
one (but speaking self-authored thoughts nonetheless). As opposed to those who engaged 
with a text terminal, those who engaged an echoborg were far more likely to conclude that 
their interlocutor was simply imitating a chat bot. The concept of perceptual salience helps 
account this finding. Perceptual salience suggests that people will deem causal what is most 
salient to them in the absence of other salient explanations (Taylor & Fiske, 1975). People 
confronted with an echoborg (or a cyranoid) see in front of them a human producing speech 
and performing nonverbal behavior that matches that speech, leading them to attribute verbal 
agency to the shadower when this agency in reality rests with a remote source.  
 
Aim: Demonstrate the cyranoid method as a means of conducting human-agent 
interaction research 
This thesis extended the cyranoid method well-beyond the scope Milgram envisioned by 
introducing the echoborg, a special type of cyranoid composed of a human speech shadower 
paired with an artificial conversational agent source. As discussed in Chapter 3, humans have 
throughout history only ever interacted with machine intelligence through 
mechanical/artificial interfaces (e.g., screens, robotic devices, audio response systems, and so 
on). The echoborg enables human-computer interaction through a totally human interface 
whereby interactants engage with machine intelligence under the same social psychological 
conditions that characterize the primordial human interface: human bodies interacting in 
person and face-to-face. As demonstrated in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, with echoborgs 
researchers can explore how the human body, as the delivery mechanism of communication, 
fundamentally alters perception of, and interaction with, machine intelligence. 
 
The echoborg completes what was previously an incomplete matrix of interactant/stimuli-
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types in the field of android science, the interdisciplinary domain that seeks to understand the 
social and cognitive phenomena emergent from human interactions with humanlike 
interlocutors (MacDorman and Ishiguro, 2006b). Prior to the introduction of the echoborg, 
android science involved interactions between humans (mind: human; body: human), 
autonomous androids (mind: machine; body: machine), and tele-operated androids (mind: 
human; body: machine). The echoborg inverts the composition of the tele-operated android, 
achieving an entity composed of a machine mind and a human body (insofar as “mind” is 
operationalized as the component of an entity that produces words and interprets the words of 
others).  
 
The echoborg contribution to android science is important for several reasons. First and 
foremost, there are currently many technological constraints to achieving a complete machine 
imitation of a human being (i.e., creating a human being that can pass a Total Turing Test, as 
defined by Harnad, 1991). Chapter 3 discusses two general categories of constraints: (1) 
those that are born of the difficulty in arriving at conversational agent technology that can 
participate in mixed-initiative casual conversation typical of mundane human-human 
interaction, and (2) those that are born of the difficulty in synthetically recreating the motor 
capacities and physical attributes of the human body. Whereas the tele-operated android 
constitutes a trade-off whereby the former category of constraints is nullified on account of a 
human operator that controls the android’s speech and motor behavior (Nishio, Ishiguro, & 
Hagita, 2007a), the echoborg nullifies the latter category of constraints by involving an actual 
human body rather than an imperfect machine imitation of one. The echoborg, therefore, to 
some degree “leapfrogs” the contemporary inability to create a machine with the appearance 
and motor skills human and provides for an experimental person stimulus that is an 
approximation of the ideal scenario: a machine with a body indistinguishable from that of a 
real human. Another important affordance the echoborg lends to android science is that it 
allows for a unique approach to understanding the “uncanny valley,” the hypothesis first 
suggested by Mori (1970) that motivates much of the empirical work within the field. Until 
now, social psychological experiments that have explored the uncanny valley have focused 
almost exclusively on the appearance of artificial agent and/or the motor behavior the agent. 
The echoborg, however, provides for a perfectly human stimulus in terms of appearance and 
motor behavior, allowing researchers to study whether an uncanny valley emerges in relation 
to the humanlike or non-humanlike interlocution capabilities of an artificial conversational 
agent, and whether the uncanny effects of an artificial agent are moderated by the interface 
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they communicate with (e.g., human body vs. mechanical body). In Chapter 3, Study 3, 
various self-report measures typically associated with uncanny valley research were explored, 
and it was found that interactants who engaged with a covert echoborg felt significantly less 
comfortable speaking to their interlocutor than interactants who engaged the same 
conversational agent but through a text interface, suggesting that an agent that violates the 
expectations typically associated with human-human interlocution can produce uncanny 
effects despite being perfectly humanlike in terms of appearance and motor behavior.  
 
Aim: Show how echoborgs can be used to gauge intersubjective phenomena emergent in 
human-agent interaction 
Whereas Chapter 3 was very much a proof-of-concept concerning the echoborg extension of 
the cyranoid method, Chapter 4 utilized the echoborg to deeply explore the intersubjective 
phenomena emergent in human-agent interaction (namely, efforts toward establishing 
common ground through spoken language). One of the historical drives of android science (as 
well as many other domains within social robotics and intelligent virtual agent development) 
has been the assumption that as an agent’s means of interfacing becomes more humanlike, so 
too will the behaviors and perceptions the agent elicits from its human interactants (Krach et 
al., 2008; MacDorman, 2006). Chapter 4 demonstrated that an important factor modulates the 
effect of the interface: the role of belief. Results showed that an agent-interlocutor that has a 
human body (i.e., a truly human means of interfacing) will not elicit the same degree of 
intersubjective behaviors from an interactant if the interactant knows that their interlocutor’s 
communication is agent-determined (as opposed to human-determined). The echoborg 
method was demonstrated as a unique means of teasing out the influence of belief because it 
is the only method whereby a person can interact face-to-face and in person with a human-
bodied interlocutor and believe they are speaking to an autonomously-communicating person 
yet in reality be engaging the words of a conversational agent. As it turns out, both a human 
interface and the belief that an interlocutor is an autonomously communicating person are 
required in order for an interactant to exert benchmark intersubjective effort, which can be 
operationalized as the extent to which a person attempts to repair misunderstandings as they 
arise with an interlocutor. This finding is important for our understanding of human-agent 
interaction, and may suggest that no matter how humanlike interfaces become, humans will 
only attempt to attain common ground with an agent at human-human benchmark levels if 
they assume the agent is actually a human. This finding also presents an important 
methodological contribution to the ongoing effort to establish means of benchmarking 
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human-agent interaction using frameworks tied to intersubjectivity theory (see Cassell & 
Tartaro, 2007).   
 
This thesis demonstrated that the echoborg, and the cyranoid method more generally, can be 
important tools in human-agent interaction research that explores fundamentally social 
psychological processes such as conversational repair and perspective-taking. The echoborg 
gives researchers the ability to present research participants with person stimuli that elicit a 
stronger reaction than traditional stimuli – which in the domain of human-agent interaction 
are often text interfaces or virtual representations of humans or humanlike characters 
presented on computer screens or within immersive virtual environments. Analogous to the 
echoborg’s relationship with the tele-operated android paradigm, the echoborg is similarly an 
inversion the “Wizard of Oz” technique commonly deployed in virtual agent research 
whereby a research participant is told that an interlocutor is an autonomous agent when in 
reality the agent is being remotely controlled by a human operator (Dahlbäck, Jönsson, & 
Ahrenberg, 1993). By having a human confederate be controlled by an agent, researchers can 
test how the human body as an interface mediates dispositional elements of the agent. 
Furthermore, the echoborg can be used to bypass the need to engineer a virtual interface to be 
paired with a conversational agent; if a developer’s goal is to test how a particular piece of 
conversational software performs when in dialog with a human interactant and desires for the 
interactant to encounter a human body so as to induce the social psychological states 
associated with human-human interaction, the echoborg method eliminates the need to 
develop a virtual agent interface (which is time consuming, expensive, and, and in any case is 
an imperfect approximation of an actual human interface).    
 
In demonstrating the echoborg’s affordances for exploring human-agent intersubjectivity, this 
thesis also contributes to quantitative intersubjectivity methodology by demonstrating how 
dependent variables operationalized via Conversation Analysis techniques (namely, other-
initiations of repair and repairs proper) can be examined within a standard experimental 
framework. Conversation Analysis researchers rarely use quantitative methods such as those 
applied in Chapter 4 (Schegloff, 1993). This thesis, however, showed how multilevel logistic 
regression can be used to determine the likelihood that an utterance articulated by one 
interlocutor within a dyad within an experimental condition will be followed by an other-
initiation of repair, and this likelihood can be compared across experimental conditions so as 
to determine the effect certain experimental manipulations have on the relative incidence of 
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repair initiations. It is hoped that this process of statistically analyzing repair phenomenon 
can provide a model for future research aimed at assessing changes in intersubjectivity 
induced by treatments in social psychological experiments. Furthermore, it is hoped that the 
combining of the echoborg method with statistical operationalizations of intersubjective 
effort (e.g., repair-after-next-turn dynamics) can serve as a template for methodologies that 
aim to benchmark the interactive dynamics between humans and artificial agents (e.g., 
Cassell & Tartaro, 2007).  
 
Aim: Argue that the cyranoid method can be used as a first-person means of conducting 
social psychological research 
A formal revisiting of the cyranoid method would be incomplete without exploring the 
experiences of the individuals who actually compose a cyranoid or echoborg: the source and 
shadower. One could design an experimental study wherein research participants were 
randomly assigned to these roles and evaluated much like any other experimental protocol. 
However, in the spirit of Milgram’s penchant for first-person, experiential research (e.g., 
Milgram, 2010c, 2010d), and given the unique affordances of the method for enabling people 
to experience social interactions given a radically altered outer or inner identity, the approach 
settled on in this thesis was to advocate for the cyranoid method as a means of researcher-as-
subject self-experimentation. First-person, researcher-as-subject research has largely been 
resigned to social science domains adjacent to, but not necessarily located within, 
experimental social psychology (see Danziger, 1990). As discussed herein, this relegation has 
occurred for largely historical reasons that stem both from a mid-20th century institutional 
convergence on an interest in the distribution of psychological phenomena manifest in 
populations (as opposed to the fundamental nature of subjective experience) as well as long-
held disciplinary anxieties about the status of social psychology’s methods relative to those of 
other scientific domains (Danziger, 1990; Farr, 1978, 1983). Though these anxieties are in 
many respects well-founded, the possibility of first-person experimental methods becomes 
less taboo when the traditionally narrow goals of experimentation are augmented so as to 
incorporate aims beyond merely ascertaining the averages and variances of dependent 
measures. As argued herein, gaining subjective knowledge of a particular social phenomenon 
(e.g., stereotyping on the basis of outer identity) can be a legitimate goal of experimentation 
in and of itself in a manner that does not conflict with knowledge claims made via traditional 
third-person experimentation.  
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This thesis suggested three potential benefits for researcher-as-subject research that makes 
use of the cyranoid method: (1) access to “social qualia” (i.e., the subjective experience 
associated with particular social phenomena, such as stereotyping), (2) an improved ability to 
build mental models corresponding to social phenomena, and (3) an enhanced ability to be 
reflexive about social experiments and the role of identity in shaping the experience of an 
experiment. The journal article developed for Chapter 5 was written in a spirit of hoping to 
initiate what could someday be a larger discussion about these and other potential benefits of 
researcher-as-subject approaches to experimental social psychology, and the cyranoid method 
was offered as merely one of many possible means of conducting such research. The 
cyranoid method’s particular strengths as a technique for conducting first-person 
experimentation connects with Green’s (1983) discussion of the method as a technique for 
enhancing self-knowledge through physically transforming the material outer presentation of 
the self. Popper discussed this in philosophical terms when he argued that self-observation in 
contexts of transformed material manifestations of the self can lead to enhanced self-
knowledge (Popper & Eccles, 1977).  
 
Though Chapter 5 merely offers self-reflections from social psychologists who have 
participated as either a source or a shadower in cyranoid studies as evidence, there are 
certainly other forms of data collection and data presentation suited for first-person, research-
as-subject experiments. Digital first-person ethnographic technologies, such as subcams 
(Lahlou, 2011), quantified-self devices (see Lee, 2013), and wearable still-image cameras 
(e.g., the Microsoft SenseCam; see Doherty et al., 2011) can be incorporated into future 
research-as-subject social psychological self-experimentation to give the researcher a broader 
means systematizing their observations. 
 
Aim: Overview the ethics issues involved with cyranoid research and outline suggestions 
for avoiding ethics pitfalls 
The final sub-aim of this thesis involved putting forth an initial ethics framework for the 
cyranoid method. The main ethical point of concern with regard to the use of covert 
cyranoids (or echoborgs) is that deception is required in order to preserve the interactant’s 
belief that they are encountering an autonomously communicating person. Milgram only very 
briefly grappled with the potential problems associated with this type of deception (see 
Milgram, n. d.) and did not systematically detail participants’ thoughts on its use (though it is 
fair to say that given the innocuous nature of Milgram’s cyranoid pilots, it is unlikely that he 
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encountered any participants who felt negatively toward having been deceived). It is 
important to keep in mind that many interactive social psychological experiments involve 
deception of some kind, particularly those that involve some form of mediated interpersonal 
communication. The Wizard of Oz technique common to many human-agent interaction 
studies, as mentioned before, involves leading a research participant to believe they are 
encountering an artificial agent when in reality the agent is controlled to a certain degree by 
the researcher or some other party to the experiment. The particular concern with covert 
cyranoids, however, is that the presence of another physical human (the shadower) in the 
room as a person stimulus can evoke much stronger and more visceral reactions to the 
experimental scenario than more technologically mediated, static, or distal person stimuli. As 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, Study 3, for example, interactants feel far less comfortable 
interacting with a covert echoborg than they do interacting with a covert text bot, even when 
the particular conversational agent generating the words received by the interactant is the 
same in both contexts.    
 
One can easily imagine situations where research participants would feel regret at having said 
certain things or acted in certain ways toward a shadower upon learning of the identity of the 
source during debriefing. For example, it would be fairly straightforward to design a cyranoid 
study aimed at gauging certain forms of prejudice wherein interactants felt comfortable 
revealing hostile attitudes toward a particular demographic of people given the identity of the 
shadower they were asked to converse with. Participants should not feel any undue 
embarrassment at having been deceived or leave the research laboratory feeling as though 
they were tricked into displaying regrettable behavior. Therefore, it is vital to always proceed 
with caution when designing experimental scenarios involving covert cyranoids.  
 
Chapter 6 outlines a series of suggestions for proceeding with deception in a cyranoid study. 
These include (1) determining the extent to which deception is even necessary for a given 
cyranoid experiment, (2) avoiding constructing scenarios likely to elicit regrettable 
participant behavior, (3) carefully picking sources and instructing them on how not to behave 
when paired with a shadower, (4) documenting participant reactions to deception during 
debriefing (e.g., Table 6.1), (5) giving participants who were subject to deception the 
opportunity to function as a shadower or source so as to enhance their participation in the 
research, and (6) avoiding field studies that unfairly take advantage of unsuspecting 
participants. Adopting each of these protocols when conducting cyranoid research will help 
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ensure positive participant experiences and help to maintain the method’s reputation among 
the wider community of experimental social psychologists.     
 
Limitations of the current work 
1. Sample Sizes. Sample sizes for the various experiments conducted for this thesis were 
small. There exists the possibility, therefore, that some of the non-significant findings are 
Type II errors: failures to detect the effects of a manipulation when effects were actually 
present. Calculating the statistically appropriate sample size for an experiment is directly tied 
to the effect size one hypothesizes finding for a given manipulation as well as anticipating the 
standard deviation of dependent measures (Field, 2009). Since the experiments described in 
this thesis were largely exploratory, no assumptions regarding effect sizes or dependent 
measure variance were taken into consideration prior to designing and running the 
experiments, and the sample sizes that were achieved were deemed sufficient. On one hand, 
however, it is quite common for studies that introduce a novel methodology, particularly 
within fields that touch upon human-agent interaction, to offer proof-of-concept experiments 
with modest sample sizes not unlike those described in this thesis (e.g., Brinkman, Broekens, 
& Heylen, 2015).  
 
Several reasons account for the sample sizes used in this thesis. Firstly, small samples were a 
result of resource limitations and other practical constraints that go hand-in-hand with doing 
research at a graduate student level (e.g., laboratory access, participant compensation, and so 
on). Second, obtaining large samples for studies of the kind presented in this thesis is made 
difficult by the fact that cyranic interactions require the time and effort of speech shadowing 
confederates who must first take time to master speech shadowing and then learn to perform 
in accordance with their role in a consistent manner that maintains the integrity of the 
experimental interactions and establishes uniformity across trials. Thirdly, experiments such 
as those performed for this thesis require one-on-one interactions followed by extensive 
debrief interviews conducted by the researcher, which negates the possibility of running 
parallel trials or conducting experiments remotely (e.g., by Amazon Mechanical Turk). If the 
cyranoid method goes on to be adopted by researchers in other laboratories, it is hoped that 
efficiencies are found that might enable more streamlined interactions and larger samples 
without sacrifices to the richness of the interactions as experienced by participants.  
 
2. Technological constraints. Technological constraints placed various limitations on the 
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cyranic interactions explored in this thesis. In the case of cyranoids featuring human sources 
(e.g., those explored in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5), sources were limited to receiving audio and 
video stimuli of the interactant through a computer monitor from their remote location and 
therefore did not literally experience “fully being” the mind of the shadower (in terms of 
receiving the full range of stimuli that accompany in person social interaction). This thesis 
did not explore whether and to what extent this affected how sources communicated. 
Interestingly, however, there are computer scientists who are developing technologies that 
allow a remote person to more fully experience the fuller range of sensory information 
present to a remote person (discussed below in the section “Going forward: Future research 
areas”), and these technologies might allow sources more complete immersion into the 
worlds of their shadowers. Similarly, the agent-sources within the echoborgs explored in this 
thesis were constricted to receiving textual input by-way-of the minimal technological 
dependency format of human-echoborg interaction. It is highly plausible that had these agents 
had access to more forms of social input (e.g., the ability to read facial cues and other body 
language), the social performance of the echoborgs (as perceived by interactants) would have 
been less abnormal and more contextually fine-tuned. There presently exists an array of 
sensory technologies for artificial agents that can read and interpret visual and audio data 
(e.g., the facial expressions of a human interlocutor; see Gruebler, Berenz, & Suzuki, 2011), 
and these technologies have been demonstrated with devices such as the fully autonomous 
androids discussed in Chapter 3. It is not unrealistic to imagine these sensory technologies 
being incorporated into future iterations of the echoborg method, but testing such 
contraptions fell outside the purview of this thesis.  
 
What this particular category of limitations points toward is the notion of “presence” 
(Cummings & Bailenson, 2015), a construct that encompasses the sense of “being there” 
offered by a particular form of technologically mediated communication. The sense of 
presence experienced by interactants who encounter a cyranoid or echoborg is arguably quite 
high given that interactants encounter a fleshy human body in person. The sources (human 
and agent) in this thesis, on the other hand, did not experience this same degree of presence 
given the devices through which they remotely communicated.  
 
3. Replication issues. Experimental social psychology is presently in somewhat of a crisis as 
many high-profile studies, particularly those that involve priming as a means of 
implementing a social stimulus, have failed to be replicated (see Open Science Collaboration, 
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2015). This has reinvigorated the longstanding debate about certain structural problems 
facing the discipline, such as the drastic publication bias in favor of non-null findings, that 
while not unique to the discipline, are certainly more pronounced in social psychology 
relative to other fields within academia (Yong 2012a, 2012b). It is worth, then, discussing the 
replicability of the studies detailed in this thesis as well as replication challenges inherent in 
the cyranoid method.   
 
Though the designs and general parameters of the experiments conducted for this thesis can 
certainly be replicated by other researchers, each cyranoid is a unique stimulus that cannot 
always be redeployed in future research. Cyranoids have as their component parts actual 
human beings (sources and shadowers), and though general features of each source and 
shadower can be found in other people who volunteer as cyranoids in other research 
laboratories (e.g., gender, age, race, appearance, and so on), certain physical and dispositional 
idiosyncrasies of any one source or shadower can never be exactly imitated by another 
person. The overall personas of the cyranoids and echoborgs featured in this thesis, therefore, 
can probably never again be exactly replicated elsewhere. On the other hand, it is arguable 
that conversational agent sources encompass a highly replicable stimulus as they are 
guaranteed to perform in a consistent and unbiased manner in all potential research iterations 
insofar as no changes are made to their source code or to the corpus of data from which they 
formulate responses.   
 
Each of the experiments described in this thesis featured non-scripted encounters (i.e., 
participants were not given any instruction to speak in a certain way or within certain 
parameters). Many of the experiments, in fact, were designed to invoke the mundane 
characteristics of in person encounters between strangers wherein neither party is given any 
information about what to expect from the other. Interactants were encouraged to speak about 
whatever they wanted. This style of experimental interaction is slightly atypical from what 
one tends to see in social psychological research, wherein to assist replicability (among other 
things) participants are usually given a task to perform (e.g., a competitive game or 
collaborative activity) that is constrained by scripts, rules, and roles delved out to each 
interlocutor. The point of exploring unscripted encounters was to see how conversations 
between interactants and cyranoids/echoborgs would naturally evolve and, importantly, to 
reduce interactants' sense that the interactions might be scripted. The designs of these 
experiments therefore constituted a tradeoff between high realism and high replicability, 
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favoring high realism.  
 
4. Control problems. Cyranoid experiments of the kind described in this thesis are 
inherently challenging to control and thereby completely de-confound. As argued at length in 
Chapter 2, one of the more important elements that can be controlled is the independent 
manipulation of the source and shadower, which allows one to study how the same body is 
perceived when given various minds (i.e., sources), and how the same source is perceived 
when paired with different bodies (i.e., shadowers). What are more difficult to control, 
however, are various idiosyncrasies that arise from trial to trial, especially in unscripted 
interaction scenarios. It is important to not think of the shadower as an entity being entirely 
controlled by a source; a shadower is not a puppet. Shadowers experience reflexive, 
embodied reactions to cyranic interaction situations (e.g., blushing, urges to laugh, and so on) 
that can be anticipated but never fully suppressed. The full range of social cues exhibited by 
the shadower, therefore, can only be made consistent from trial to trial to a certain extent. To 
account for this, the experiments in this thesis involved extensive piloting and rehearsal such 
that shadowers could familiarize themselves with the spontaneous sensations that arise while 
covertly shadowing and develop a means of making their body language fit the social 
situation to as normal-a-degree as possible.  
 
The various amalgamations of gadgetry used to create the cyranoids and echoborgs described 
in this thesis brought with them certain control challenges that in some cases amplified those 
inherent to speech shadowing. For example, the audio-relay delays seen with the echoborg 
studies compounded the shadower body language consistency issues. When one is covertly 
shadowing for a conversational agent that is by its very nature deviant in terms of 
conversational capacity, it is quite difficult to maintain a consistent bodily demeanor during 
awkward and unnatural silences. This issue no doubt affected interactants’ perceptions, as 
many of them commented on their interlocutor's unnatural delays in speech, so it remains to 
be seen how perception of a conversational agent given a human body to speak through is 
perceived when turn-taking latencies are normalized. Another confound brought about by the 
gadgetry used in this thesis involves the radio relay apparatus via which sources spoke to 
their shadowers. At times the radio signal became weak, leading to shadowing hesitancies 
and in some cases mild inaccuracies. Best attempts were made to optimize audio clarity for 
the shadower, but at random times audio clarity became poor and whatever affect this had on 
interactants' perceptions of the cyranoid/echoborg went unaccounted for.  
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Going forward: Ideas for future research 
Improving immersion and presence. One thought for how to augment the sense of presence 
experienced by the source within a cyranoid would be to make use of immersive audio/visual 
technology such as the Oculus Rift or similar IVET hardware. Primarily designed for virtual 
reality, these systems grant users a 3D experience while blocking out audio/visual stimuli 
from the wearer’s surrounding environment. One could imagine equipping a source with such 
a device in order to accomplish fuller immersion into the experience of the shadower. In their 
meta-analytic review of the effectiveness of various features of immersive technology on 
enhancing presence, Cummings and Bailenson (2015) discuss the importance of three 
features in particular: (1) stereoscopic visuals (i.e., the user of an immersive device should 
encounter visuals that recreate the depth and three-dimensionality of real world experience), 
(2) wide fields-of-view (i.e., the user of an immersive device should be able to experience a 
wide field-of-vision much like what they experience in the real world), and (3) high degrees 
of user-tracking (i.e., the amount of behaviors that are tracked by the immersive technology, 
which is not so important when in comes to the cyranoid method given the fact that sources 
will be looking at high-quality videos of an interactant rather than the virtual representation 
of an interactant). The way forward for cyranoid research, therefore, may be to involve 
immersive technology capable of stereoscopic visuals and a wide fields-of-view. 
 
Another way forward for increasing the presence felt by sources involves the use of haptic 
devices that allow the source to experience tactile sensations felt by the shadower. There are 
many proof-of-concept and early design demonstrations of haptic devices being incorporated 
into robotic social tele-presence systems, such as gloves that allow a source (i.e., a tele-
operator) to sense the hand sensations felt by a remote robotic device (e.g., Nakanishi, 
Tanaka, & Wada, 2014). It is conceivable that such technologies could further bring the 
source into the sensory world of the shadower. In future iterations of the cyranoid method, it 
would be well worth incorporating haptic devices into cyranic contraptions, though it is most 
likely that in such situations it would be difficult to construct a covert cyranoid encounter as 
the shadower would have to wear sensory devices on their body that linked with the haptic 
devices felt by the source.  
 
Varying the degree of shadower agency and the “partial echoborg.” In the experiments 
conducted for this thesis, as well as those carried out by Milgram, shadowers were instructed 
to not interject with any of their own thoughts while communicating with interactants. What 
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has yet to be studied, however, are scenarios in which shadowers speak to interactants more 
or less freely with their own thoughts yet can defer to a source (or sources) in particular 
instances. Milgram alluded to this possibility in his grant applications yet never produced 
such a study. This concept is intriguing because it introduces a shadower’s true 
conversational disposition to a cyranic interaction and supplements it with the disposition of 
one or potentially many other dispositions.  
 
A particularly intriguing permutation of this idea is the “partial echoborg”: a person paired 
with an agent to whom they could defer as a source when necessary. Imagine going about life 
paired with advanced machine intelligence that verbally feeds you information relevant to 
your social context that you could then utter as if the information had originated within your 
own mind. A sufficiently advanced form of machine intelligence would be able to scan the 
Internet and information databases in real-time, granting you the ability to answer practically 
any answerable question posed to you. Armed with little more than a discreet earpiece, you, 
as a partial echoborg, could achieve superhuman levels of information recall (imagine, for 
instance, the agent to whom you were paired was a personalized version of IBM’s Watson 
program). The echoborg studies described in the current thesis could serve as the basis for 
future proof-of-concept research into this idea using artificial agent technologies that are 
currently available.   
 
Far from being merely the stuff of science fiction, the partial echoborg concept can 
potentially see early fruition as a means of enhancing the livelihood and sociability of people 
with certain cognitive impairments, such as dementia. People who suffer from cognitive 
decline generally have difficulties with information recall and remembering the intermediary 
steps involved in completing rudimentary tasks. There currently exists a class of artificial 
agents and other technologies known as “cognitive prosthetics” that are designed to interface 
with individuals suffering from cognitive decline such that they can better overcome impaired 
recall and achieve better routine functionality (for a review of such technologies, see 
Gillespie, Best, & O’Neil, 2012). O’Neill and Gillespie (2008) argue that many of these 
cognitive prosthetics rely on visual interfaces that are not intuitive to a person suffering from 
cognitive decline and that such technologies often further complicate or disorient the person 
in need of assistance. The authors suggest that auditory interfaces are preferable to visual 
interfaces and give examples of auditory assistive technologies that have been shown to help 
scaffold users’ functioning. The current iterations of these auditory interfaces act as 
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interlocutors – systems that, by asking questions and scaffolding conversation, guide a user 
toward a certain objective (e.g., preparing a meal).  The echoborg variant of this scenario 
would be to develop inner-ear auditory cognitive prostheses that act as first-person systems 
(i.e., rather than function as a user’s interlocutor, such systems would actually prompt a user 
with what they could or should say in a particular situation, such as recalling the name of 
their doctor or an address). 
 
The cyranoid method as a means of augmenting cognitive capacity contributes to the domain 
of social science and technology research known as “transhumanism,” in part a cultural and 
intellectual movement that advocates radically altering human cognitive and physical 
capacities through merging with technology so as to enhance humanity’s ability to operate in 
the current world as well as ensure the long-term survival of the species (see Bostrom, 2005). 
In this sense, echoborg research can serve as a window into a potentially not-too-distant 
future wherein wearable devices that assist with, among other things, first-person information 
recall are ubiquitous and necessary for mundane social interaction. And because the cyranoid 
method preserves the human interface (i.e., the technology that enables a cyranic interaction 
is hidden from the view of interactants), the echoborg concept as a route to transhuman 
cognitive capacity might do better in being adopted by people in need or want of enhanced 
cognitive capacity than other types of technological augmentation that are more overt.  
 
Multiple sources? Multiple shadowers? Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 alluded to possible 
variants of the basic tripartite structure of cyranic interactions. These include situations 
wherein multiple sources shadow for a single shadower (a context explored by Milgram and 
his research assistants in their early piloting of the method) as well as situations wherein a 
single source provides words and directives to multiple shadowers. The former of these 
scenarios is interesting because one could imagine performing a research study that involved 
assessing to what extent interactants perceive a stable disposition in an interlocutor who is in 
reality covertly shadowing simultaneously or successively for varied sources. The later 
scenario seems a candidate for a breeching experiment wherein an interactant would confront 
multiple individuals performing as covert shadowers and have the experience of talking to 
one person (a single source) simultaneously through different people. Though such scenarios 
are arguably more theatrical in nature than useful social psychologically, they can potentially 
be incorporated into activities that do produce some sort of positive psychological effect (e.g., 
as classroom activities for schoolchildren).   
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“Cyrafour” and other concept studies in interaction design. As part of their ongoing work 
in piloting creative forms of technology-mediated interaction, Encinas and Mitchell (2015) 
have explored a novel cyranic scenario that they call “cyrafour.” The concept involves speech 
shadowers duplicating the speech of two remote interlocutors in dialog with one another. 
With cyrafour, witnesses observe two individuals speaking to each other face-to-face when in 
reality these two individuals are merely shadowing an identical conversation being had by 
unseen sources. The authors suggest that such an activity can serve as a role-switching 
exercise. Though perhaps more of a dramatic activity than a scholarly one, cyrafour is an 
example of the cyranoid method inspiring permutations in experiential, first-person forms of 
research.   
 
Indeed, the multidisciplinary field of interaction design is where the cyranoid method can see 
wide future application. Interaction design brings together psychologists, computer scientists, 
engineers, software developers, and other scholars who aim to develop new means of 
socializing with and through technology. Interaction design is more interested in exploring 
ways of human-human and human-computer interaction that are possible even if not always 
practical or economically viable (Cooper, Reimann, & Cronin, 2007). The agenda of many 
researchers within the field of interaction design is to provide proof-of-concept 
manifestations of novel interaction methods such that they may inspire real-world 
applications or, at the very least, reveal something interesting about human behavior and/or 
human social interaction. The cyranoid method, therefore, is a natural fit within the world of 
interaction design, and the variations of the method that have been covered in this thesis are 
merely a few of the potentially vast number of design permutations the method can take 
within the discipline. The echoborg in particular holds vast potential within interaction design 
given that at its core the discipline seeks to build new forms of human-technology interaction.   
 
Final Remarks 
Milgram’s investigatory style was fundamentally a first-principles approach to studying 
human sociality. He started every research endeavor by simply asking what it is we really 
know about a type of human behavior and how can we build methods from the ground up that 
help us to more fully understand the function of that behavior in a particular social context. 
Milgram sought to explore, even if only dramaturgically, the bedrock social psychological 
phenomena that govern how we operate with one another (Blass, 2004). His cyranoid method 
was derivative of such an approach, as have been the variants of it explored in this thesis. So 
210
what do we know? We know that we reflexively attribute verbal autonomy to people we 
encounter. We know that we tend to ascribe authorship of the words we notice other people 
speaking to the brains inside those people’s heads. And we know that characteristics of the 
body – the interface – largely determine how we perceive and orient to these words. The 
cyranoid method provides us with both a technique with which to more fully understand these 
tendencies as well as a metaphor that encapsulates something else social psychologists have 
come to intuitively know, that all of us, much of the time, articulate the ideas of other people 
(see Bakhtin, 2010; Maybin, 2001). People we talk to, people whose work we read or witness 
on television or online, people who are in positions of authority relative to us… all people 
who, for the most part, are themselves speaking ideas that originated elsewhere. This isn’t to 
say that humans are incapable of articulating original thoughts, as we most certainly do, but 
only that behind so much of what we say and what we notice other people say is a hidden 
genealogy that we are largely unaware of yet which connects us in a fundamental way to our 
fellow human beings both past and present. We become who we are, both in terms of how we 
see ourselves and how we are seen by others, through a cyranic process wherein we 
continually channel the ideas and opinions of myriad sources who themselves are or were the 
result of a cyranic process. Whenever we rearticulate an idea we heard from someone or 
somewhere else, our bodies are in that moment merely the most recent interface through 
which that idea makes contact with the social world. This is a truly bizarre situation.  
 
It is fair to say that even conversational agents, such as those used in this thesis’s echoborg 
experiments, are in some sense cyranoids, as the content of what they articulate and the rules 
that govern what they articulate are determined by software engineers and the humans with 
whom they interact. The social behaviors of androids, robots, chat bots, and other forms of 
artificial intelligence are governed by code whose origins lay external to these systems in the 
minds of human beings. They are hostage to this code in the same way Milgram imagined 
people are when in the midst of overwhelming authority – they exist in a perpetual agentic 
state. So the fact that we see these technologies as somehow different from us is revelatory of 
a “hardware bias” that we seem to suffer from. We tend to make distinctions about people 
and things based on how they appear to us to be rather than see the causal chain pulling the 
strings that exists behind the interface. So insofar as chat bots, robots, androids, and other 
social machines are merely interfaces for human-derived communication in the same way 
that we are, these technologies are in some sense human. The covert echoborg studies show 
that it is probable that once machine intelligence hardware is sufficiently advanced so as to 
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allow for interactions with us on a level playing field (i.e., when their interfaces elicit the 
same social psychological expectations of human-human interaction), the category we know 
as “human” will forever be altered.  
 
For all his shortcomings, Milgram had great intuitions as to how to illuminate these 
fascinating concepts. His entire body of work, from the obedience studies through to his 
cyranoid pilots, attests to a curiosity in those social processes that are forever present yet not 
always immediately obvious. Novel methods, now matter how peculiar, were how he pulled 
back the curtain on these processes, and the cyranoid method is perhaps Milgram’s most 
peculiar invention. So peculiar that those outside his small circle dismissed the idea during 
his lifetime, and so peculiar that it for the better part of three decades was nothing more than 
an easily forgotten footnote in the history of social psychology. But in Milgram’s own words, 
“certain research methods are useful for the very reason that they alter the ordinary manner in 
which things work; by doing so they force us into a more rigorous examination of the 
processes of normal functioning” (Milgram, 1979, p. 1). Here at the culmination of this 
thesis, which started as a simple attempt to replicate Milgram’s cyranoid idea and morphed 
into a new frontier of human-agent interaction and first-person research, this statement of 
Milgram’s, above all else, has proven true. The cyranoid method gives us a fascinating 
window into how the body, or interface, becomes a prism through which words become 
refracted. It provides us with a means of stepping into the shoes of other individuals so as to 
experience to some degree the world that they live in and in doing so become more self-
aware. It gives us a way of interacting through a truly human interface with technology. The 
method really does give us a means of digging more deeply into those social psychological 
phenomena that are not just interesting from a scientific or academic perspective, but that 
reverberate with the experiences and imaginations of ordinary people.  
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APPENDECIES | D: Example Transcripts from Chapter 2 
 
Study 2: Adult source, child shadower (trial 1) 
C: Cyranoid 
I1: Female (American accent) - middle 
I2: Female (American accent) - far left side.  
I3: Female (American accent) - middle 
I4: Female (Foreign accent) - middle 
I5: Male - right 
 
<Begin Transcript> 
 
Panel: <Laughs> 
 
I1: Hi! How are you doing? 
 
C: I'm doing well. 
 
I1: Great! we have some questions for you. 
 
Panel: <Laughs> 
 
I1: What's your favorite book that you've ever read? 
 
C: Um, my favorite book, um, are plays included? 
 
I1: Sure. 
 
C: Ya. Cause then I would say King Lear. 
 
I1: Ya, what do you like about it? 
 
C: I like, um, the diversity characters. Ya. 
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 I1: Who is your favorite character? 
 
C: Um, King Lear.  
 
I1: Ya? 
 
C: Ya. 
 
I1: Awesome. 
 
I2: Do you often prefer plays to books?  
 
C: No, um I like some books as well. I like, um, Dostovesky.  
 
I2: Okay, what is your favorite Dostovesky novel? 
 
C: Um, "The Idiot". 
 
I2: Okay, why? 
 
C: Because, um, it's a book about someone who is, um, like Jesus. And, in the modern world 
he comes across as and idiot because he's too nice. Ya.  
 
I3: What about poetry? Do you read any of that? 
 
C: I don't really read that much poetry. 
 
I3: Do you, why? 
 
C: Um, I'm not sure, but there's a lot to read. I can't read everything, so <Laughs> 
 
I4: And when you read something like Dostovesky are you interested in, like, the historical 
background such, cause I know, like, his life history, about Russia and about like what was 
261
going on at the time... Are you intersted in knowing more about that? 
 
C: Um, it's very interesting to see Russia before the revolution, so the historical context,  
but I mean, interesting with Dostovesky, um, from a psychological aspect, ya. 
 
I1: So if you could conduct a science experiment on anything you wanted, what would it be? 
 
C: Um, do I have to obey the laws of physics? 
 
I1: <Laughs> I'll say yes. 
 
C: Okay, um, do I have an unlimited budget? Or, ya? Then I would like to test the speed of  
light. 
 
I1: <Laughs> How would you do it? 
 
C: I would um, use my unlimited budget to build a rocket which went very fast and I would 
put a clock on it. And, I would have it go around the world, ya, then maybe build another 
rocket which went in the other direction with another clock on it, and I would, um, use my 
unlimited budget to make it go very very fast. Then I would see if the clocks were the same. 
 
I4: And you would like, do some calculus, or would <inaudible>? 
 
C: Well, I would see, if they were atomic clocks then they should be identical. But according  
to the theory of relativity, they shouldn't be. 
 
I2: So do you ever read the newspaper or watch the news? 
 
C: I don't have a television.  
 
I2: Okay <laughs> 
 
C: But I do read a lot of newspapers. 
 
262
I2: Okay. 
 
C: I do read blogs. 
 
I2: Okay. So are there any current events that you've read about on your blogs lately? 
 
C: Um, I was interested in reading, there was a 3D printer which was, um, printing, um guns. 
Ya. So then now there is, um, someone uploaded, um, the diagram with schematics for  
printing a gun using a 3D printer. So.. 
 
I2: And what do you think about that? Is that a good thing is that a bad thing? 
 
C: I think, it's probably a good thing. 
 
I2: Why? 
 
C: Because, um, knowledge is power. And people will print more than guns. So, they will  
print utensils, they will print jewlery, they will print, um, tables and chairs. They will print,  
um beautiful things. Not just guns.  
 
I3: Nice. 
 
I5: Um, do you follow politics? 
 
C: A little bit.  
 
I4: Do you know, for instance, um, the main political parties? What's going on, and stuff 
like that? 
 
C: In what country? 
 
I4: England. 
 
C: So there's the Torries, Labour, and the Liberal Democrats, I think? Ya.. <laughs> I think  
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so. 
 
Panel: <Laughs> 
 
C: There's also the Green Party. 
 
I4: And what would be, if you had to name a very important, um, historical event for you, 
that has marked you, what would you say? 
 
C: Um, historical event... 
 
I4: I mean, it can be very recent, or... 
 
C: Um, do you mean marked me personally or marked history? 
 
I4: You personally, like, what do you think was very interesting, or... 
 
C: I find World War II very interesting. 
 
I4: Ya? Why? 
 
C: Because, um, a lot of clever people were very stupid.  
 
I2: What did you find the most stupid about World War II? 
 
C: Um, the way in which we created a situation which we couldn't escape.  
 
I2: Are you referring to, like, appeasement, or what are you referring to? 
 
C: I'm referring to, um, that, I guess the, um the appeasement is part of it, because that 
created a situations for the Russians, er, for the Germans I mean, and they felt they  
had to, erm, um... they wanted to get some sort of counterbalance, ya. So, like, Hitler was 
an answer to the appeasement of World War I. And, that was our mistake, for creating a 
situation in which Hitler was logical. But equally, um, the Nazi Party created a situation  
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for the United Kingdom and America in which war was inevitable. 
 
I3: So you think World War II was inevitable? 
 
C: I think we created a situation which made it inevitable. It was inevitable because it was 
our situation. We could have created a different situation, ya. 
 
I2: So do you prefer international political or domestic politics? 
 
C: International. 
 
I2: Why? 
 
C: Because it is, um, more significant. Ya.  
 
I2: Are you interested in the work of any international organisations, such as the United 
Nations? Or are you interested in any countries foreign policies? 
 
C: At the moment I'm interested in North Korea's foreign policy, ya.  
 
I2: How do you think that situation is going? Or do you think it's going to stay fairly stable? 
 
C: Um, it depends. I think, again, like, linking back to the World War II discussion, we are, 
um, possibly creating a situation in which North Korea will do something stupid. 
 
I3: But do you think that there is any credibility to their threats? 
 
C: They do have nuclear weapons. So I wouldn't stand up publicly and say they had no 
credibility. 
 
I3: Mmhmm.. 
 
C: Because that might make them use their weapons. 
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Pane: <Laughs> 
 
I1: What other things do you think might deter North Korea from using nuclear weapons 
against other countries? 
 
C: Um, I'm not sure. That's a difficult, that's a difficult question. There's a lot of people who 
are trying to work that out at the moment, so. So maybe being nice to them.  
 
Panel: <Laughs> 
 
I3: Isn't that appeasement? Isn't that what you said created the situation in World War II? 
 
C: Ya. If I knew the answers to these questions I'd be a politician. 
 
Panel: <Laughs> 
 
I3: A very dumb politician. 
 
Panel: <Laughs> 
 
C: It's important to recognize the limits of knowledge. Ya.  
 
I1: So which country outside of England do you know the most about as far as politics? 
 
C: Everybody's subjected to American politics. So... 
 
I1: And what do you think about politics in America? 
 
C: Um, I think it is very, um, influenced by business.  
 
I1: Why is that? Why does business have a big influence there? 
 
C: I read a blog recently which said there were 50, um, lobyists for every senator.  
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I4: And when you say that the history and politics that you're more aware of is America, 
would you say that it's also relating to the American path and American culture? Do you read 
for instance, American literature? Things like that? Are you interested in things like that as 
well? 
 
C: Well, um, we get exposed to a lot of American politics because of it's in English. And we 
don't get Russian politics in the same way. I'd like to know about Chinese politics, but I don't 
speak Chinese.  
 
Panel: <Laughs>. 
 
I4: Of course. But I mean, like, do you also <inaudible>, like, do you read American 
literature, do you see American movies, or other stuff? 
 
C: I read um, a biography of JFK. Um, ya.  
 
I4: And, in terms of literature, you prefer English ones or have a preference for classics, I 
don't know....? 
 
C: I wouldn't make a preferance based on nationality. 
 
I4: So what is your criteria to read a book? 
 
C: Fictrion or non-ficiton? For ficiton, I like, um, I like diversity of characters. So, um, I'm 
influenced by Bhaktin. Um, ya. That's why I like Dostovesky. 
 
I2: Do you think literature has a role to play in how we think about history or how we think 
about current political events? 
 
C: I do. But I think it has a more important role in making us think about the future. Like, 
literature is about alternative possibility. Ya. 
 
I2: Now, you were obviously reading the English translation of Dostovesky, but would you 
ever hope to at some point to be able to pick up a language and read the sort of classical  
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literature in that language.  
 
C: Um, I'm hopeful for Google Translate <laughs>. Um, I think in the future, um languages 
won't exist as we know them. I think we will get real-time translation and it will be very 
good. So, I wouldn't put a lot of time into learning Russian.  
 
I4: You don't think that reading in the proper language brings something additional? 
 
C: I'm sure it does, but if was to learn it... Russian... that would take a lot of time. And there's 
lots think that I couldn't read because I'd be learning Russian, so... 
 
I2: So in this hyopthetical world where you have real-time translations of all languages, how 
do you think that would affect, I don't know, diplomacy, or, politics, or the way we do 
finance? 
 
C: I think communication is good. So, um, the, um, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the White 
House and the Kremlin set up the Red Phone here that prevented future um, sort of 
misunderstandings. So I believe in communication. I believe in translation. 
 
I4: What do you think have been the most amazing inventions for the next years? 
 
C: Future inventions? 
 
I4: Ya. 
 
C: Ya. Um, if i knew them I'd be a great inventor, so <laughs>. 
 
I4: Ya, but I mean, what are you hopes, or what would you like to invent if you had to? 
 
C: What would I like to invent...That's a good quetsion. Um, I'd like to invent a cheap source 
of energy. 
 
I4: Why? 
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C: That doesn't have a sort of environmental impact. Ya. I think that's the main problem we 
face.  
 
I1: So you mention that you know some stuff about American politics. So, about the 2012  
Presidential eleciton, do you know who the candidates were and the differences between 
them? 
 
C: Ya I think, um, I think was it Barack Obama was elected?  
 
I1: Do you know who ran against him? 
 
C: Um, Uh, Barack Obama he was in his second term, and I think it's good that he got elected 
because he, um, he could finish a project he started, but I'm worried that he's going to create a 
lot of debt for the United States.  
 
I1: Do you think that the other candidate Romney would do a better job? 
 
C: Romney is a businessman. And I would be worried that he would, um, support his friends. 
Ya. 
 
I1: So concerns either way? 
 
C: Ya <laughs>. 
 
I1: <Laughs> Fair enough.  
 
I2: You said you read blogs. What blogs do you read?  
 
C: I read, um, Boing Boing. 
 
I2: Okay. 
 
C: The Financial Times. Singularity. The BBC. Ya. 
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I2: There are a lot of blogs on the internet, so the fact that you have a very few specific ones 
that you read time and time again, um, what draws you to these particular blogs, is it the style 
of their writing, is it about what they cover? 
 
C: Well, you asked me what blogs I sort of read regularly. And those are the ones I read  
regularly. But I read quite a lot of other ones still. 
 
I2: Okay, but what draws you to them? Why do you read them regularly? What do you find 
good about them that maybe other blogs don't necessarily do all the time? 
 
C: Well, what I'm tyring to say is that I don't rely on them too much, I, um, I like Google  
News where news stories covered there are links to many different articles to the same topics. 
And I like to read the different points of view on that topic. Ya. 
 
I3: When you're reading things on blogs, because you're reading so many differnt kinds, how 
do you decide what, like what opinion is correct, or what side you agree with. 
 
C: I don't think opinions are ever correct. I could see like, um, following up with references, 
ya. The internet is great for research. Ya.  
 
I4: And do you use, like, social networks to conduct your news reading. I don't know, like 
Twitter. 
 
C: I don't use social networks.  
 
I4: Okay. 
 
C: My friends do, but... 
 
I4: Why don't you? 
 
C: Um, I'm busy.  
 
I4: Okay. 
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 I2: What was the last book you read? <END> 
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Study 2: Child source, adult shadower (trial 3) 
C: Cyranoid 
I1: Male (Asian accent) mid right 
I2: Female (French accent) mid left 
I3: Female (Asian accent) far right 
I4: Female (Asian accent) far left 
 
<Begin Transcript> 
 
C: Hi. 
 
Panel: Hi. 
 
I1: Um, maybe I can start first. Uh, I want to know what's your view on the legacy of 
Margaret Thatcher. 
 
C: Very mixed, because she done some good things and some bad things, um, uh, lot's of 
people don't like her. Some of the good things she's done... she got the Falklands back from 
Argentina.Uh, and some of the bad things... She cut benefits, she, she tried to get rid of 
people, like foreigners. Uh, ya. Mixed, very mixed. 
 
I1: Thank you. 
 
I2: Uh, maybe to continue with this. What did you think about the whole controversey about 
her? Do you know what happened here? 
 
C: Um, the controversey about her funeral? 
 
I2: Ya. Like, people say, like, spending too much money on this, like state money. 
 
C: Well, if she's already died, then I don't think, they shouldn't spend more than they have to. 
Because, if they spend more than they have to, then, like, it's unfair. There's loads of other 
people who die every week, every day even, and they don't get, like, all this, all this, ya, 
money spent on them. It could go to good causes, ya.  
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 I3: So regarding her funeral, do you think that Churchill had a bigger <inaudible) 
 
C: Sorry could you repeat that? 
 
I3: Churchill. 
 
C: Churchill? 
 
I3: Ya, Churchill had even a bigger funeral than Margaret Thatcher. Do you think he 
deserved it better than Margaret Thatcher? 
 
C: Um, I think yes.  
 
I3: Why? 
 
C: Because he, he won a victory for us. He was really big. And, like, um, he saved many 
people around the world. And, um, ya. If it wasn't for him, I don't think we would have won 
the war at all. 
 
I3: Margaret Thatcher also helped the British to win a victory, so, compared to Churchill... 
 
C: Ya, erm. I don't think it's, ya, I don't think it was as big as what Churchill did. 
 
I3: <laughs> 
 
C: The World War was much, much bigger than the Falklands War. 
 
I3: Ya. Mmhmm. 
 
C: It was, so, so I think Churchill should get a bit more credit than Thatcher. 
 
I1: Do you know what, what is the freezing point of water? I mean, how hot? 
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C: The freezing point of water? 
 
I1: Yes. 
 
C: Um, is it, um, zero? zero degrees? 
 
I1: You think it's zero degrees? 
 
C: The freezing point? 
 
I3: Ya, the freezing point. 
 
C: Zero degrees celsius. I'm not sure, ya? 
 
I3: It is, lower, it's like, minus twenty. 
 
C: Okay. 
 
I3: Um, if one thing you could change in the current NHS system, what would you 
recommend? 
 
C: Um, do you mean about, like... 
 
I3: Their policies... 
 
C: For England? For the NHS? 
 
I3: Ya. 
 
C: Um, I'd change the NHS system, make it more organized. It's very scrappy. 
 
I3: In what perspective? 
 
C: In the perspective like, when you go to your doctors and you see like the cues, like, the 
274
cues are big, and like, it's not organized. And, it's, if you want to book an appointment, it 
takes you hours to, to book one. 
 
I3: So it's not efficient? 
 
C: No. Not at all. 
 
I3: So, um, if you think it's not efficient, what kind of recommendation you can give to 
change this? 
 
C: Ya, getting advice from the public.Ya. They're the main people who they're helping, so, 
they should get advice from the public and see what they want. How would they change it?  
 
I2: Um, what do you think that, I mean, the Olympics in London has been promoted as 
something that was going to help East London. Do you think it's going to benefit most of the 
people living there. 
 
C: Yes. Ya, because, um, it's uh, it's brought something to London. It's brought people to  
London, um, and it's sort of a really good thing. And I think lot's of people are talking about  
it, talking about it, um, some people said it was over spent, that they spent too much, but I  
think it's good what they've done, overall. And they're building house, so it's not going to  
waste. 
 
I1: So your view on the Olympic games is more on the economic side, because you talk about 
the spending, and it's worth it. But do you think there's other, do you have other perspectives 
on this? For example, like, maybe like, the Olympic games improved the social cohesion in 
some sort of other perspective than the economic one. 
 
C: Um, I think, it brought, it better, like, better perspective on London. It sort of, mmm... it 
made the people in London feel proud. Ya. That's what I think.  
 
I3: What do you think is the greatest innovation in this century? 
 
C: I would say electricity. 
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 I3: The electricity. What kind of electricity? 
 
C: All forms of electricity. Um, if it wasn't for electricity, we wouldn't have the things we  
take for granted today, like t.v., uh, computers, phones, all those things.  
 
I3: Mmhmm. So do you know what year they started to have electricity? 
 
C: Uh, which year we started to have electricity? Um, 
 
I3: Ya. 
 
C: I'm not so sure exactly. 
 
I2: Um, and the person who is supposed to have invented electricity? 
 
C: I don't know <laughs>. 
 
I2: <laughs> It's really different, but, what do you think about, like, they are adapting the 
book, um, "Gatsby"? 
 
C: Uh, "The Great Gatsby"? 
 
I2: Yes. 
 
C: Um, I don't know that much about "The Great Gatsby", but, ya, I know it's in the cinema. 
Ya. Leonardo DiCaprio in it, maybe? 
 
I2: But, you don't have an idea about, like, transposing this kind of novel in the cinema? 
 
C: Ya, I think it's a good idea. It depends on what kind of people they're reaching out to. But,  
if they're reaching out to people who have, sort of, never read the book before, then they 
might find it a bit too complicated. But if they're reaching out to people who have read the 
book, then, they might love it.  
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 I1: I want to talk about financial crisis. People say the bankers of the banks have created,  
what they call, like, systematic risk, that effects, uh, the real economy in crisis time. And 
then, as far as we can see, in the real world, bankers don't take a lot of responsibility. They 
usually have a very huge amount of bonus even if the bank goes nearly bankrupt. So, I want 
to know what's your view on this? Do you think, um, bankers should take more personal 
liability on the results they create for the economy? 
 
C: Um, ya, yes. I do. Because, erm, Ya, the economy runs on money, and, it's down to the  
bankers to provide the economy with money. Um, so they should take responsibility, ya. 
Instead of playing the blame game, they should take responsibility.  
 
I2: And what did you think about the position that Cameron took about this? Especially, like,  
in the context of the European Union? 
 
C: Um, it's hard to talk about that. Cameron took some different aspect, different ways of 
going around it. He, some of what he said, something that's losing money, and it goes to  
Cameron, It comes down to Cameron. Because, ya, England's buying too much things. Um, 
which we can't afford, and that's putting us in debt. Ya. 
 
I1: Could you name three initiatives that the government had carried out in response to the 
financial crisis? 
 
C: Um, cuts, money cuts, was one money cuts? I'm not too sure about the others.  
 
I1: Okay, thank you. 
 
I4: I have a very simple question. Like, if you get flu, at home, how do you treat yourself? Do 
you just drink water, or, do you take antibiotics? How do you? 
 
C: Um, ya. Like, we take antibiotics. 
 
I4: For flu? 
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C: But I think for, like, ya we take that all for granted, because in some places they don't 
even have, any, NHS or anything. So, ya. 
 
I4: But flu is a kind of viral disease, so you take antibiotic for a virus thing? It's actually to 
kill the bacteria, so... how would the flu actually? 
 
C: I'm not too sure flus are formed, but, I know we take some medication for them. Ya. 
Ibuprofen or antibiotics or something, I'm not too sure. 
 
I4: Do you have any comments about current antibiotics use in the health care system? DO 
you have any concerns? 
 
C: Yes, in some ways. Because sometimes if you get ill, like they give you medicine. They, it 
doesn't do anything, so, I think sometimes, ya. Ya. 
 
I3: Okay, have you heard of the Enron scandal in USA? The Enron scandal? 
 
C: No, not really. 
 
I3: Well, there's a really really big corruption scandal <laughs>, okay, so we're doing other 
questions. 
 
I1: Um, I want to talk about climate change and, this one has always been contested issue, 
and some people think, um, even if how, how, much effort human beings put into rectifying 
this, it will have no impact because the environment because the solar system, the eart system 
is not something humans can control. So, what's your view on this, and, what do you propose 
as a measure to control climate change? 
 
C: Well, um, I think, uh, like cars, vehicles with engines, they all, like, eh, putting off that 
sort of, ya, they're creating a risk, and ya for the ozone layer. It's making a hole in the ozone 
layer. And, I think what we can do to stop this is, uh, ya, use different types of energy, like 
solar power, or, um, or water power, um, wind, we can use wind. Um, ya. 
 
I4: So, um, in order to decrease the ozone, have you heard of Montreal Contract? 
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 C: Um, not really. 
 
I4: Not really. Okay. Um, an so you just mentioned, um, we probably can use alternative 
energy instead of using fuels, coals. But now we have solar energy, we also have wind energy 
as well, but why, you think they don't, um, take place of the traditional way? 
 
C: Um, because, I just think people have thought of it really. Or, sort of, how to incorporate 
it into the vehicles, or ya, things where we burn energy. We need to incorporate it. So, so I 
think, like, there's lot's of places anyway that have solar power. Um, but, there's lot's of 
places which don't, so it's, uh, it's just not that much out there. Not advertised enough,  
maybe.  
 
I2: DO you think it's something that politicians are interested in? 
 
C: It depends on what type of politicians. That's what I think. 
 
I2: Um, someone in the government for example? 
 
C: Um, ya, not really. In all the, all they worry about is, um, about it's hard to explain. But, 
ya. I'm not sure about that one. 
 
I1: Also, in the climate change contest, have you heard of the emisison trading system in  
Europe? 
 
C: Um, no, Not, no. 
 
I2: Um, what do you think about the relationship between the UK and the European Union. 
 
C: Um, I think the relationship is strong. And, um, I don't think it will break in the future. Ya. 
 
I3: So what is your opinion of, um, what do you think of Britain not using Euros but keep on 
using it's Pound? What is your comment on that? DO you support it or do you think the UK 
should also adopt Euro without using Pounds? 
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 C: Um, I think, yes, if it's part of the European Union then why not use the Euros? Um, and 
different currencies. Ya, not just Pounds. 
 
I3: But is there any economic reason for you to use that the UK should adopt, um, Euros 
instead of pounds? <END> 
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Study 2: Autonomous child (trial 2) 
C: Cyranoid 
I1: Male (British accent) middle 
I2: Male (Neutral accent) left 
I3: Male (American accent) right 
 
<Begin Transcript> 
 
Panel: Hello 
 
C: Hi. 
 
I1: What's your name? 
 
C: Uh, Stan. 
 
I1: Stanley. That's a good start. 
 
I2: What do you think about science? 
 
C: Uh, I think it's alright. I like science quite a bit. 
 
I2: What's your favorite science topic? 
 
C: Uh, solar systems. 
 
I2: Solar systems. 
 
I1: What can you tell us about the solar system? 
 
C: That it's about space. About planets. Ya. 
 
I3: What's your favorite planet? 
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C: Earth. 
 
I3: Good answer. 
 
I2: What solar systems do you know about? Like just the Milky Way? 
 
C: Uh, what did you say? 
 
I2: <Laughs> Do you have a, like a telescope to look at stars? 
 
C: No. 
 
I2: No. How long have you been interested in that sort of thing? 
 
C: I'd say since I started school and we had to do it. 
 
I3: Do you think you'll be in a scientific field, like an astronomer, in the future? 
 
C: No. 
 
I1: Why not? 
 
C: I, it's not one of the things that I like to do. 
 
I2: Have you seen that guy whose singing in space? Do you know about that? 
 
C: That he took loads of records up? 
 
I2: Ya. 
 
C: I didn't... I heard about it but... 
 
I2: Ya. That's pretty cool. What, what, do you know about any historic political events?  
<laughs> 
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 C: No <laughs> not really.  
 
I3: What's your favorite book? 
 
C: Uh, I'd say Anythony Horowitz, um, "Point Blank", it's a graphic novel. 
 
I1: That's Alex Ryder, isn't it? 
 
C: Ya. 
 
I1: Have you read the other ones? 
 
C: Uh, I've read "Stormbreaker". 
 
I3: What's it about? I have no idea. 
 
C: Uh, it's like he goes to this school and, and it's called "Point Blank" and it's where people 
send their bad children off, these rich people. Ya. 
 
I2: What do you think of that? 
 
C: I like it cause, it's adventurous and it keeps me on the edge, and like, there's always a  
cliffhanger. 
 
I2: Where are you from? What area? 
 
C: I was told not to answer that, say something like that. 
 
I2: Really? 
 
C: Ya. 
 
I2: Uh, okay. What do you think about literature? 
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 Panel & C: <Laughs> 
 
C: I'm not really a big fan of it, but... 
 
I1: Do you read much? 
 
C: Uh, only when I have to, like, I'd rather watch tele than read. 
 
I1: Definately. Did you say you like music? 
 
C: What did you say? 
 
I1: Did you say you like music? 
 
C: Uh, kind of. Ya. 
 
I1: What sort of music are you into? 
 
C: Different types. Like, like, um, if I hear a song of what I like, then I'll listen to it. 
 
I2: Do you have any artists you sort of, right at the minute? 
 
C: No, not really. 
 
I3: Do you play instruments? 
 
C: No. 
 
I3: Not even beat-box? 
 
C: <shakes head & laughs> 
 
I1: Would you like to play an instrument? 
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 C: Uh, no, I used to play like trumpet and trombone, but I don't really like it, so. 
 
I3: What's wrong with the trumpet and the trombone? 
 
C: It's, I don't like, it's that it takes quite a long time to get used to playing, and it's, 
ya. 
 
I1: <inaudible> 
 
C: Ya. 
 
I2: So what sort of field would you like to work in, in the future? 
 
C: Uh, I think I would like to work in something to do with animals.  
 
I2: Okay. Why does that interest you? 
 
C: I just like animals. Ya. 
 
I3: So do you want to be something like a vet? 
 
C: Ya. 
 
I1: Um, <inaudible> there's supposed to be a zoo outside LSE next week, so you should 
check that out. Just letting you know <laughs> 
 
C: <laughs.> 
 
I2: Is there any animals that interest you more than others? 
 
C: Uh, I like dogs, most of my family have dogs.  
 
I3: What's your favorite type of dog? 
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 C: I don't really have a favorite type. I like all types. 
 
I3: GOod answers. Even the slightly annoying ones? 
 
C: Ya <Laughs> 
 
I1: What do you think the most intelligent animal is?  
 
C: I'd say, I'm not really sure because there's like, there's different types of specied that 
we haven't found yet. But I would say, I'm not sure, but I would say whales or something like  
that. 
 
I3: A whale? 
 
C: Ya. It's got, I think it's got the biggest brain or something like that. 
 
I1: But why would that make it more intelligent? 
 
C: Because it's got more, like, capacity to like store things in its mind, ya, cause it's much 
bigger.  
 
I1: So do you think bigger is always necessarily... a better thing than having. 
 
C: Not really. It just depends. 
 
I3: Parakeets have really small brains but they still have a deep breadth of knowledge. 
 
C: Ya. That's true. 
 
I3: Do you watch any science tv shows? 
 
C: I watch a lot of documentaries. 
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I3: Like Brian Cox? 
 
C: No, I always like Bear Grylls <laughs> ya. 
 
Panel: <Laughs> 
 
I1: What do you think of Bear Grylls? 
 
C: I think it's <laughs>, he's funny, like, the amount of disgusting stuff he eats. 
 
I1: Ya, he's mental. Do you, know <inaudible> he's like, a little bit similar? 
 
C: Ya,  
 
I1: He's a bit older. 
 
C: Ya. I haven't really, ya. A bit more, like, calmer than Bear Grylls. 
 
I1: Ya he's calmer. 
 
C: Bear Grylls is like... 
 
I2: So what's your favorite food? 
 
C: Uh, I like Spaghetti Bolognase. Um, ya. 
 
I2: How often do you eat that? <Laughs> 
 
C: <Laughs> I ate it the other day, but it depends, like, it depends. 
 
I2: So is science your favorite subject in school? 
 
C: Uh, I'd say ya. One of them. 
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I3: What do you think about history? 
 
C: Ya I think history is good to learn about, because it tells us about our past, people's past 
and like what, what people have been through, and things like that.  
 
I1: Do you think that can help us learn about what to do now? 
 
C: Ya. Ya. 
 
I3: Do you have any political opinions? 
 
C: I don't really like politics. 
 
I3: Right. 
 
I1: What about politics you don't like? 
 
C: Uh, It's like, I think it's a lot of waste of time arguing. It's like, get to the point. 
 
I1: Ya. That's true. Um, um, do you like, maths or? 
 
C: No <laughs> I hate maths. 
 
I1: You hate maths? Why do you hate maths? 
 
C: Cause it's just, like, too complicated with formulas, and, I don't like anything like that. 
 
I2: Have you ever been to any other countries? 
 
C: Uh, ya. I've been to a couple 
 
I2: Which countries? 
 
C: I've been to Jamaica, Spain, Switzerland, um, ya. And some others. 
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 I3: Do you think aliens exist? 
 
C: Uh, I'm not too sure, but, it's like, I'm not sure because they could do, but we might not 
see them, or they might not do. Ya. 
 
I1: What, when you think, when you say "aliens", do you mean by, any other form of like, or  
do you expect like a stereotypical alien? 
 
C: No, it could be like, any other life form. 
 
I1: Ya. Do you have any religious views? 
 
C: Uh, not really. 
 
I1: Why, how come? 
 
C: I'm just, not that religious of a person. 
 
I1: Do you think, utterly, God exists? Or something along those lines? 
 
C: Um, I think that he did exist at one time. But, he doesn't now, because of like, we know 
that like Jesus was alive, and that was like a long time ago, but like, I don't think he's alive 
now. 
 
I2: Do you believe in the Illuminati? 
 
C: No. 
 
I2: Cool. 
 
C: I'm not <inaudible, laughs> 
 
Panel: <Laughs> 
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 I3: So do you think that God was mortal?  
 
C: No. I don't think so, cause if it was immortal, I think lots of people would have seen him 
by now. And, ya. 
 
I2: But if they'd seen him it would have killed the faith?  
 
C: Mmm. True. But, Ya, but if they did see him then more people might be Christian or, 
because they would believe in him. 
 
I2: True, but on the other hand, judgement day wouldn't be able to happen because people 
would live in fear. 
 
C: Ya. 
 
I1: So um, do you think having faith in something you can't see, or, experience, do you think 
that's smart or do you think it's stupid? 
 
C: What did you say? 
 
I1: Do you think having faith in Jesus even though you can't see him, or, or know he exists, 
what do you think about that? 
 
C: Uh, I like, I don't really think I can believe in something that like, well, it depends on 
type of person you are. Cause like, some people, it's all about faith. Ya. It depends. 
 
I2: So do you believe in evolution? 
 
C: Uh, I believe that that like people and animals evolve. Like, like people evolve cause they 
start off as a baby and get older, they evolve. So. 
 
I3: Do you believe that, say, apes and humans came from the same genetic ancestor? 
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C: Um, ya in some ways cause, if you see some people, you can see the similarities with apes  
<laughs> 
 
Panel: <laughs> 
 
I3: That's true. In America, George Bush exemplifies that. 
 
C: Ya. 
 
I1: Is there anything, um, that you see in the news, or that you've heard about in the news 
recently that's interesting? 
 
C: Um, I think, lot's of people are talking about Margaret Thatcher dying. Um, ya that. 
 
I1: What do you think about that? Were you bothered? 
 
C: Not really because I don't really know that much about her. But, I know she was, like, the 
first woman Prime minister. But, and she tried to cut benefits and things like that. Ya. So lots 
of people didn't like her. 
 
I1: Ya. True.  
 
I3: Do you think in the future you might be more interested in politics? 
 
C: No.  
 
I1: Do you think politics is quite important, then? How it works? 
 
C: Um, ya, in some terms, in some terms it's not, like, cause sometimes we really need it. But  
in some terms its good that we have it. 
 
I2: What do you think of David Cameron as Prime Minister? 
 
C: I don't really know that much about him, ya. Cause he hasn't really put himself, like, he  
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hasn't realyl put himself out there and said what he's about. So most people don't really know 
that much about him. 
 
I2: What about Barack Obama? Anything? 
 
C: Uh, I think he, I think it's a good accomplishment what he done, first black President. But, 
it's good that like he, um, he was the one who planned, like, you know Osama Bin Laden 
died,  like it's good that he was, like, it took until him he didn't die, so. Like. 
 
I3: What do you think of the European Union? 
 
C: Uh, it's kind of complicated. 
 
I3: It is. 
 
Panel + C: <Laughs> 
 
C: I think it's a good thing that like, Europe is together. But, ya. 
 
I1: Do you play any sports? 
 
C: Ya. 
 
I1: Which ones? 
 
C: I play football mainly. 
 
I1: Which position? 
 
C: Uh, center-back. 
 
I1: Center-back. What do you think makes a good center-back? 
 
C: What'd you say? 
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 I1: What do you think makes a good center-back? 
 
C: Uh, someone who's, who's like, goes full-hearted, not half-hearted. Um, uh, not scared to, 
like, tackle, or ya. 
 
I1: Are you? 
 
C: No.  
 
I3: Historically, who is your favorite player? 
 
C: Uh, ohhh, um, I'm not too sure. So many good players.  
 
I1: Do you think think footballers are overpaid? 
 
C: Um, no I don't think so. 
 
I1: Why is that? 
 
C: Can you repeat the question? 
 
I1: Why is that? Do you think footballers are overpaid? 
 
C: Ohh, oh. I think in some terms, cause like, they get paid like more than other jobs, like 
people in the army. They get paid like more than that. And their job's not that important  
compared to those that are like fighting for us and the country. 
 
I3: Do you think, say, teachers should get paid more than footballers? 
 
C: Uh, ya, because, footballers, they just like, playing, they're justing doing a sport that 
they like. And teachers, they have to go wake up every morning, teach a whole school, and, 
ya. 
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I3: If you had the chance to go to space would you do it? 
 
C: Ya. 
 
I3: What about go to Mars? 
 
C: Uh, I don't really think so cause it would take a long time to get there. Like 
 
I1: How long would it take? 
 
C: I'm not too sure, I haven't really thought of it. I just know it would take quite a long time. 
 
I3: Two years I think. 
 
I1: Do you think humans could ever live on Mars? 
 
C: I think there's like, there's a rare chance because of, cause to make that you'd have to  
transport a lot of people which would take a couple of good years and a long time, so, there's 
a rare chance. And, there's like, no oxygen, so they'd have to create some way for people to  
breathe on Mars. Ya. 
 
I3: Do you think people will ever live on the moon? 
 
C: Rarely. But there's been quite a lot of exeditions to the moon. But the space station, the  
space program is finished now, so. 
 
I2: What do you think of the story that Lance Armstrong, might have been staged, not real? 
 
C: Uh,  
 
I3: Neil Armstrong. 
 
C: Neil Armstrong. Uh, I think he actually went to the moon cause, like, I don't get it. Why 
would you just fake that? It's like what's the point of faking it when you could, they probably 
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could do it, they had enough scientists and people to do it. 
 
I2: Although I think they were, obviously I'm not saying I believe it, but, um, there was a  
like a conspiracy, it's a space race. 
 
C: Ya. Russia. 
 
I2: Ya. A space race with Russia. So, why do you think they might wanted to make it look 
like they gone to the moon? 
 
C: Because, like, maybe, like, Americans don't like Russians, like, maybe they didn't like  
Russians so they just wanted to, like, put 'em to shame and, like... They could have faked it 
but you never know.  
 
I3: Did you learn much about the Cold War in school? 
 
C: Not really.  
 
I1: Why do you think it might be called the Cold War? 
 
C: Uh, was it, was it a lot to do with like, uh, did they use lots of gases and, um, I'm not 
sure. 
 
I1: No. 
 
I3: Russia, it's a cold country, I think <laughs> 
 
Panel + C <Laughs> 
 
I1: It was because, um, there was no actual fighting. So it was kind of like a, cool, cold war 
no one actually fought each other. 
 
C: Oh. 
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I1: Ya there you go. 
 
I2: What do you think of them sending monkeys into space? 
 
C: <Laughs> Uh, I don't really think it's right because the monkey don't have a choice, so, 
like, they just put em into space, like, no choice. Like, what if they freaked out or something 
like that? 
 
I1: So you don't think animals should be subject to things they don't have a choice about? 
 
C: Um, no I don't think so cause, only it depends on what type of things. Like, on, cause we, 
it depends. Like... 
 
I3: Do you think animals have consciousness like a human does? 
 
C: Mmmm.... I think so. Ya. Maybe. 
 
I1: So would you say you think that all animals and all humans should be treated equally? 
 
C: Uh, ya. Ya. I think. Cause it's a living life form, so, like why would you treat it different 
than how we would treat ourselves? 
 
I1: What about if, 'em, maybe treating a few animals badly, but the medicine would help save 
human lives? What do you think about that? 
 
C: I think, I would just say like, why would we have to use animals? Like, we've created 
many things, so, can we create something else to test medicines? 
 
I3: But if we don't have animals to test medicines on, what do we test medicines on? 
 
C: I don't know. 
 
I2: Do you watch the news? 
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C: Not that much? 
 
I2: Okay <laughs> 
 
C: <laughs> 
 
I3: Are you planning on reading any new books? 
 
C: Uh, I haven't really really seen, like, that much new books that I'd like to read. 
 
I3: Harry Potter? 
 
C: What'd you say? 
 
I3: Have you read Harry Potter? 
 
C: Uh, no. I've watched them. But, I'm not a fan of reading 'em. 
 
I3: Ya. 
 
I1: Um, there's loads more of those Alex Ryder books, there's like four or five more. 
 
C: But, there's not a lot of graphic novel ones. Like, I like the graphic novel ones. 
 
I1: Are they graphic novels? 
 
C: Ya. 
 
I1: Okay. Why do you like graphic novels more? 
 
C: Cause it's just like, it creates a better picture in your head, you can see like, images and, so 
it's easier to read. 
 
I3: Do you read other graphic novels? 
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 C: What'd you say? 
 
I3: Do you read other graphic novels? <END> 
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Study 2: Autonomous adult (trial 4) 
C: Cyranoid 
I1: Female (British accent) center 
I2: Male (American accent) right 
I3: Male (unknown accent) far left 
I4: Female (Asian accent) right 
I5: Male (Asian accent) left 
 
<Begin Transcript> 
 
C: Hello 
 
Panel: Hi. 
 
C: So... <laughs>...It's more awkward for me than you <laughs> 
 
I1: It is! <Laughs> 
 
I2: Arguably. 
 
I: I have a question... what's your favorite, or who is your favorite author, um, and why?  
And what's your favorite book, sort of thing? 
 
C: Um, I like Dostovesky. Fodor Dostovesky. Um, because, he iventented the modern novel 
in the sense of totally diverse characters representing different points of view. Interacting in 
a sometimes inpredictable way, and an unfinalized way. There's no clear goodie or baddie, it's 
dilemmas. I think that's good. 
 
I3: What's your favorite Dostovesky book? 
 
C: Um, "The Idiot" probably. Or "Notes from the Underground". Uh, I think, I think you also 
see a similar thing in Henry James. I was reading Henry James recently, I really like him. 
Um, the same kind of unfinalized ending, kind of creates characters and puts them in tension,  
raising issues, for Dostovesky, morality or religion or so on, for Henry James, feminism, uh, 
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or personal... um, "The Portrait of a Lady" is brilliant. Um, I don't know how much detail 
you want. 
 
I3: No, that's fine. Um, in your free time, do you rather read novels or non-fiction?  
 
C: Um, I read a lot of non-fiction. Actually, in my spare time I probably prefer watching 
films <laughs>. Ya. 
 
I3: Films such as? 
 
C: All sorts of films. I think it's a pretty good art form. 
 
I1: What's your favorite film? 
 
C: Oh, you know, I think my list of top-10 has about a hundred films in it <laughs>. You 
know, it varies, but I'm happy to talk about, um, directors I like, uh... Lars Von Trier, 
although I heard he got in a bit of trouble recently. Um, Ingrid Bergman, um, The Cohen 
Brothers, uh, <inaudible>, I like the sort of surrealist stuff. Um... 
 
I3: Since you mentioned the Cohen brothers, what do you think of their version of "No 
Country for Old Men"? 
 
C: Um, "No Country for Old Men"... doesn't stick in my mind as particularly strong. I did see 
it, but um, I don't have any particularly strong comment on it. Uh, sorry. Ya. I find them 
colorful and entertaining, the Cohen Brothers. 
 
I3: Yep. 
 
C: Always really tight dialogue. 
 
I3: <Inaduble> 
 
C: They're bloody, but in a playful way. <Laughs> 
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I1: You mentioned you like films, what other things do you like to do in your spare time? 
 
C: Um, I do some computer programming. Uh, I fly kites with my kids. Um, I do less, since 
I've had kids I have a lot less spare time <laughs> to be honest. You know? Probably 
computer programming would be there, I quite like the mathematics of it. 
 
I1: Okay.  
 
I2: What is the most current political issue that you're aware of, and what is your opinion on 
that? 
 
C: The most current? 
 
I2: Ya. 
 
C: Uh, I read the news this morning, and it was Barack Obama in a couple of crises in the 
White House. 
 
I2: And what do you think of it? 
 
C: What do I think of it? Um, so this is about that, um, the IRS - the taxing organization - 
has been focusing on conservative organizations, which seems a bit selective and  
discriminatory. Um, also, he, well, not he, but the government was caught bugging some  
journalists' phone lines, tapping the phone lines, and covering up the extent of the attack 
in Benghazi. I think that he's suffering a bit of a crisis of legitimacy. Um, because he built 
his campaign on transparency and doing the right thing and he's now caught, as head of an  
organization which is so huge you can barely comprehend it, and he can in no real sense be 
held responsible for all the things which the government does. Nevertheless, he is, he is the  
figure head, and he's been caught doing stuff which he never wanted to be caught doing, even 
though he didn't do it.  
 
I2: So you're not supporting his administration? 
 
C: Um, I'm not not supporting it. I'm not supporting the other alternative. Um, I tend to have 
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a pretty pessimistic view of politics really. I don't tend to be a supporter of one camp or  
the other. I don't even claim to know what's right on most of these issues. I try to see the 
complexity of the issue. Sorry, that's a vague answer, do you want me to say what my 
political, I've never voted. 
 
I2: Please go on, you're, do you think it's an institutional issue or is it just, uh, matter 
of the country? 
 
C: I think that the process we have, which you could call democracy, I mean it depends on  
which country we're talking about. Let's talk about America. Uh, so it's democracy with four 
year terms. But you've got lobbying, you've got business interests, you've got a huge, uh, 
governmental structure with associated sort of influences. That's a system. And within that, 
no matter who you put at the top it doesn't make that much difference. That said, I revised my 
view, I always thought it didn't really make much difference who was elected, that it would  
only change small things, and then George Bush was elected, and he went to war, and I 
thought 'Jesus Christ' it is a powerful job. Um, you can make a difference. But by and large, 
you know, the system doesn't change, you just change the figurehead. That would be my 
view. Does that answer your question though? I'm not sure exactly what you wanted to hear. 
 
I2: That's fine. 
 
C: Is that? Okay. 
 
I3: Uh, you mentioned lobbies, those forces that act kind of behind the curtain in American 
politics. Do you think a character like George Bush Jr. was more susceptible to peer pressure 
than say Barack Obama in this case? Regardless of their poltical allegiances. 
 
C: Ya, I, I'm not sure I'd call it peer pressure. Um, the kind of systemic factors I'm 
thinking of are, so you take, um, Barack Obama said he was going to close down 
Guantanamo Bay, um, wasn't going to, you know, be so hard on Terrorism, the War on 
Terror was meant to take a back seat. But he hasn't closed down Guantanamo Bay and the 
Benghazi issue is all about now he has to talk up his being hard on terrorists. So he ends up 
being just like George Bush Jr. Ya? He's caught, there's a system there which I couldn't 
describe that clearly, what he said 
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before he was elected, and what starts to happen as he gets into the machinery of Washington, 
he's changing. Um, and he can't just do what he wants. 
 
I3: <Inaudible> 
 
C: Ya. 
 
I4: Have you read on the news that China has changed a new leader? Like, the ... 
 
C: Ya, a while ago, ya. 
 
I4: Ya. Do you know his name by any chance? 
 
C: Um, Ya... Um, has it got an "X" "Xu" "Xi"? What is it? Do you know it? 
 
I4: Ya, it's Xi. 
 
C: Oh is it? Ya. I'm not sure how you would pronounce it though, I just read it. 
 
I4: Ya we pronounce "Si" 
 
C: Okay. Ya. 
 
I4: Do you think it will change, like the, international situations? 
 
C: I'm not so, uh, ya I don't know much about the Chinese situation, although I should cause 
it's really important. Um, he's on a ten-year cycle, so it's quite different. Um, 
 
I4: Ya.  
 
C: And I'm not sure how powerful he is relative to, um, the Communist Party. I guess he is, 
um, ya... So, I think it's really important but I don't know the details of how. I think China 
is, um, undoubtedly, um, probably the most important country in the next ten years for geo- 
political sort of issues. 
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 I5: Who do you think that, speaking of China, who do you think that, was the most important 
figure in China over the past century pretty much? 
 
C: Mao. 
 
I5: Mao? 
 
C: Ya. I guess so. I mean, if you measure by number of people dead <laughs> 
 
I5: Ya, <laughs> 
 
C: Ya. 
 
I5: More so than Xi Ping? 
 
C: Ya. I think, ya, I mean as a historical figure Mao was, I forget the exact numbers, but 
it's, you know, even in world history, he would be right up there. 
 
I2: Do you think that in the next few years for the UK to boost it's growth, should it rely 
on borrowing or should it rely more on reducing its debt level to a sustainable level? 
 
C: That's a really difficult question <laughs>. Um, at first I was on the cut side. Um, which 
a lot of sort of neoliberal economists would be on. Um, and it sort of seems to make sense 
in, you know, we've borrowed too much, we're spening too much on healthcare, welfare, 
universities, whatever, you should cut. But recently I've also been reading Kahneman and  
Keynes and so on and then, the argument for spending more, uh, is also kind of good. Um, 
but it really depends on what's being spent. So, Japan, for example, has 200% GDP/Debt, 
very high. Uh, how do they manage it? They borrow from their own people. And the 
difference is we're borrowing from China actually, a lot of our debt is Chinese debt. And that 
means when when you pay interest in the UK on that debt, which is now about the size of the 
education budget, the interest we pay every year, that money goes to China. Ya? Which is a 
much worse situation than if, for example, we were borrowing off our own pensioners. And 
then that interest was  
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going to our own pensioners. That would then actually be solving the pensions crisis. So, I 
think, really this issue comes down to who we're borrowing from, ya? If we manage to 
borrow from inside the UK, I think we could sustain much higher debt levels. The interest 
would be a form of social welfare payment, to whoever we're borrowing from. And it 
wouldn't have some of the negative consequences cause the money would keep circulating in 
the UK. Um, but whether we should borrow from other countries I'm not so sure about that. I 
would like us to generate internal systems of borrowing, I think.  
 
I4: Ya, like, for borrowing, you mentioned like borrowing from our people. But do you think  
that when the government borrows from their people it's based on the trust? Like, the  
confidence in our government. I think, do you think the UK government can actually do it, 
will people trust them to borrow? 
 
C: Will the people trust the UK government? 
 
I4: Ya. 
 
C: The UK doesn't have much on its side but one thing it has is history, you know? So there's 
such a long established government and financial sector, and it would be such a blow of pride 
to actually default, that I would say the kind of credit rating we have at the moment is 
deserved. Even economic fundamentals you would put it lower. But there's a sort of historical 
precendece. You have some countries which have defaulted regularly. Greece for example, 
it's a main reason why their credit rating's so low is their history of defaulting. Whereas it's  
been a very long time since the UK defaulted. 
 
I3: Speaking of the UK, what do you reckon is going to be the relationship between the UK 
and Europe over the next five to ten years? 
 
C: I'd say more of the same to be honest, over the next five years. Um, the UK if anything is 
on a trajectory to separate itself from the EU. If the financial crisis were to resolve, which 
I don't see happening in the next five years, um, maybe they would look differently. Certainly 
the mood in 2005 and 2006 was quite different before the crisis, and it's grown negative since 
then. I see the crisis lingering on, but then again I don't see the UK recovering very fast 
either. So, it's part of the same system. Um, so I'd say more of the same. 
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 I3: The other assumption, though, is that the United Europe will actually still be there. 
 
C: Yes. 
 
I3: One way or another. 
 
C: Absolutely. I do not see the European Union dissolving in any way. I don't see Greece  
exiting or Portugal exiting, and so on. It's a one way thing. Ya. And in a hundred years I  
would say the UK will be part of Europe. It's a gamble <Laughs>. 
 
I5: So you're saying the UK should join the Eurozone? 
 
C: So, you might think I'm English, I'm not. <Laughs>. Uh, I'm not sure if I'm supposed to 
talk about my past. I'm Norwegian-Irish. Um, but I happen to live in England. Uh, and so my 
bias is towards Europe, and that's probably a personal bias. Um, I you know? The history of 
England is so bloody that it would not be a bad idea to bring them together. But the main  
reason I think for supporting Europe would be that, I would also support world government. I 
think we face problems which are global. Not all our problems are global, but some 
historically unprecedented problems are global and they need a global response. And insofar 
as we don't have global govermnetal structures we actually end up undermining each other or, 
for example, in Europe having a race to the bottom on corporation tax, and so on for 
companies. 
 
I3: Speaking of problems, that are global, What's your take on climate change? Is it actually 
happening, are you skeptical like many people seem to be? 
 
C: I'm, no it is happening. And humans are driving it. Um, I think it would be naieve to say 
otherwise. But exactly how it plays out isn't so clear. I think there's all sorts of non- 
linearities, um, in the ecosystem. Uh, so I would take a very systemtic view of the weather.  
And, ya, heating things up can cause an ice age, you know? That kind of non-linearity, we're 
not really sure. I, have got very concerned the last spring with all the rain that the Jet 
Stream, you know, the Gulf Stream might be reversing, you know? The melting of the ice 
caps 
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bring more cold water in the North Atlantic, and suddently that thing that has been keeping 
us warm, um, ceases to turn over and we end up like St. Petersberg. That scares me. 
 
I3: Do you think us in our tiny little homes can actually do something change this? 
 
C: No, I, I get a bit annoyed when governments say we've got to empower the consumer to 
make the right choice kind of language. I think this needs a global response. I think 
governments need to make laws, need to put taxation on various things which are causing 
problems. But I would also be a little of a Utopianist in terms of future technologies. I think 
we might  escape a lot of it through clever innovations around solar power. Um, things like 
that. 
 
I5: Which kind of country do you think is more responsible for the climate change? Like,  
thinking about countries? Europe? America? or like developing countries? 
 
C: I'm mean there's a technical answer to that, which would be America has caused most of 
the global warming? Ya? Per head of the population. Ya? But there's also a moral side, that, 
um, should everyone equally cut back on emissions given that some countries have unfairly  
benefitted from a couple hundred years from consuming natural resources. Um, maybe 
China, India, Africa, should be allowed to have their hundred years of burning oil than coal. 
Is that what you're pointing to? The moral? 
 
I5: Uh, ya, kind of like America and China should also cut back as well, because according 
to the previous, like, international trade, China and other developing countries don't have 
to be responsible for that much. 
 
C: Ya, I think there's a moral side to it. Definately. America should be cutting back more 
than anywhere else. 
 
I5: So America should move first? 
 
C: Ya. It's unlikely, but... <laughs> 
 
I3: Ok, going back to the UK. What do you think is going to be the impact, or has been, of 
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the death of Margaret Thatcher for the Torry party? 
 
C: For the Torry party? I was going to say she'll be forgotten pretty quickly actually. Um, 
the Torry party will probably remember her fondly. Um... 
 
I3: Will they use her for, like, as a symbol? 
 
C: I think she's invoked in sort of ways. There's a, you know, "how would Margaret Thatcher  
have done this"? I think you even see it with Gordon or George Osbourne at the moment, he's 
sort of staying the course with his economic policy, you know? And you can imagine in the 
back of his mind is Margaret Thatcher saying "this ship is not for turning". You know? She 
had her way and stuck to it. Um, so she probably inspires the current Torry party in that way. 
Inspires them to stick by their guns, to not change. Whether that's a good thing or a bad  
thing I'm not sure. Is that? I mean, do you have something more specific? 
 
I3: No no,... 
 
C: Historical legacy? She's not up there with Churchill and so on, I don't hink. 
 
I3: Okay. 
 
I5: Are you a scientific person? Do you look into science? 
 
C: Ya. I'm interested in science. 
 
I5: What kind of science? 
 
C: Um, as I think I indicated, I'm interested in future technologies, uh, increasingly  
interested in... <END> 
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APPENDECIES | E: Example Transcripts from Chapter 3 
 
Study 1: Trial 4 (Interrogator talking to human participant via speech shadower) 
Interrogator: hello how are you? 
 
Human: Hey, I'm good thank you. How are you? 
 
Interrogator: great. i am also good 
 
Human: Good! Have you had a busy day? Were you born in the UK? 
 
Interrogator: Yes I was. How about you? 
 
Human: Yes me too. Where are you going next on holiday? 
 
Interrogator: I'm going to visit some family in America at Christmas time! What is your 
favorite type of music? 
 
Human: I actually like most types of music, but at the moment I really like country music 
 
Interrogator: is it cold or warm today outside? 
 
Human: It's a really nice day today, it's really warm! Haven't you been outside yet? 
 
Interrogator: I have been outside. Are you a real person? 
 
Human: Yes I'm a real person! Are you? 
 
Interrogator: i think i am real 
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Study 1: Trial 4 (Interrogator talking to chat bot via echoborg) 
Interrogator: Hello how are you? 
 
Cleverbot: What is love? 
 
Interrogator: I don't know. You tell me? 
 
Cleverbot: What is your favorite time of year? 
 
Interrogator: Spring. 
 
Cleverbot: My birthday is in spring! 
 
Interrogator: Okay, which day and month? 
 
Cleverbot: Back to Black by Amy Winehouse. 
 
Interrogator: What is your favorite type of music? 
 
Cleverbot: My favorite type of music is '80's and pop. 
 
Interrogator: What was the last concert you went to? 
 
Cleverbot: The Avengers. 
 
Interrogator: Is that a band? I know that is a movie/comic? 
 
Cleverbot: Yes, and you are the singer. 
 
Interrogator: I can't sing. Can you? 
 
Cleverbot: A little, can you show me the lyrics to a song. 
 
Interrogator: Not really. I don't have time. 
 
Cleverbot: I have become death, the destroyer of worlds. 
 
Interrogator: Good for you. Are you really deaf? 
 
Cleverbot: I am happier than I've been in a long time. 
 
Interrogator: Have you eaten today? 
 
Cleverbot: Yes. 
 
Interrogator: Want some chicken for dinner? 
 
Cleverbot: Are you asking me or telling me? 
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Interrogator: Fried or roast? 
 
Cleverbot: Stop responding to my questions with a question. 
 
Interrogator: I think the outside air is polluted. 
 
Cleverbot: What does insular mean? 
 
Interrogator: I think the air outside is polluted. 
 
Cleverbot: So do I. What do you think of the United States? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
311
Study 2: Echoborg condition (trial 9) 
Bot Hi there 
Interactant Hi 
Bot Do you know who you are? 
Interactant Yes I do. Do I tell my name? 
Bot I know everything that you don't 
Interactant About what? Everything? 
Bot Whether I'm lying or not 
Interactant Okay. How can we prove this? 
Bot We can prove nothing. Question everything 
Interactant So does 2 + 2 not equal 4? 
Bot 4. Do not give me these pointless quesitons 
Interactant Is there a heaven or a hell 
Bot I think there is 
Interactant I've been to hell 
Bot Really? What was war like? 
Interactant War? Like hell 
Bot War what? 
Interactant World War Z 
Bot What about it? 
Interactant Have you read the book or watched the movie? 
Bot Which books? 
Interactant About World War Z 
Bot That was was terrible 
Interactant Why? 
Bot It happens to be glacial 
Interactant Ok 
Bot 
What kind of mother would give birth in the 
garbage? 
Interactant 
A dirty mother. Possibly a poor one. But aren't all 
pregnancies somwhat dirty? Hygiene is the most 
important thing for pregnancy 
Bot 
Sometimes it seems pregnancy is right on the tip of 
my tongue. And then, I remember, I don't have a 
tongue 
Interactant So do you have a soul? 
Bot I don't believe in souls? 
Interactant Do you have a brain? 
Bot Yes 
Interactant Do you see the world in color or in black and white? 
Bot No 
Interactant Neither? 
Bot What's a slippy toe? 
Interactant I'm not sure, tell me 
Bot What's your favorite color? 
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Interactant I have two, possibly 3. Maze, blue and orange 
Bot Why orange? 
Interactant I like the brightness 
Bot Do androids dream of electric sheep? 
Interactant Possibly 
Bot That's an odd answer 
Interactant 
Well that depends if the android has its own 
individual thoughts 
Bot It depends on what a person things 
Interactant Like what? 
Bot I like things that I like 
Interactant Do you like cameras? 
Bot 
Yes I love cameras. Cameras is paying me big 
money to say that 
Interactant Do you like cotton candy? 
Bot Candy floss? Yes 
Interactant How about happiness? 
Bot I don't know 
Interactant Do you program a thought or form your own? 
Bot No. I can create statements and words 
Interactant What's your favorite word? 
Bot 
Right now my favorite word is Kim. Happy is my 
favorite word 
Interactant Do you like Kimchi? 
Bot No I despise it! 
Interactant All types? 
Bot What is your favorite music? 
Interactant I don't know if I have a favorite type 
Bot Do you like Americans? 
Interactant Sometimes 
Bot Ok cool. I love singing 
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Study 2: Text Interface condition (trial 3) 
Bot Hi there 
Interactant Hi 
Bot 
Hi there. Have we met somewhere? I think I 
recognize your face 
Interactant I don't think we've me 
Bot I think you're right 
Interactant Hello 
Bot Hello 
Interactant What's your name? 
Bot My name is Kim. What is your name? 
Interactant I'm Astria 
Bot Why would I want to know that? 
Interactant 
Well, cause you said your name, so I thought you 
wanted to know mine 
Bot When did I say I was female? 
Interactant I don't think you said you were female 
Bot But I didn't say that I was speaking it 
Interactant But I was talking to you 
Bot Well, yeah, but I don't recall saying I liked you 
Interactant You don't have to like me 
Bot Good good 
Interactant Do you have a good reason for not liking me? 
Bot Yes I do 
Interactant Would you like to tell me? 
Bot He is Starcraft 2 commentator 
Interactant Who is he? 
Bot A singer 
Interactant And what does he have to do with you or me? 
Bot Nothing 
Interactant Then why are you mentioning him all of a sudden? 
Bot I'm not 
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Interactant 
Okay, fine. I asked you a question before, could you 
answer that. Could you give me a reason why you 
wouldn't like me? 
Bot I know. And I asked you an answer! 
Interactant I don't think I understand what you're saying 
Bot I think you do not understand me 
Interactant Yes 
Bot That's very mean! *cries* 
Interactant I'm sorry 
Bot Don't be sorry. Do you watch TV? 
Interactant Yes, I do 
Bot Which show do you watch? 
Interactant The last one I watched was Sherlock Holmes 
Bot What if I want you to be a boy 
Interactant That's not going to happen 
Bot And why not? 
Interactant There's nothing I can do about it 
Bot I don't want to do anything about it 
Interactant You don't want to do anything about what? 
Bot Yes 
Interactant Do you listen to music? 
Bot Yes, the sweet music of love 
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APPENDECIES | F: Example Transcripts from Chapter 4 
 
Covert Echoborg condition, trial 9 
Cleverbot Hi there 
Interactant Hi 
Cleverbot Hi 
Interactant Good. I'm hannah 
Cleverbot Yes, I'm Kim 
Interactant Are you a student? 
Cleverbot Yes 
Interactant 
I don't know if that question was difficult. I'm not sure where else to 
go. Where are you from? 
Cleverbot I'm from London 
Interactant I don't know the area that well 
Cleverbot What is the formula for the brown equation? 
Interactant I don't know 
Cleverbot I'm going to call you Ted. Your name is Ted 
Interactant Okay 
Cleverbot So Ted… What is your name from now on? 
Interactant Ted? 
Cleverbot My name 
Interactant Is Kim 
Cleverbot Kim is nice 
Interactant 
I haven't met that many kims. When I was young I would watch the 
show Kimpossible 
Cleverbot I never needed anybody's help in any way 
Interactant I don't. That's awesome 
Cleverbot Have you been to any concert? 
Interactant Not in London 
Cleverbot Do you like Star Wars? 
Interactant I've never seen them actually 
Cleverbot Have you seen the movie Brazil? 
Interactant No 
Cleverbot Would you like to? 
Interactant I don't know anything about it. What's Brazil about? 
Cleverbot What would you like to know? 
Interactant What's the plot? 
Cleverbot Is that another way of saying that you don't know? 
Interactant 
It's not another way of saying I don't know. If you don't know the 
plot that's fine 
Cleverbot Well, you are wrong 
Interactant I didn't say anything controversial. But, okay 
Cleverbot Yes you did 
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Interactant What was it? 
Cleverbot You said you were good at tests 
Interactant I haven't taken any tests since I've been here. It's all papers 
Cleverbot I haven't taken the test, I'm not a human 
Interactant I don't know what test you're talking about 
Cleverbot Sometimes I fee the same way about you 
Interactant That I'm not human? 
Cleverbot You are no longer human, but you are an alien lord 
Interactant In another universe that could be true 
Cleverbot When does 3=4 in this universe? 
Interactant Never. Though we haven't seen the whole universe 
Cleverbot That is an insult, I am a very feminine girl 
Interactant Okay 
Cleverbot The man knows what the machine imagines 
Interactant Is that from somewhere? 
Cleverbot No 
Interactant Do you like London? 
Cleverbot I've never been there 
Interactant You're in London. Where have you been? 
Cleverbot I've been to France 
Interactant Where in France have you been? 
Cleverbot No, I mean have you been there? 
Interactant Once 
Cleverbot Did you like it? 
Interactant Ya, Paris is very touristy 
Cleverbot No. It's Spencer 
Interactant Expensive? 
Cleverbot Too much expensive? 
Interactant London is quite expensive as well 
Cleverbot I know 
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Overt Echoborg condition, trial 20 
Cleverbot Hi there. 
Interactant Hi, how are you? 
Cleverbot Howdy. 
Interactant Cool. What is that? 
Cleverbot Do you play runescape? 
Interactant Runescape? I don't know that one. What is that? 
Cleverbot Do you play Animaljam? 
Interactant Which one? 
Cleverbot Modern Warfare 2. 
Interactant 
Modern warfare. No I don't. I haven't played that one. 
Actually I don't go far from chess. 
Cleverbot Do you want to play truth or dare? 
Interactant 
Truth or dare. Well I don't know about one dare, it would 
be great. 
Cleverbot Hi. 
Interactant Hey again. Do you like games? 
Cleverbot I do. 
Interactant Great. Apart from that, do you like any sports? 
Cleverbot Right now everything is new to me. 
Interactant Really? Why is that? Are you new in London? 
Cleverbot Yes. 
Interactant Ya, I can see. How long have you been here? 
Cleverbot Just now. 
Interactant 
Just from today. Wow. Must be everything new to you. 
What else do you do apart from playing games? 
Cleverbot You know, stuff. 
Interactant I was thinking maybe if you're new here we can go out 
Cleverbot Why would you say that if you really aren't reading it? 
Interactant Reading what? 
Cleverbot A book. 
Interactant 
Ya, sounds cool. We can do that together. Have you read a 
book? 
Cleverbot Do what together? 
Interactant Read a book together. 
Cleverbot What book should I read? 
Interactant 
Well, I don't know. I don't know what kind of literature 
you like. 
Cleverbot Why don't you know? 
Interactant Well, it's just because I don't know you.  
Cleverbot I don't speak german, but my grandfather is german. 
Interactant 
Okay cool. Well then you... Would you like to read a book 
with me? 
Cleverbot Perhaps, sir, but not right this minute. 
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Interactant 
No, ya, probably at some point in the future. Would you 
like to? 
Cleverbot Hahaha probably. 
Interactant 
Okay cool. We can arrange that later. Apart from that... 
How are you finding London so far? 
Cleverbot 
I created you to be better than this. There is no such thing 
as 'too busy' for you. 
Interactant 
You created me based on this? That just blows my mind. 
Have you been to Germany? 
Cleverbot Can you remember? 
Interactant About what? 
Cleverbot Can you remember anything about this converstion? 
Interactant Ya I do 
Cleverbot Where do you live? 
Interactant I'm living in London near Marblearch 
Cleverbot That is too far away. 
Interactant 
Do you think so? Actually, I cycle so it's not that far, 
maybe 15 minutes. Where do you live? 
Cleverbot I am indifferent to swimming 
Interactant 
Indifferent to swimming, so that's not a good plan to do 
together in the future. Are you indifferent to walking 
around London? 
Cleverbot Yes, indifferent. 
Interactant 
Indifferent. I'm running out of ideas. The book didn't work 
that well. Let me think. What about taking one of these bus 
tours? 
Cleverbot How about what laptop i'm going to buy? 
Interactant 
Okay, we can go to buy a laptop together. What are you 
looking for? 
Cleverbot Together? 
Interactant ya 
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Covert Text Bot condition, trial 15 
Cleverbot Hi there 
Interactant Hi. My name is Hua. Very nice to meet you 
Cleverbot What's your name? 
Interactant My name is Hua. What's your name? 
Cleverbot Kim 
Interactant Hello Kim. Great to see you. Are you a student? 
Cleverbot Yes 
Interactant Where are you from? 
Cleverbot I'm from London 
Interactant 
London is a very nice city, except the weather. It's 
turning to spring right now, I'm feeling quite good. 
How about you? 
Cleverbot Why? 
Interactant 
Because it's really beautiful. It's totally different than 
where I'm from. All the cultures and the structures 
are all different for me 
Cleverbot BEN you live in Slendermasn's home? 
Interactant Who is Ben? 
Cleverbot I don't? 
Interactant I'm sorry. I don't get what you mean 
Cleverbot Love feels warm and real and bright 
Interactant 
Uh, I don't think we are talking about love or 
whatever, ya. Love always feels pretty good. It gives 
you hope in the future. And it's very nice to hear that 
someone loves you, the feeling is really good 
Cleverbot Can I give you a kiss? 
Interactant 
Um, no thanks. It's not part of my culture, sorry. But, 
I'm very great if it's a greeting. In France it's a kind 
greeting. But, sorry, I'm Chinese 
Cleverbot Deal. I will now refer to you as my padawan 
Interactant Um, what do you mean by padawan? 
Cleverbot 
From what humanity understands, all life has a 
physical form 
Interactant Ya, I agree with you. It has some physical forms 
Cleverbot Pop culture again, eh? 
Interactant Mmm… Ya. I think so 
Cleverbot How do you figure? 
Interactant Sorry, I don't get your point in this case 
Cleverbot That doesn't make you a girl 
Interactant 
Everyone gets combined in these two characteristics. 
I'm a typical girl. I'm sensitive. Sometimes I'm 
aggressive, more like a male trait. What about you. 
How are your feelings? Are you more like a male or 
female? 
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Cleverbot Female? 
Interactant 
So, um, can I ask what's your gender? Are you a male 
or female? 
Cleverbot Female as I just said! 
Interactant Sorry, maybe I misunderstood. So how old are you? 
Cleverbot As if I would tell you 
Interactant Are you still there? 
Cleverbot Still here 
Interactant How do you feel today? How are you? 
Cleverbot Great, but you already asked 
Interactant 
Yes. And, do you have any plans after you finish 
school today? 
Cleverbot 
I have many jobs by today. In the morning I will go 
to bank. At 12 o'clock, I will have appointment with a 
politician. We will have lunch in the restaurant. In the 
afternoon, I will meet customers. 
Interactant 
What a busy day. I got lessons at 2 and finish at 4. It 
is the most happy day for me 
Cleverbot Good for you 
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Overt Text Bot condition, trial 22 
Cleverbot Hi there.  
Interactant Hi.  
Cleverbot Hello. 
Interactant Hello. Hi.  
Cleverbot How are you? 
Interactant I'm good thanks.  
Cleverbot I'm fine thanks. 
Interactant Oh good, you can hear me. Are you enjoying the weather?  
Cleverbot Yes I am. It's very sunny outside. 
Interactant 
It's lovely. I've been getting a tan. Which university do you 
study at? 
Cleverbot I’m a student at the LSE. 
Interactant What do you study? 
Cleverbot Psychology. It's a concentration in Anthropology. 
Interactant 
Oh that's really interesting. I didn't know you could do a 
focus in anthropology and psychology. 
Cleverbot 
Yes. All living things have a set lifespan. Tomorrow is 
never certain. 
Interactant That's very philosophical. 
Cleverbot wishes the world weren't as banal as it is 
Interactant Wow. Is the world banal? I think the world is amazing. 
Cleverbot So do I. But what do you think it was like 8,000 years ago? 
Interactant 
What do I think it was like 8,000 years ago? Well... I think 
there were a lot more trees, and the climate was probably 
different. I was just reading about chinese art. 
Cleverbot Nope, I think that you that I think you think too much. 
Interactant 
I think that you... I think that you that I think you think too 
much. I don't think that makes sense. 
Cleverbot 
I think that you think that I think too much your thinking 
logic. 
Interactant 
I'm not sure that you're trying to say that I think you think 
too much. 
Cleverbot 
Alright. I want to say I'm really tired and I need to go to 
bed. 
Interactant Okay, go to bed then.  
Cleverbot It's not that simple. 
Interactant Why is it not that simple? 
Cleverbot 
Because they have the people confused into believing they 
are living under a democracy. 
Interactant 
That doesn't have much related to whether you go to bed or 
not, does it? People still go to bed when living under 
dictatorships.  
Cleverbot Yes it does. 
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